






Micro-Mobilization Processes during Civil 
Wars: The Case of the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka 
 
 
PhD thesis submitted by  
Larissa Daria Meier 
Instituto di Scienze Umane e Sociali, Scuola Normale Superiore, Firenze, Italia 
Larissa Meier, Scuola Normale Superiore, Palazzo Strozzi, Piazza degli Strozzi, 50123 




Table of Contents 
1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 6 
1.1 Analysing Micro-Mobilization Processes during Civil Wars .................................................. 8 
1.2 The Case – Why the Sri Lankan Civil War? ......................................................................... 11 
1.3 Outline of Remaining Chapters ............................................................................................. 14 
2 A Dynamic and Multi-Dimensional Understanding of Mobilization during Civil 
War .......................................................................................................................................... 16 
2.1 Mobilization during Civil War – the State of the Art in the Field ......................................... 16 
2.1.1 The Structuralist Approach............................................................................................ 17 
2.1.2 The Rationalist Approach .............................................................................................. 20 
2.1.3 The Identity based Approach......................................................................................... 23 
2.1.4 Attempts to develop Integrated Approaches ................................................................. 25 
2.2 Adopting a Dynamic and Multi-Dimensional Approach to Mobilization during Civil War. 29 
2.2.1 Why focusing on the Micro-level? ................................................................................ 30 
2.2.2 Developing a Dynamic and Multi-Dimensional Framework to Mobilization ............... 31 
3 Methodological Approach and Challenges ................................................................... 43 
3.1 Data Sources and Data Collection ......................................................................................... 43 
3.2 Challenges and Potential Data Biases ................................................................................... 49 
3.3 Sampling and Selection of Research Areas ........................................................................... 53 
3.4 Processes of Memory Formation ........................................................................................... 56 
3.5 Data Analysis and Theoretical Contribution ......................................................................... 58 
4 The Sri Lankan Civil War and the LTTE`s Struggle for an Independent State ...... 61 
4.1 Conflict Antecedents ............................................................................................................. 61 
4.2 Escalation and Evolvement of the Armed Conflict ............................................................... 65 
4.3 Failure of Peace Negotiations and Defeat of the LTTE ........................................................ 67 
4.4 The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam – Ideational and Organizational Characteristics ...... 69 
4.4.1 The LTTE`s Political Program and Symbolic Struggle ................................................. 69 
4.4.2 The LTTE as a Military Organization – Structure and Recruitment ............................. 74 
4.4.3 LTTE as De Facto State ................................................................................................ 77 
4.5 Securitization and Reintegration of Tamil Combatants ........................................................ 81 
5 Joining the LTTE – Pathways to Militant Activism .................................................... 85 
2 
 
5.1 Territory and Control during Civil Wars ............................................................................... 86 
5.2 A Typology of Mobilization Areas ....................................................................................... 88 
5.3 Some Chapter-specific Notes on Methodology ..................................................................... 92 
5.4 How Socio-Political Contexts Shape Mobilization Paths ..................................................... 93 
5.4.1 Militarization and Everyday Lives in Rebel Controlled Areas ..................................... 94 
5.4.2 The Disruption of Routines in Contested Areas ............................................................ 98 
5.4.3 Securitization and Alienation in Government Controlled Areas ................................. 101 
5.5 Discussion and Conclusion ................................................................................................. 104 
6 Recruiting an Army: Strategies employed by the LTTE to recruit Members ........ 108 
6.1 Recruitment, Emotions and Armed Conflict ....................................................................... 109 
6.2 Analyzing the Strategic Use of Emotions in Recruitment – An Analytical Framework ..... 111 
6.3 Analyzing the LTTE`s Use of Emotions in Recruitment Strategies.................................... 116 
6.3.1 Mobilizing Support for the Armed Struggle – Resentment and Polarization .............. 117 
6.3.2 Provoking Anger and Shame – Pushing Youngsters to Take up Arms ....................... 120 
6.4 Discussion and Conclusion ................................................................................................. 124 
7 Socialization into Militancy: Explaining Commitment in Armed Groups .............. 128 
7.1 Theories of Combat Motivation and Retention ................................................................... 130 
7.2 Theorizing Sustained Participation in Armed Groups through Socialization ..................... 133 
7.3 Analyzing Sustained Participation in Armed Groups.......................................................... 137 
7.3.1 Politicization ................................................................................................................ 138 
7.3.2 Identification ............................................................................................................... 140 
7.3.3 Empowerment ............................................................................................................. 144 
7.4 Discussion and Conclusion ................................................................................................. 146 
8 Variation in Perceptions of Violence and Support for Armed Groups ................... 151 
8.1 Violence, Wartime Attitudes and Popular Support ............................................................. 152 
8.2 Mechanisms that Shape Perception of Violence ................................................................. 155 
8.3 Civilian Perception of Violence and Popular Support ........................................................ 159 
8.3.1 Polarization and the Perception of Violence Against Civilians................................... 159 
8.3.2 The LTTE as the “only” Representative of Tamils – Solidarity and Moral Pressure . 163 
8.3.3 Institutionalization – Predictability, Efficiency and the Acceptance of Violence ....... 165 
8.3.4 The Enduring Shadow of Violence – Desensitization and Suppression of Criticism . 170 




9 Turning back to Civilian Lives – Ex-Combatant Experiences ................................. 176 
9.1 Adding Diversity to the Analysis of Disengagement Trajectories ...................................... 178 
9.2 Integrating Diversity: An Intersectional Approach to the Study of Disengagement ........... 182 
9.3 Analyzing the Diversity of Disengagement Trajectories .................................................... 184 
9.3.1 Disengagement and Marginalization – The Social Arena ........................................... 184 
9.3.2 Disengagement and Poverty – The Economic Arena .................................................. 190 
9.4 Discussion and Conclusion ................................................................................................. 194 
10 Some Concluding Reflections ....................................................................................... 198 
10.1 Mobilization and Emotions ................................................................................................. 205 
10.2 Mobilization and Networks ................................................................................................. 206 
10.3 Mobilization and Territory .................................................................................................. 208 
10.4 Mobilization and Repression ............................................................................................... 210 
11 The Sri Lankan Civil War – A Chronology of Key Events....................................... 213 
12 Overview Interviews Conducted ................................................................................. 216 




List of Figures  
 
Figure 1 Territorial Control during the Sri Lankan Civil War Page 13 




List of Abbreviations 
 
LTTE  Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
FP  Federal Party 
IPKF  Indian Peacekeeping Force 
PTA  Prevention of Terrorism Act 
SLA  Sri Lankan Army 
SLFP  Sri Lanka Freedom Party 
SOLT  Student Organization of Liberation Tigers 
TNT  Tamil National Tigers 







How and when do individuals join and/or support armed groups? What motivates them to 
remain fighting and how do they experience their return to civilian lives once they have left 
armed groups? These questions – particularly the first one – are far from new. A range of 
scholars, using various theoretical and methodological approaches, has analyzed and tried to 
explain mobilization during civil wars. Nevertheless, there is little consensus among scholars 
about how to study mobilization and, consequently, about which factors are most 
consequential in shaping militant activism.  
While existing approaches differ in many regards, they share two common characteristics 
that, as this dissertation will argue, limit our understanding of violent activism. First, most 
frameworks focus on pre-given characteristics at different levels of analysis, such as structural 
conditions (poverty, inequality, natural resources etc.), group characteristics (ethnic or 
religious affiliation, ideologies etc.) or individual motivations (greed, grievances etc.) to 
explain mobilization into militancy. They, however, tell us little about the process through 
which these characteristics get activated, that is to say gain relevance for collective action, nor 
how they are transformed during the course of the conflict and how these transformations in 
their turn reshape mobilization. Second, most – though not all – existing approaches favor 
mono-causal explanations and thus concentrate on either, structural, group-level or individual 
explanations for militant activism. Thereby, they provide insights into some aspects of 
mobilization but neglect other equally relevant dimensions.   
My first central objective in this dissertation is thus to propose a dynamic and multi-
dimensional approach to micro-mobilization dynamics during civil wars, which, I believe, is 
better able to capture the empirical reality of militant activists. There are two main reasons for 
this. First, such an approach allows to analyze and explain variation in activist experiences. 
As I will show in the following chapters, there is no single cause or a common set of factors 
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that can explain the militant trajectories of all of the former members of the Liberation Tigers 
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) I interviewed for this dissertation. Although they joined the same 
armed group, LTTE militants followed different paths to militancy, remained fighting for 
different reasons and made different experiences when returning to civilian lives. Moreover, 
militant trajectories are rarely individual trajectories. That is to say, my respondents did not 
turn to violence or kept fighting all on their own. Rather, their trajectories were deeply 
embedded in and shaped by networks and the local socio-political contexts where they 
mobilized. Militant activism can thus neither be explained solely by reference to motivations 
and characteristics inherent to individuals or groups, nor by focusing only on conflict 
generating structures. Rather, we need a multi-dimensional framework which understands 
militant activism as resulting from the interplay of motivations, group processes and 
contextual factors, thereby integrating different levels of analysis whose influence on 
mobilization has often been analyzed independent from each other.   
Achieving this first goal requires prioritizing the voices of those tens of thousands of Tamils 
who constituted the rank and file members of the LTTE – the armed group that has been 
fighting for an independent Tamil state for nearly three decades (1983-2008) – or who have 
lived in the midst of the Sri Lankan civil war. My second goal in this dissertation is thus to 
give voice to the experiences of some of these Tamil men and women whose lives have been 
deeply embedded in the armed conflict and whose agency has contributed significantly to 
shape its development. In order to capture the conflict experiences of this Tamil men and 
women, I have conducted 47 life history interviews with former members of the LTTE and 
with Tamil civilians who have lived in areas affected by the civil war. The empirical material 
this dissertation is based on results predominately from these long conversations which 
provide rich data about the actions, experiences and thinking of my interviewees and allow 
me to analyse their mobilization paths over the course of the Sri Lankan civil war, from their 
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participation, to their time within the LTTE and their return to civilian life (for militants), to 
their conflict experience and relation to conflict actors (for civilians). 
Prioritizing and collecting the experiences of rank and file members of armed groups is rare in 
the literature. Most accounts of civil wars concentrate either on official documents or texts 
produced by armed groups or they focus on the actions and experiences of armed group 
leaders and senior members (Viterna 2013; Wood 2003). However, as I will show in the 
following chapters, focusing on micro-level data about militant trajectories of militant 
activists is particularly fruitful to explore variation in activists’ experiences and to understand 
how these variations are themselves rooted in broader political, social and organizational 
contexts. A micro-level analysis of participants’ experiences thus not only improves our 
understanding of individual-level variations in activism but also extends and strengthens 
existing meso- and macro-level theories of mobilization during civil wars. 
1.1 Analysing Micro-Mobilization Processes during Civil Wars   
This dissertation focuses on understanding rather than explaining micro-mobilization 
processes during civil wars (Woods 1996). This means that less emphasis is placed on 
singling out causal variables and testing hypotheses on causal relationships. Since many 
causal factors are likely to be in operation in micro-mobilization processes, I consider it more 
relevant to understand how particular combinations of factors may account for when and how 
specific patterns unfold in the way they do for different groups of militant activists and how 
these patterns change over time and across space. The approach this dissertation takes to 
micro-mobilization thus seeks to trace key traits of mobilization patterns with an emphasis on 
singling out the different factors at play as well as on grasping their meaning for actors 
involved.   
In order to capture the dynamic and multi-dimensional nature of micro-mobilization 
dynamics, I draw from social movement theory and the contentious politics paradigm and 
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propose an analytical framework which understands mobilization as resulting from the 
interaction of individual motivations, group processes and contextual factors. Micro-
mobilization patterns can thus neither be explained solely by reference to motivations and 
characteristics inherent to individuals, nor by focusing only on conflict generating structures. 
Rather, individual motivations are created, sustained and transformed through interactions 
within networks and these interactions are, in their turn, influenced by socio-political 
contexts.  
This dissertation uses the concept of militant trajectory to analyse and understand the 
pathways militant activists follow during civil wars which I consider as particularly useful to 
capture the dynamic and multi-dimensional nature of micro-mobilization processes. It 
highlights the dynamic aspect of mobilization by stressing that militant activism has to be 
understood as a process rather than a punctual decision. A trajectory refers to the movements 
militant activists undertake during their career as activists. These movements may vary 
considerably between activists and might involve complex patterns of interactions (Torjesen 
2013; see also Bjorgo 2011; Horgan 2008). Moreover, the concept of militant trajectory 
subsumes different phases of militant activism which together are constitutive of a trajectory, 
namely participation (the path through which an individual joins an armed group), retention 
(the path through which an individual remains fighting) and disengagement (the path through 
which an individual returns to civilian life). To distinguish between these different stages is 
important to capture the dynamic nature of micro-mobilization as different mechanisms 
explain militant activism in different phases of an activist`s career.  
Exploring the trajectories of militant activists also allows to capture the multi-dimensional 
nature of micro-mobilization processes. It understands mobilization not as the result of 
individual motivations or structural factors alone but as shaped by the interplay of different 
factors (Torjesen 2013). Focusing on trajectories thus urges scholars to explore how 
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motivations for militant activism emerge and are influenced by the networks as well as the 
socio-political contexts activists are embedded in, thereby capturing the multi-dimensional 
nature of militant activism (Bosi and Della Porta 2012). 
While militant trajectory refers to those individuals who join an armed group and thus have 
been directly engaged in (organized) collective violence, I use the term support to refer to 
those individuals and social groups who aren’t members of an armed group but are connected 
to the group through dynamic patterns of mutual orientation and dependency (Malthaner 
2015). The empirical manifestation of support for armed groups can range from neutral 
cooperation, to silence (i.e. non-betrayal) to more active forms of support, such as offering 
food, shelter and information (ibid.; Arjona 2017; Schlichte and Schneckener 2015). Similar 
to militant trajectories, support relations between armed groups and civilians have to be 
understood as evolving over the course of the conflict and as resulting from individual 
motives, group processes and socio-political contexts, thus reflecting the multi-dimensional 
character of support.   
The dissertation concentrates on analysing and explaining micro-mobilization trajectories 
during and after civil wars. The focus on civil wars is particularly relevant given that since 
1945 the dominant form of large-scale violence has been civil wars. Although the annual 
number of extant civil wars (far larger than the number of interstate wars) peaked before the 
turn of the century, civil wars continue to inflict vast suffering – including displacement, 
sexual violence, and death – on millions of civilians each year (Wood 2015).  
A civil war constitutes a particular form of political violence and is commonly defined as an 
armed conflict that takes place within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign state and that 
involves at least two conflict parties who have been subject to a common authority at the 
outset of the hostilities (Kalyvas 2006). This definition stresses two components characteristic 
for a civil war: the involvement of at least two competing sides which are relatively well 
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organized (in order to distinguish civil wars from other forms of violence, such as communal 
riots, terrorism, crime, and genocide) and a domestic challenge directed against the authority 
of the current holder of sovereign authority (in order to distinguish civil wars from interstate 
war) (Kalyvas 2007: 416-417; Sambanis 2004: 829).  
Armed conflicts are often classified according to their intensity that is measured by reference 
to the number of battle-related deaths per year. Minor or low-intensity conflicts result in 25 to 
1,000 victims per annum, while full-blown civil wars cause a minimum of 1,000 battle-related 
deaths per calendar year (UCDP 2020; see also Sambanis 2004). There is legitimate criticism 
regarding the arbitrariness of the civil war threshold which leads to the exclusion of major 
conflicts that have never reached the threshold, as well as to problems regarding 
measurement.1 Moreover, a threshold artificially creates fixed categories where there is, in 
fact, a continuum. However, while I acknowledge these difficulties, I will still use the term 
civil war as it has been firmly established in the literature and the use of another concept 
would create unnecessary confusion and further contribute to the already existent 
fragmentation of the literature dealing with different forms of violence.  
1.2 The Case – Why the Sri Lankan Civil War? 
The methodology used for this PhD is a single in-depth case study. This method has several 
advantages which make it the most appropriate method to study mobilization during armed 
conflicts. First, the objective of this project is not to identify one single dimension or causal 
factor that explains mobilization; rather the aim is to analyse how different factors interact to 
shape militant activism. Focusing on a single case allows me to collect and analyse the rich 
empirical data which is needed to explore the interaction of factors operating in specific 
                                                 
1 Death tolls are more informative in proportion to the size of the community that the conflict affects than in absolute terms and absolute 
figures thus tell us relatively little about the actual intensity of the conflict. Moreover, correctly calculating the number of battle-related 
deaths is a challenge in conflict contexts due to lack of reliable information and data as well as attempts by conflict parties to conceal or 
even falsify the number of victims (Dixon 2009: 729-730). 
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contexts (Della Porta 2014; George and Bennett 2004). Moreover, a single case study allows 
for the investigation of variation in mechanisms at the sub-national level while controlling for 
many variables that can be held constant, such as group ideology, organizational structure, 
training regimes among others (Kalyvas 2008: 398). Finally, a single case-study is especially 
fruitful to explore how mobilization trajectories changes over time and to single out the 
factors that might account for these changes (Blee 2002).  
I decided to focus my project on the Sri Lankan civil war which I consider a crucial case to 
explore mobilization during and after armed conflicts for the following interrelated reasons. 
First, the LTTE succeeded in building and maintaining a highly cohesive fighting force, 
numbering from 3000 to 10`000 recruits, over almost three decades (Richards 2013). The case 
thus allows me to study the factors that shaped the motivations of many Tamils to join the 
LTTE and to investigate if and how mobilization paths varied over time and space (see 
below). Second, the fact that the LTTE was one of the most successful armed groups in terms 
of generating and maintaining a cohesive army over almost 30 years makes it a fascinating 
case to explore how recruits are socialized into a cohesive fighting force and what factors 
promote and/or inhibit sustained participation in armed groups. Third, the LTTE not only 
recruited and maintained an impressive army, the group was equally successful in mobilizing 
and maintaining considerable support for their armed struggle from the Tamil community 
living in different parts of Sri Lanka as well as abroad (Bose 1994; Lilja 2009). This despite 
the fact that the LTTE is also considered as a particular ruthless armed group that not only 
engaged in battles against the Sri Lankan armed forces but repeatedly targeted rival militant 
groups as well as Sinhalese and Tamil civilians (Thiranagama 2013b). The case thus allows 
me to investigate how the LTTE`s struggle was perceived by civilians and to explore the 
mechanisms that shape these perceptions. Furthermore, the literature on civil wars and 
political violence indicates that mobilization paths into militancy and forms of support 
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relations between armed groups and civilians vary over time as well as across space (Bosi and 
Della Porta 2012; Malthaner 2015; Viterna 2013). The Sri Lankan case, in turn, provides an 
interesting case to explore, first, variation over time as the existing empirical evidence 
suggests that supportive ties connecting the LTTE with their supportive environment as well 
as the recruitment strategies employed by the LTTE to mobilize fighters varied considerably 
over time (Lilja 2009; Thiranagama 2013a). The case thus allows me to study if and how 
mobilization trajectories as well as relations between the LTTE and civilians changed over the 
course of the conflict and what kind of factors affected these changes. 
 Figure 1: Territorial Control during the Sri Lankan Civil War Second, the LTTE managed to 
gain full control over some parts of 
the Sri Lankan territory while in 
other parts control remained 
contested between the LTTE, the 
Sri Lankan army and other armed 
and paramilitary groups (Fuglerud 
1999; Stokke 2006) (see Figure 1). 
The Sri Lankan case thus provides 
an equally fascinating laboratory to 
explore if and how different forms 
of territorial control shape 
mobilization paths and civilian 
perceptions of violence. Finally, 
there is one practical reason for choosing the Sri Lankan case, namely the timing of the 
conflict. I collected most of the data for this dissertation in 2018 and 2019, ten years after the 
LTTE was defeated in 2008. This allowed sufficient time to see how LTTE members 
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experienced their return to civilian lives after the end of the war, yet the conflict was not so 
long past that participants` wartime experience would be too difficult to recall (Viterna 2013).            
1.3 Outline of Remaining Chapters  
Following this introductory chapter, chapter 2 provides a critical discussion of existing 
approaches to analyze and explain mobilization during armed conflicts and proposes a 
dynamic and multi-dimensional approach to violent collective action that can help scholars to 
overcome some of the major shortcomings of existing approaches. This theoretical chapter is 
followed by a methodological one (chapter 3), where I describe the data gathering methods 
used for this PhD and discuss the challenges encountered during field research and data 
analysis. In chapter 4, I present a brief history of the Sri Lankan civil war, outlining the events 
and conflict dynamics relevant to understand mobilization patterns analyzed in the following 
empirical chapters.  
In the chapters 5 to 9, I focus on different phases of my respondents` militant trajectories and 
analyze their experiences at different stages of their militant careers. Chapter 5 investigated 
the mobilization paths my interviewees followed to militancy and argues that depending on 
where my interviewees lived during the civil war they experienced different everyday life 
contexts and therefore followed different paths to militancy. Chapter 6 deals with recruitment 
strategies employed by the LTTE to mobilize fighters and argues that emotions formed a 
crucial strategic resource used in their campaigns. In chapter 7, I investigate the mechanisms 
that motivated interviewees to keep fighting. While existing accounts tend to explain combat 
motivation with reference to one factor, I argue that it is the interplay of three mechanisms – 
identification, politicization and empowerment – which mutually reinforce each other, thereby 
sustaining combatants’ commitment over time. Chapter 8 deals with how violence exerted by 
the LTTE was perceived by Tamils civilians they claimed to fight for. It singles out the most 
relevant mechanisms that affect civilian perception of violence and illustrates how these 
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mechanisms – by influencing perceptions – shape supportive ties between the LTTE and their 
supportive constituency. In chapter 9, I turn to the trajectories my interviewees followed when 
returning to civilian lives. I posit that an intersectional approach is best suited to capture the 
variety of ex-combattants` experiences as well as to analyze the different dimensions relevant 
in shaping disengagement processes. Finally, in chapter 10, I summarize how a dynamic and 
multi-dimensional approach can improve scholarly understanding of mobilization and 
conclude with some reflection on how the findings of this dissertation could open up themes 
for further investigation.   
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2 A Dynamic and Multi-Dimensional Understanding of 
Mobilization during Civil War  
This chapter outlines the dynamic and multi-dimensional framework that guides the empirical 
analysis in the following chapters. It begins with a critical discussion of existing approaches 
to analyze and explain collective action during armed conflicts and points to the most 
important shortcomings of these frameworks. Then, I propose that adopting a dynamic and 
multi-dimensional approach can help to address some of these shortcomings and allows 
scholars to analyse variation in activist experiences as well as the relational and contextual 
embeddedness of militant activism.  
2.1 Mobilization during Civil War – the State of the Art in the Field  
There is a broad consensus, both among those practicing violence and among those 
researching armed conflicts, that popular support matters. If armed groups want to be 
successful in the long term, they have to convince enough individuals to join the group and to 
remain fighting as well as to mobilize support from their broader social environment (Gates 
2002; Malthaner 2011; Schlichte 2015; Wichham-Crowley 1992). It is therefore no surprise 
that the question of how militant groups solve the collective action problem2 and convince 
individuals to take part in their armed campaigns figures prominently in the literature on 
political violence. Nevertheless, there is little consensus among scholars about which causal 
factors are most important for generating popular mobilization during armed conflicts 
(Demmers 2016: Desrosiers 2015; Kalyvas 2007; Kriger 1992). This is not least due to the 
fact that violent collective action has been studied from a wide theoretical spectrum, using 
different analytical and methodological approaches to explain armed conflicts.  
                                                 
2 Most accounts on civil wars are based on the collective action problem, that is the lack of incentives for individuals to participate in 
mobilization for a common good as their individual action has normally no bearing on the provision of the good. Under these 
circumstances, every person's best move is to stay home and let someone else work for the public benefit—that is, free ride. 
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This section looks at the most relevant approaches and the explanations they provide for 
mobilization during armed conflict. Moreover, it discusses some of the major shortcomings of 
each approach and analyses how more recent frameworks have made important steps forward 
to address them by approaching violent collective action as a dynamic and multi-dimensional 
phenomenon.   
In an attempt to systematize existing approaches, it is helpful to distinguish between three 
main theoretical perspectives which have been most influential in explaining mobilization 
during civil wars and to discuss their central contributions and shortcomings: the structuralist, 
the rationalist, and the identity-based approach (Demmers 2016; Desrosiers 2015). However, 
it is important to note that these theoretical perspectives have to be understood as broad 
“umbrella approaches”, comprised of different sub-explanations bound by a set of core 
assumptions on which I will focus here.  
2.1.1 The Structuralist Approach  
The structuralist perspective to civil wars is predominately based on large-N cross-country 
analyses which aim to shed light on the motivations behind civil wars by assessing the so-
called “root causes” of armed conflicts (Dixon 2009; Kalyvas 2007; Wood 2015). Common to 
all these studies is that the identified structural conditions are understood as providing 
opportunities to initiate a civil war for the actors who intend to reach their goals through the 
use of armed force. Rather than explaining violent collective action from the point of view of 
those who perform a rebellion, large-N approaches thus are concerned with when, generally 
speaking, men are most likely to rebel (Demmers 2016, my emphasis). The factors included in 
these studies as conducive for the onset of civil wars are numerous and include economic, 
political, and/or geographic features of the country (rough territory, poverty, horizontal 
inequality, political exclusion, state weakness, the presence of natural resources, cultures of 
violence etc.) (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Dixon 2009; Henderson and Singer 2000; Fearon 
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and Laitin 2003; Gurr 2012). For example, Fearon and Laitin (2003) argue that the factors 
explaining which countries are at risk of civil war are not related to their ethnic or religious 
characteristics but rather to the conditions that favour insurgency. These include poverty – 
which marks financially and bureaucratically weak states and also favours rebel recruitment – 
political instability, rough terrain and large populations. It would take us too far to discuss the 
many internal debates about hypotheses, propositions and proxies and to review the various 
sets of factors that are distinguished as explaining rebellion (for a good overview, see Dixon 
2009). It suffices here to remind that through a careful testing of a series of hypotheses, large-
N approaches try to produce general explanations about the likelihood of civil war onset in 
any country.  
The first major problem with this type of analysis is that large-N approaches make empirical 
generalizations about causes, that is to say they examine how the existence of an armed 
conflict (the output variable) co-varies with a range of potential factors conducive for violence 
(input variables), without saying much about the complex causal chains that link identified 
conditions with armed mobilization (Cederman, Wimmer and Min 2010; Desrosiers 2012; 
Goodwin 2004; Tang 2015). For example, even though the relationship between conflict onset 
and natural resources remains statistically robust across many studies, these results tell us 
little about when and how the existence of natural resources lead to violence. As Ballentine 
and Sherman (2003: 4-5) conclude in their volume The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: 
Beyond Greed and Grievance?: “While there is growing agreement that economic factors 
matter to conflict dynamics, there is little consensus as to how they matter, how much they 
matter, or in what ways” (emphasis added). Moreover, if large-N works provide theoretical 
hypothesis about the mechanisms linking structural conditions to violent activism, they often 
suffer from a lack of empirical validation for the micro foundations suggested (Cramer 2003). 
For example, the correlation of high levels of poverty with the onset of civil wars can be 
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interpreted as the result of “greed” or “grievance”, that is to say, it tells us little about the 
actual motives of those individuals who engage in militancy: do they join because they expect 
material benefits from fighting and intend to improve their economic standing (greed) or 
rather out of resentment about the inequality that characterizes society (grievances)? 
 A second major problem with structuralist approaches concerns the neglect of human agency 
(Jackson and Dexter 2014). While actors are occasionally referred to, they are not 
systematically included in the analysis. Instead, civil war appears to be the inevitable result of 
structural variables. However, the use of force requires choices and interactions by individuals 
or collective actors. Particularly the strategies of armed groups have a decisive impact upon if 
and how militancy emerges and is sustained (ibid.; Bakony & Bliesemann De Guevara 2009; 
Eck 2009).  
The lack of attention to agency results in at least two pitfalls. First, macro-approaches tell us 
little about the timing of rebellion (Granzow, Hasenclever and Sändig: 2015; Lawrence and 
Chenoweth 2010; Tang 2015). In most cases poverty and/or inequality have been a conditions 
present for many decades and thus tells us little about when – the particular moment – a 
conflict breaks out as well as how – through what kind of mechanisms – mobilization occurs. 
We thus lack understanding of how and when root causes are “activated” (Tarrow 2007). As 
Tarrow notes (2007: 589) collective violence is most of the time the outcome of a longer 
process of interactions between individuals and groups who react upon changes in their socio-
political environment. Furthermore, actors` motives are not fixed; often the reasons why 
groups initiate a rebellion diverge from the causes that lead them to continue fighting (Gates 
2002, 2017). As Kalyvas (2006) notes, once the conflict escalates, the persistence of violence 
is an endogenous process as armed conflict often produces the mechanisms which then fuel it. 
This is particularly true for polarized (ethnic) identities. While relevant in most armed 
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conflicts, polarization and the animosity between groups is often the outcome of violence 
rather than its cause (Bakony and Bliesemann De Guevara 2009). 
Furthermore, the neglect of agency also results in a second shortcoming related with the fact 
that the root causes for civil wars are much more widespread than are armed conflicts. Why 
do we see violence in certain poor countries but not in others? Structural approaches are 
ultimately unable to account for cases where armed conflicts are absent or violence doesn’t 
escalate into a full-fledged war despite the presence of one or more of the identified root 
causes of violence (Alimi, Demetriou and Bosi 2015; Jackson and Dexter 2014). Again, 
paying attention to activists and groups who activate structural conditions and mobilize 
people into collective violence are crucial to explain why poverty can contribute to the 
escalation of violence in some countries plagued by poverty but not in others (Granzow, 
Hasenclever and Sändig: 2015). In sum, to lead to action, context must acquire meaning, in 
particular social meaning, which is unaccounted for, at least in a clear and explicit manner, in 
structuralist works.  
2.1.2 The Rationalist Approach 
In contrast to structuralist approaches, the rationalist perspective starts from the strategic 
calculations of individuals and groups. Although the meaning and degree of rationality 
ascribed to actors varies, rationalist explanations posit that actors are fundamentally 
instrumental (Demmers 2016). Violence is therefore understood as the result of rational 
calculations that render violence more “desirable” than peaceful mobilization (Desrosiers 
2015). There are two main versions of the rationalist argument: the first one focuses on elites 
trying to take advantage of violent turmoil to maintain or gain power (the instrumentalist 
approach) while the second one is more concerned with why war is rational from a “normal” 
individual`s perspective. At the core of elite theories of civil wars is the assumption that 
violence is functional, that is to say, it is deliberately planned and orchestrated by elites to 
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increase group cohesion and build a loyal support base (Demmers 2016). Although they are 
heterogeneous, elite centred approaches generally posit that politicians of group leaders who 
fear to lose power or see a potential to enhance their status – often in situations of regime 
change or state collapse – use propaganda to steer social polarization and evoke violent 
emotions among their followers against a perceived opponent (Brass 1997; Gagnon 
1994/1995; Lake and Rothchild 1996; Tambiah 1996). A classic example is that of elites who, 
when confronted with systemic changes beyond their control, try to divert public attention 
from political issues to identity based appeals. In other words, elites play the ethnic or 
religious card by mobilizing their “own” group while scapegoating the “out-group”. Thereby, 
they deepen polarization between social groups and construct threat images which then justify 
violence to counter these threats (De Figueiredo and Weingast 1999).3  
While elite centred-rationalist models tell us more about (elite) motivations behind armed 
conflicts and the processes which lead to violence, they have little to say about the “popular” 
side of violence, that is to say about the complex processes by which ideas and perceptions 
are negotiated, debated, and eventually accepted to become drivers of action (Desrosiers 
2015; King 2004: 435). Rather rationalist models tend to presume the “groupness” of ethnic, 
religious or linguistic groups and to assume that ethnocentric rhetoric is easily bought into by 
“the masses” (Demmers 2016: 30; Fearon and Laitin 2000). Publics thus appear as passive 
actors that receive and internalize hostile beliefs and feelings with little room for autonomous 
agency and without considering that people – as Kalyvas (2003) has persuasively argued – 
often are not so much following as pursuing their own local agendas not directly related to the 
master cleavage (here ethnic hostility).  
                                                 
3 Alternative rationalist explanations for civil war onset focus more on a group perspective and use dyadic models to explain the onset of 
violence. According to this perspective violence mostly results from problems of credible commitment and information failure – so 




This criticism brings us to the second perspective which focuses on the instrumental 
motivations of individuals to engage in violence.4 This perspective gained prominence in the 
civil war literature mainly through an influential World Bank report named Breaking the 
Conflict Trap which was published by David Collier and colleagues in 2003 and which gave 
rise to the so-called “greed theory” of civil wars and marked the beginning of the proliferation 
of economic explanations to armed conflict. Rejecting the widely held assumption that 
grievances resulting from economic inequality cause rebellion, the authors postulate that it is 
greed not grievances which lead individuals to participate in violence. According to their 
model, if there is a large proportion of young men in a society who have limited prospects of 
sustaining themselves financially and there is plenty of opportunity for economic gain by 
looting primary commodities then civil wars are more likely to occur than in countries with 
opposite characteristics.  
The authors build upon a rational choice approach to human behaviour and highlight the role 
played by cost benefit calculations in leading individuals to fight. Rebels weigh the expected 
economic benefits of joining a rebellion against those that follow from a safer, normal life. 
When militancy offers benefits, such as financial gains through looting, the escape from 
poverty and unemployment etc., mass mobilization becomes likely. Militants are thus 
assumed to be motivated mainly by greed, that is to say by the interest in private material 
gains, rather than communal benefits, ideologies, beliefs, or social ties.  
The attempt to explain civil war mobilization by focusing on one explanatory factor while, at 
the same time, rejecting the relevance of others is of course problematic (Gates 2002, Jackson 
and Dexter 2014; Macartan and Weinstein 2008). While the greed argument moved the 
literature forward in the sense that it stressed the relevance of the economic dimension of civil 
                                                 
4 While the rationalist, economic based perspective gained prominence with Collier`s work, earlier studies by Popkin (1979) and Lichbach 
(1995) have provided rationalist based explanations for violent activism based on Olsen`s (1965) collective action problem and argued 
that selective incentives provided by armed groups are crucial in motivating individuals to support or join an armed campaign.  
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wars, a range of studies have shown that economic factors do indeed matter but they matter in 
interaction with other equally relevant dimensions. For example, in their edited volume, 
Ballentine and Sherman (2003) compiled qualitative case studies that specifically analysed 
the role of economic factors regarding conflict onset, duration, and character of armed conflict 
in various regions. The contributions reveal that economic factors were neither the only, nor 
the most important factors for the eruption of armed conflicts in the given examples, but 
rather highlight the multi-dimensional, evolving, and complex character of conflict dynamics. 
Furthermore, a broad range of case studies provide examples of highly committed individuals 
fighting for no apparent or immediate economic benefit. People fight for their communities, 
for their ideas, to gain back dignity or to take revenge, among other reasons. There is thus 
ample evidence of people failing to free-ride, and individuals sticking to solidary behaviour or 
what they consider morally just action (Bosi and Della Porta 2012; Petersen 2001; Wood 
2003; Viterna 2013). The overestimation of economic factors thus neglects and distorts much 
of the complexity of social reality as interactions with other variables, such as state structures, 
identity, emotions etc. are not taken into consideration. Finally, as has been noted already 
with regard to structuralist models, Collier’s proxies to measure greed might just as well be 
used to measure grievance. For example, a lack of education might block the way to gainful 
employment and, therefore, reveal a low opportunity cost for conflict but it might just as well 
be a source of anger and indignation (Demmers 2016). 
2.1.3 The Identity based Approach 
Identity based approaches to civil wars mainly try to shed light on why publics support and 
engage in violent activism. Works in this tradition primarily focus on inter- and intra-group 
dynamics resulting in polarized group identities and hostile feelings against the out-group to 
explain violent collective action. While scholars from a social-psychological perspective 
focus more on the innate human desire for self-esteem that sometimes produces escalatory 
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group dynamics – from comparison to competition – which then results in violence (Tajfel 
and Turner 1986), more cultural oriented works stress the importance of so-called symbolic 
myths that justify hostility and promote fears of group extinction as the central causes of 
violent mobilization. The more groups can rely on a glorious, well-documented past (of 
heroism and sacrifice); on a sacred mission as a Chosen People with a special contract to God; 
and on the common imagination of an ancestral homeland, the greater their capacity for 
sustained collective violence (Kaufmann 2001, 2006).  
The problem with both of these perspectives is that either the natural human need for social 
identification or so called ‘predatory myths’ that are also seen as almost naturally grown out 
of societies, are considered as the basic drivers of violence. Individuals thus seem to mobilize 
“naturally” once their group identity is recognized as threatened and violated (Demmers 
2016). In other words, identity based approaches give little insight into how changes in 
interpretations occur, and in particular what rhetoric contributes to form and police perceived 
impermeable boundaries and social categories (Derosiers 2015). Rather, like structural 
conditions conducive for civil wars universal psychological mechanisms or the presence of 
myth about social groups are fairly stable over time and arguments focusing on these factors 
are thus unable to account for temporal variation (Lawrence and Chenoweth 2010).  Like 
regime type and geographical features, ethnic heterogeneity, settlement patterns, and 
historical conditions of inequality and discrimination are often fairly stable over time, and 
therefore tell us little about when we are likely to see violence begin.   
Moreover, the identity based perspective pays limited attention to how certain structural 
conditions promote and/or inhibit processes of group polarization and thereby contribute to 
collective violence (Desrosiers 2015). As with sructural approaches we can thus observe a 
tendency to over-empathize the explanatory power of certain factors at the expense of others, 
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such as economic and social explanations as well as structural conditions conducive to 
mobilization during armed conflict.  
2.1.4 Attempts to develop Integrated Approaches  
As a reaction to the mentioned shortcomings and the realisation that existing approaches 
highlight some important aspects of collective violence but fail to explain others, scholars 
increasingly try to develop more dynamic and complex understandings of mobilization during 
armed conflicts. In the field of civil war studies, a new research agenda – so-called micro-
approaches – has emerged that calls for the specification and testing of disaggregated causal 
pathways and mechanisms. Moreover, it urges scholars to take spatial and temporal variation 
of violence into account when studying different aspects of armed conflicts. And finally, 
micro–macro relationships are studied less through crossnational statistical analyses and more 
through integrated research designs that make intensive use of fine‐grained subnational 
data—quantitative as well as qualitative (Kalyvas 2008).  
Works using such a micro-perspective have led to what Wood (2008) calls the “opening up of 
the black box of civil war” and the analysis of the complex ways in which a violent campaign 
is articulated, emerges successfully, and is sustained and countered. With regard to collective 
action during war, the focus on micro-level dynamics has produced a range of interesting 
studies that provide novel insights into the dynamics that lead to mobilization into militancy. 
Most importantly, studies have started to integrate several (material and non-material) factors 
into their analysis and try to understand how the interplay of these factors make mobilization 
possible. For example, Costalli and Ruggeri (2015) analyse the process leading groups from 
acceptance of the status quo to armed mobilization by integrating emotions (indignation), 
radical ideologies and material factor into a comprehensive framework to analyse sub-national 
variation in mobilization during the civil war in Italy. Cederman, Wimmer and Min (2010) 
combine structural factors (political and economic inequalities and conflict histories) with 
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emotional responses (indignation and resentment about political domination and/or a loss of 
status) and organisations (ethnic networks) to explain why some ethnic conflicts escalate into 
violence while others don’t. And finally, Kaufmann`s (2001) symbolic politics theory 
integrates pre-conditions for violence – group myths justifying hostility, a popular fear of 
extinction and political opportunities (political space for collective action and a territorial base 
for rebels) – with mechanisms of escalation – chauvinist political mobilization or a security 
dilemma – that, in combination, fuel violence. Moreover, a range of works such as the ones 
by Wood (2003), Kalyvas (2006) and Shapiro and Masoud (2008) on the violent conflicts in 
El Salvador, Greece and India respectively empathize that violence does not occur uniformly 
across time and space; it comes to different cities, villages and neighbourhoods at different 
times and in a variety of forms (see also King 2004: 447). One can thus identify variations 
regarding the intensity of fighting (Kalyvas 2006), the degree and forms of rebel mobilization 
(Wood 2003) as well as the strength of local communities (Petersen 2001; Taylor 1998) 
across space and time. This, in turn, is important for the analysis of collective action during 
war as mobilization dynamics are strongly embedded within local settings (Arjona 2014; 
Petersen 2001). 
And finally, scholars increasingly use concepts from social movement studies and contentious 
politics to study armed conflicts and thereby point to aspects of mobilization neglected so far 
by the literature. Most importantly for this project, several studies have shown that it is not 
only the integration of multiple factors that helps to better capture processes of mobilization 
but that people who join militant movements follow different paths to militancy (Bosi 2012; 
Bosi and Della Porta 2012; Viterna 2013). As Viterna (2006) criticizes, by trying to singling 
out the one causal factor that leads to mobilization, scholars tend to portray militant activists 
as a homogenous group that shares the same motivations and/or environmental conditions 
which explain their mobilization. Empirically, however, several works have shown that 
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individuals who join, remain and leave armed groups follow different pathways to militancy. 
Viterna (2006; 2013) identifies three different paths that Salvadorian women followed 
towards guerilla activism during the civil war in El Salvador. She finds that each of these 
paths is the result of an interplay of specific biographical characteristics of the respondents, 
the networks relevant for mobilization as well as the situational context the women were 
living in. Similarly, Bosi and Della Porta (2012), in their comparative analysis of militants of 
the Provisional Irish Republican Army and the Red Brigades, show that activists followed 
different pathways towards militancy: the ideological, the instrumental and the solidaristic 
path. They show that each of the pathways identified is characterized by the reciprocal 
intersection of different dimensions (individual motivations, recruitment-related networks and 
political opportunities) operating at different levels of analysis (micro-, meso- and macro-) 
(See also Hwang and Schulze 2016).  
Moreover, several scholars have begun to adopt the concept of framing to bridge the ongoing 
micro-macro divide in civil war studies and to be better able to account for the timing of 
violence as well as to integrate a cultural dimension into the analysis of mobilization during 
armed conflicts. As the authors of the introductory chapter to a special issue about framing 
during civil wars argue (Granzow, Hasenclever and Sändig 2015: 114):  
In our understanding, framing – and the agency it involves – mediates between the structural conditions 
and the actual protest behaviour. To successfully mobilise, collective action frames need to tap into 
existing group discourses, appeal to group values and identities, and convincingly refer to empirically 
observable events. In other words, frames are connected to structural conditions, yet they are not 
determined by them. Instead, actors are assumed to possess agency in their strategic communication: 
based on their values and interests […] framers ‘select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them 
more salient in a communicating text‘. 
While there is an increasing number of scholars that adopt a cultural interpretative approach 
to study civil wars and emphasize the symbolism, discourse, and the emergent construction of 
violence, these works are still rare in collective violence research (Demmers 2016; Desrosiers 
2015; King 2004). This is problematic in the sense that a more interpretative approach would 
help scholars to better understand “how insurgents interpret their options, their roles in 
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bringing about regime change, their relations to each other, the opportunities and threats that 
present themselves, and the courses of action open to them” (Johnston 2015: 270).  
Recent developments by scholars who analyse violent collective action from different 
theoretical perspectives thus point to the fact that mobilization cannot be study as a unilineal 
phenomenon where one casual factor or a set of factors “typically” lead to militant activism.  
Rather, mobilization is a much more complex process in which multiple factors operating at 
different levels of analysis matter and interact to explain violent collective action. We thus 
first need a theoretical approach to mobilization that is able to integrate different factors 
relevant to explain militant activism. Moreover, the discussion of the shortcomings of existing 
frameworks has shown that motivations for violent collective action, such as group 
identification, emotions and/or interests, as well as the perceptions of structural conditions are 
often taken as given and consistent properties of individuals or groups instead of analysing 
how motives and perceptions are created in interactions among different conflict actors 
embedded in a specific local setting and how they are transformed as the conflict evolves.  
We thus need, second, an analytical perspective that is able to capture the emergent and 
interactive dimension of violent collective action. Finally, an aspect of mobilization during 
civil wars which is implicitly present in some of the discussed perspectives but which is rarely 
explicitly theorized is the interpretative dimension of violence. As scholars taking an 
“understanding position” to violence argue, the way people interpret conflict events and give 
meaning to the actions of different actors engaged in a conflict is crucial if we want to 
understand how they position themselves with regard to the conflict and come to act as 
bystanders, supporters or participants (Jackson and Dexter 2014; King 2004). Understanding 
violent collective action thus means to explore how the conflict is socially and discursively 
constructed and how processes of meaning making are embedded in socio-spatial settings as 
well as transformed over time. 
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Taken together, the discussion of existing approaches has shown that we need an analytical 
framework which is better able to capture the dynamic and multi-dimensional character of 
militant activism. In the following section, I suggest a framework which might allow scholars 
to move into this direction. 
2.2 Adopting a Dynamic and Multi-Dimensional Approach to Mobilization during 
Civil War  
Existing approaches and theories have offered important insights in different aspects of 
mobilization during civil wars. Nevertheless, as the discussion in the previous section has 
shown, there are several weaknesses as well. Most importantly, research on the structural 
conditions for civil wars has not always been able to explain the causal mechanisms that 
intervene between macro-causes and micro-mobilization. Moreover, mobilization paths of 
militant activists have been shown to vary, not only between countries and across armed 
groups but also within the same groups. And finally, the preference for invariant and mono-
causal theories has produced explanations for violent collective actions which are, albeit 
parsimonious, often implausible. Some of the unexplored aspects of mobilization in the field 
of civil war studies have instead been addressed in more detail in social movement studies 
and the relational approach developed in contentious politics. Research within these fields has 
developed some concepts and empirical insights which I believe to have high heuristic 
capacity for analyzing mobilization during civil wars. This becomes particularly evident when 
looking at the works by scholars who have used theoretical approaches from social movement 
studies to analyze dynamics of violent radicalization. Their influence has been considerable in 
highlighting theoretical elements, such as the relevance of networks and social ties for 
radicalization processes, unaccounted for in the literature, as well as in proposing exploratory 
frameworks which connect micro-, meso- and macro-level explanations for radicalization 
instead of favoring either structural or individual factors. However, while social movement 
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theory has been increasingly adopted to explore relatively small left wing militant groups or 
so-called home-grown terrorist cells5 predominantly in Europe, its application to understand 
mobilization during civil wars has been rare (for exceptions see Viterna 2013 and Wood 
2003). This section thus uses some of the main concepts from social movement theory and the 
relational perspective within the contentious politics paradigm (Della Porta 2018; McAdam, 
Tarrow and Tilly 2001) and combines them with constructivist approaches to civil wars in 
order to develop an analytical framework that guides the analysis in the empirical chapters. 
Before turning to the discussion of the framework, however, I briefly outline why I belief a 
focus on the micro-level is particularly fruitful for analyzing militant activism as a dynamic 
and multi-dimensional phenomenon.      
2.2.1 Why focusing on the Micro-level? 
This dissertation concentrates predominantly on micro-level data to analyze militant 
trajectories during armed conflicts. I believe that such a micro-level approach can improve 
our understanding of militant activism for four interrelated reasons. First, studies that focus on 
the micro-level to explain violent collective action are rare (Kalyvas 2003, 2006; Viterna 
2013). Rather scholars tend to infer individual identities and motivations from the civil war’s 
master cleavage, such as ethnicity, class or religion. However, as Kalyvas notes (2003) the 
locus of agency is as likely to be at the bottom as at the top. We thus have to focus on how 
motivations for militancy develop and change at the micro-level and how they are connected 
to broader conflict dynamics. 
Second, a focus on the micro-level allows scholars to situate militants in their everyday 
relational and situational context and to analyze mobilization paths as resulting from these 
                                                 
5 The controversial term “home-grown terrorism” appeared in the literature after the London bombings in 2005 and refers to individuals who 
were born and raised in the West and participated in violent acts, mostly but not always, against targets in Western countries (for a 
critical discussion of the concept see Crone and Harrow 2011). 
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dynamics. As Petersen (2001: 1) argues and the following empirical chapters will 
demonstrate, it is individuals` embeddedness in their everyday socio-political context which 
best explains “whether individuals come to act as rebels or collaborators, killers or victims, 
heroes or cowards during times of upheaval […].”  
Third, a micro-level analysis allows scholars to investigate variety in mobilization paths over 
time and across space – an approach which seems more promising to capture the empirical 
reality of combatants than works that identify one facto or the set of factors that typically lead 
to collective action (Verwimp, Justino and Brück 2009). As Viterna (2006: 2) stresses, 
questions about the causes of violent mobilization remain unresolved because scholars still 
tend to seek for the general factor that “typically” leads individuals to activism. However, 
activists do not form a homogenous group: they do not all mobilize for the same reason(s), 
but tend to follow different paths to militancy, that is to say there are different factors or set of 
factors which facilitate mobilization for different groups of activists.  
Finally, by focusing on the micro-level, I don’t mean to imply that only mechanisms 
operating at the micro-level are relevant for explaining mobilization; rather, a micro-level 
approach maintains that relational dynamics at the meso- and the macro-level of analysis are 
key to understand collective action but it analyzes how their influence manifests at the micro-
level (Bosi and Della Porta 2012). This helps scholars to clarify in how far changes at the 
macro- and the meso-level shape micro-dynamics of militancy (mechanisms operating at the 
macro- and meso-level might correlate with the onset of a civil war without causing militant 
collective action on the ground) and how – through what kind of mechanisms – they shape 
mobilization.   
2.2.2 Developing a Dynamic and Multi-Dimensional Framework to Mobilization 
The proposed framework focuses on three dimension at three levels of analysis which have 
been identified as crucial in shaping mobilization pathways of militant activists (Della Porta 
32 
 
1995, 2018; Bosi and Della Porta 2012; Steinhoff and Zwerman 2008; Viterna 2006, 2013). 
First, at the micro-level, individual motivations are central to understand when and how 
people join and support armed groups. Motivations, however, aren’t formed in a vacuum but 
are the result of individuals’ embeddedness in different networks (meso-level) and the 
interactions and social ties between members of these networks. And third, people react to 
perceived conditions and changes in the socio-spatial context (macro-level) they are 
embedded in. Mobilization pathways thus have to be understood as dynamic processes, where 
motivations, networks and contextual factors interact to generate or inhibit violent collective 
action (Bosi and Della Porta 2012).   
i. Motivations and Mobilization   
Large-scale (political) violence requires a number of actors to actually participate in a violent 
campaign as well as a large number of people who don’t become soldiers themselves but who 
support violence or at least accept and don’t resist to it (Jackson and Dexeter 2014). Kaufman 
(2002: 2) is thus right in pointing out that the involvement of ordinary citizens in organized 
violence cries out for explanation, and “no account of ethnic war is adequate which does not 
explain how such things can happen”. However, the problem with many approaches to civil 
wars is that the agency of civilians is rarely theorized. Rather, the assumption is that structural 
conditions and violent justifying myths and discourses have a linear impact on people, 
persuading them that violence is necessary (Desrosiers 2015; Jackson and Dexeter 2014). 
However, as social movement scholars have highlighted, the way individuals perceive the 
world around them and act upon these perceptions is mostly the result of interpretative 
struggles, involving interactions between different conflict actors who propose particular 
frames of interpretation and suggest specific reactions to it and thereby transform private into 
public or group-based grievances and unlock the conflict generating potential of contexts, 
events and myths (Desrosiers 2015; Wiktorowicz 2003). A first key proposition this 
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framework is based upon is thus that individual motivations for collective action can neither 
be simply deduced from structural factors nor assumed to exist a priori, as categories 
belonging to the actors (Goodwin 2009; Jackson and Dexeter 2014; Tilly 2003). Rather, key 
motives for collective action, such as grievances, perceived efficacy or collective identities 
(Simon and Klandermans 2001; Van Zomeren, Postmes and Spears 2008) emerge and gain 
salience through interactions between activists and other actors involved in a conflict, such as, 
most importantly, militant networks and the state (see next paragraphs) (Della Porta 1995; 
Alimi, Demetriou and Bosi 2015).  
Moreover, while civil war scholars tend to pit different motivations against each other (“greed 
vs. grievance”), several studies on militant activism from a social movement perspective have 
shown that there is no single or even a prevalent set of motivations driving radicalization at 
the individual level (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010; Della Porta 2018; Horgan 2008; Viterna 2013). 
Rather, individual motives vary and people follow different paths to militant activism. For 
example, Bosi and Della Porta (2012) have identified thee core individual motivations (i.e. 
ideological, instrumental, and solidaristic) which interacted with networks and political 
opportunities to produce three paths activists followed to join the Provisional Irish Republican 
Army and the Red Brigades (see also Viterna 2013). Instead of assuming that there is a 
uniform motive underpinning militant activism, this framework thus posits that we need to 
explore how particular motivations become most relevant for mobilization in specific 
relational and structural contexts. Furthermore, different motives might interact in individuals 
to generate militant activism. Kimhi and Even (2006), for example, identify four motive-
trajectories among Palestinian suicide fighters – religious motives, nationalist motives, 
motives of revenge and motives of escape from personal problems – which often overlap in 
particular individuals, thereby adding another layer to the multiplicity and complexity of 
pathways to militant activism. 
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In my empirical analysis of mobilization paths of former LTTE militants I applied these 
analytical propositions and focused in particular on how motives for collective action 
emerged out of interactions among conflict actors and how motivations might vary among 
respondents. In line with existing research, my findings point to variation in motivations and 
mobilization paths; however, the empirical evidence also highlights aspects which have been 
neglected or only implicitly theorized by existing research. First, the analysis of recruitment 
strategies employed by LTTE recruiters (Chapter 6) points to the relevance of emotions as a 
strategic resource armed group may use to motivate youngsters to join an armed campaign. 
This finding corresponds to existing works on radicalization which often mention emotions, 
such as anger or humiliation, as a relevant push factor for militant activism (Fattah and Fierke 
2009; Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010; Obaidi, Bergh, Sidanius et al. 2018) However, scholars rarely 
theorize emotions as an independent motivational force with specific cognitive and behavioral 
effects. We therefore know relatively little on the impact emotions may have on dynamics of 
(violent) radicalization. Second, most studies that single out different paths to militant 
activism focus on variation of motivations and paths over time while neglecting variation 
across space. However, particularly in a civil war context, violence tends to fragment space 
and authority, thereby producing variation in socio-political contexts. As I will show in 
Chapter 5, depending on where – in what kind of socio-political context – my respondents 
joined the LTTE, they followed different paths to militancy. And finally, in Chapter 9, I 
suggest that intersectionality could be an additional analytical tool to explore variation in 
mobilization experiences among members form the same armed groups. More precisely, I 
illustrate how the disengagement trajectories of my respondents vary due to the intersection of 
different social divisions, such as, most importantly, gender, ability and location.   
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ii. Networks relevant for Mobilization  
One of the key findings of a range of studies inspired by social movement theory is that 
violent radicalization is often initiated and shaped by who one knows – radical ideas are 
transmitted by social networks and violent radicalization takes place within smaller groups, 
where group identification and peer pressure gradually changes the individual’s view of the 
world and its readiness to participate in violent activism (Neumann and Rogers 2008; 
Sageman 2004; Wiktorowicz 2003). It is thus the relational dimension, that’s is to say social 
ties and interpersonal processes combined with the way they shape and interact with cognitive 
processes, which is considered as most consequential in explaining violent mobilization 
(Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010; Malthaner 2017). Della Porta (1995) was one of the first scholars 
who emphasized that joining a militant group is rarely an isolated, individual process, but is 
facilitated by small groups of friends formed within larger protest movements which generate 
trust and strong ties that encourage engagement in more radical action. Since then, her 
findings have been confirmed by a range of comparative studies which found that social ties 
and personal networks are crucial in very different forms of militant activism, including left-
wing as well as ethno-nationalist and religious movements (Bosi and Della Porta 2012; Della 
Porta 2013; Malthaner 2017; 2014; Sageman 2004; Wiktorowicz 2003). Most of these works 
highlight two crucial functions of networks. First, networks are central in connecting 
individuals to radical groups. One of the key findings in the social movement literature is 
probably the notion of mobilization via pre-existing social ties. Participation in (or 
recruitment into) movements is often initiated via personal (friendship or kinship) ties to 
activists that precede involvement (McAdam 1986; Della Porta 1992; Passy 2003). The 
process of radicalization itself, then, takes place through socialization within groups – the 
second central function of networks – that transforms individual perceptions, interpretations 
and values and creates a sense of collective identification. As Wiktorowicz (2005: 16) argues, 
radical movements and milieus create “networks of shared meaning” that shape individuals’ 
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identity, perceptions, and motivations. A crucial component of this meaning work is framing 
– the process of social production and dissemination of meaning through narratives. 
According to framing theory, the mobilization potential of social movements depends on their 
ability to promote a specific version of reality and to make this version resonate with the 
worldview of potential recruits (Benford and Snow 2000; Wiktorowicz 2003). In this 
constructed reality problems are as not just misfortunes, but injustices, responsibilities for 
these injustices are attributed to a specific perpetrator and violence is presented as the only 
way to right the perceived wrongs (Bakonyi and Bliesemann De Guevara 2009; Dalgaard-
Nielsen 2010; Desrosiers 2015). This ideological and normative foundation, in turn, is a 
necessary bedrock for an armed campaign to be maintained in the long run as it creates 
identities and provides meaning that make violence possible, acceptable and potentially 
legitimate within a particular context.  
As a second key proposition this framework thus posits that motivations for engaging in 
militancy emerge from and are intimately linked to social processes of dense interaction in 
radical networks and groups. This, in turn, means, that in order understand how individuals 
become motivated to join armed groups, we need to focus on the networks individuals are 
embedded in and to analyze how these networks shape interpretation of conflict events and 
transform values and beliefs in a way that facilitates militant activism.  
However, most existing studies focus on kinship or peer networks and religious or political 
organizations which existed prior to the conflict and explore their relevance in shaping 
mobilization trajectories of militants. While I don’t deny that these networks – particularly 
peer networks – are also relevant to analyze mobilization in a civil war context, my findings 
suggest that once a conflict escalates into a civil war, violence transforms existing networks 
and creates new ones, and it is the influence of these networks which has to be analyzed in 
more detail in order to understanding mobilization during civil wars (see also Viterna 2013). 
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For instance, once the LTTE had eliminated all rival groups and had established itself as the 
only force fighting for the Tamil community, they destroyed or infiltrated most independent 
networks and created new ones which were closely affiliated to them. In a civil war context 
armed groups as well as conflict related networks, such as refugee camps and repopulation 
communities – thus tend to become the networks – though to a varying degree – most 
consequential in shaping mobilization trajectories (ibid.; Wood 2008). As Chapter 5 and 6 
will show, LTTE created networks, such as students’ associations, voluntary help groups etc., 
rituals, performances and social events related to the LTTE`s armed campaign and the mere 
presence of LTTE fighters and LTTE military camps in most neighborhoods had a crucial 
impact on my respondents’ everyday lives and the way they became to understand the 
conflict, particularly on those who lived in LTTE controlled territories. Moreover, as most 
rebel groups, the LTTE employed various recruitment strategies to motivate youngsters to 
join the group. Recruitment sessions in schools and talks with LTTE recruiters in the street or 
in private study circles were a normal part of my respondents’ everyday lives. This, in turn, 
means that the network-related incentive structure for (non-)participation and non-(support) is 
quite different in conflict environments where an armed groups becomes the dominant 
representative of a community or even acts as a de-facto state. While people who want to join 
small clandestine violent groups might struggle to make contacts to group members and face 
the risk of being arrested by the police, for individuals living in a rebel state it might be riskier 
not to get involved in the struggle and to stay neutral as non-support might be considered 
traitorous. As many works on group dynamics have highlighted and as Chapter 8 will discuss 
in more detail: high cohesion within a group or community, particularly if due to an outside 
threat, brings high pressures for conformity and strong sanctions against deviates (Brewer 
1998; McCauley and Moskalenko 2008). Community members are thus exposed to strong 
social and moral pressure, often combined with a certain degree of fear, to support the groups 
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who are fighting for them. In short, in a civil war context where one armed group becomes the 
dominate representative of a community, the armed group network is likely to be particularly 
consequential for individuals` mobilization paths.  
iii. Mobilization and Enabling Structures  
Civil war scholars have identified a series of discursive and material conditions that are 
correlated with the outbreak of violent conflict. The problem with these approaches, however, 
is that they tend to have a determinist understanding of structure, that is to say, so-called root 
causes for civil wars are thought to automatically result in mobilization. Jackson and Dexeter 
(2012: 4), based on Wight (1999), therefore propose a different understanding of structure as 
“a set of conditions that enable certain actions and constrain others”. Moreover, the authors 
stress that “these structures that shape, enable and limit possibilities in social actions are 
themselves produced through human action”. Structures are thus neither fixed or stable nor do 
they influence human behavior in determinist ways. Such an understanding of structure as 
enabling conditions comes close to what social movement scholars call political opportunity 
structure, consisting of a formal, institutional context as well as an informal, cultural one 
(Kriesi 1989: 295), which provide more or less favorable conditions for a social movement to 
mobilize and shape the repertoires of action a movement adopts.  
Based on such an understanding of structure, this framework points to two types of “enabling 
conditions” which have emerged from the literature as well as from my own research as 
particularly consequential in shaping mobilization during civil wars. First, repression needs to 
be taken into consideration as particularly consequential in enabling or restraining militant 
activism. As many works on radicalization and militancy have illustrated, confrontations with 
the police and experiences of persecution and arrests lead activists to adopt more radical 
forms of contention, resulting in an escalation of non-violent protests into violent resistance 
(Della Porta 1995). It is through the lived experience of repression that interpretations of the 
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conflict are re-shaped, powerful motivations in the form of injustice frames are created and 
violence is justified as a legitimate response to an unfair state ready to use brutal repression 
against its citizens (ibid.). Moreover, violent interaction with the state and counter-movements 
trigger processes of boundary-making which increase solidarity among activists and provoke 
hostile feelings against the out-group. As McCauley and Moskalenko (2008: 425-26) stress, 
“in small face-to-face groups, out-group threat leads reliably to increased group cohesion, 
increased respect for in-group leaders, increased sanctions for in-group deviates, and 
idealization of in-group norms” (see also Drury and Reicher 1999).  
However, the effects of repression on individuals are not constant. Rather, as an increasing 
number of works has started to explore, the question if repression increases or decreases 
support for the armed campaign among the population as well as how violence is evaluated by 
civilians, depends on whether repression is specific or indiscriminate, on whom violence is 
targeted and with whom affected communities identify, as well as on how repression is 
framed and evaluated by armed groups and their wider constituencies (Della Porta 1995; 
Kalyvas 2006; Lyall, Blair and Imai 2013; Viterna 2013). These works thus suggest that 
repression has no uniform impact on mobilization; rather its effect depends on different 
intervening variables which shape how violence is evaluated by individuals and thereby how 
they react to it. In Chapter 8, I use several of the theoretical suggestions developed in recent 
works on repression and explore the mechanisms which shape how Tamil civilians evaluated 
the LTTE`s armed campaign. I find that boundary making was particularly crucial in 
justifying violence against the perceived out-group as well as against deviate in-group 
members at an early stage of the conflict, while, at a later stage, less explored mechanisms 
became more relevant in shaping interpretations of violence, such as the institutionalization of 
violence – its application according to predictable procedures – in LTTE controlled territory 
as well as desensitization towards all sorts of violent acts in areas where control was contested 
40 
 
between the LTTE and the government and individual exposure to violence was high. 
Repression is thus definitely relevant to understand mobilization patterns and support 
relations during civil wars; the way individuals interpret and evaluate violent acts, however, 
isn’t uniform among conflict populations but depends on varying mechanisms that filter 
interpretations. A better understanding of these mechanisms, in turn, is relevant, as the way 
individuals evaluate violence exerted by different conflict actors, shapes how they position 
themselves towards them and the armed campaign more generally.   
The second type of enabling structure which need to be considered to understand mobilization 
during civil wars concerns space and control. Based on Kalyvas (2006) seminal work on 
control and collaboration, scholars have begun to explore how variation in territorial control 
might affect popular support for armed groups via different mechanisms. Kalyvas argues that 
popular collaboration with armed groups is not a matter of political preferences or ethnic ties 
but rather a function of territorial control. Driven predominantly by survival considerations, 
most civilians collaborate with the armed actor who is in control of the territory where they 
live, independent of ethnic belonging, ideology etc. However, this functional understanding of 
collaboration as a result of coercive control has been challenged by other studies which show 
that armed groups seek to not only physically control populations but to establish and 
maintain solidaristic and symbolic ties that bind them to their local constituencies (Kubota 
2011). The control of territory allows them to distribute their worldview and to foster a 
collective counterhegemonic identity among the local population (Bosi 2013). This socio-
spatial embeddedness, in turn, is a crucial resource for militant groups to sustain their armed 
campaign as strong community ties “not only increase the likelihood of active resistance to 
external threat, [but] simultaneously make it possible to absorb the consequences such 
confrontation results in” (Burton 1978: 3). Moreover, an emerging field of research in the civil 
war literature analyzes different forms of local order – often referred to as rebel governance – 
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where rebels “use liberated territories” to provide civilians with certain public goods 
(security, health, education etc.), thereby proposing to the local population an alternative 
order which might be perceived as more legitimate (or not) by civilians and thus generates and 
sustains support (Arjona 2014; Kasfir 2005; Mumpilly 2012).  
Scholars have thus begun to pay increasing attention to how territory and control shapes 
different aspects of political violence. Works looking at how variation in territorial control 
and authority shape mobilization paths of militants, however, are still rare. In an attempt to 
address this gap, I included variation in local contexts as a relevant analytical category in 
several empirical chapters. Chapter 1 proposes a typology of different mobilization areas 
which shape mobilization paths of militants across space. Moreover, in various chapters I 
provide evidence showing that collaboration with the LTTE in the territory they controlled 
didn’t result from coercion alone; rather, it was the continues exposure of individuals to the 
LTTE`s narrative and the social pressure created due to symbolic, material and coercive ties 
that linked individuals to the LTTE and sustained solidarity among community members. And 
finally, Chapter 4 and 5 show that variation in socio-political contexts in terms of authority, 
networks and repression, is an important dimension that shapes civilian perceptions of 
violence (see above) and influences the paths LTTE militants followed when returning to 
civilian lives.  
According to the proposed framework, understanding individual mobilization pathways 
involves appreciating that militant activism is a dynamic and multi-dimensional phenomenon, 
involving individual motivations, the effect of networks and enabling structural conditions. 
Engagement in violence can thus neither be explained solely by reference to motivations and 
characteristics inherent to individuals or groups, nor by focusing only on conflict generating 
structures. Rather, individual motivations are created, sustained and transformed through 
interactions within networks and these interactions are, in their turn, influenced by specific 
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enabling structures. It is thus the interaction of motivation, network and structure which best 
explains variation in mobilization paths across time and space.   
In the following empirical chapters, I will analyze the mobilization paths of former LTTE 
militants as well as support relations between Tamil civilians and the LTTE based on this 
general framework. More precisely, every chapter will focus on one key aspect of 
mobilization (participation, recruitment, retention, support and disengagement) and analyze if 
and how motivations for mobilization emerge out of interactions between activists and 













3 Methodological Approach and Challenges  
In this chapter I describe the methods used to gather the data for this PhD and discuss the 
challenges I encountered during field research and later the analysis of data, as well as the 
strategies I pursued to meet them as well as possible. 
3.1 Data Sources and Data Collection 
To explore why some Tamils joined, stayed and/or supported the LTTE during and after the 
civil war while others didn’t, my principal research strategy was to talk to former members of 
the LTTE and to civilians living in the conflict area about their subjective motivations to 
support and/or join the movement, as well as to ask why some did not. While this may sound 
familiar to scholars working on social movements and contentious politics, such an approach 
is not usually taken in research about political violence. Many of the existing studies about 
participation in armed groups or violent protests rely either on documents produced by armed 
groups, on interviews with group leaders or on official sources to study motivations for 
collective violence (Della Porta 2013; Kriger 1992; Viterna 2013; Wood 2003). While relying 
on these data sources can lead to various interesting results, they provide little reliable 
information on participants’ perceptions, motivations and beliefs. Texts produced by armed 
groups, for example, tell us little about how individual participants join and experience their 
life within the group. Rather, they convey the “official” worldview of the group which might 
or might not be shared by rank and file members or they might address an international 
audience rather than express the group’s beliefs (Blee 2003). Moreover, often only few 
documents written by armed groups and/or participants are available. In some cases, 
autobiographies written by movement leaders or senior cadres could be used as a source; 
however, relying on documents written by group leaders is equally problematic as their 
perceptions and experiences might differ significantly from those of rank and file soldiers 
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who are often illiterate or semi-literate, thus leaving little written traces of their mobilization 
(Della Porta 2014: 271; Viterna 2013). Similarly, the use of official documents to study 
participants’ lives in armed groups is often problematic. While in democratic regimes scholars 
might have access to judicial documents and police files that allow them to reconstruct 
participants` pathways to armed groups and their motivation to stay, such documents are often 
inexistent or unavailable in (semi-)authoritarian regimes (Wood 2003). Before and during the 
Sri Lankan civil war, those suspected of subversion by government agents were only in 
extraordinary circumstances processed by courts or other judicial bodies. Police and other 
security forces left few records of detentions, torture, or disappearances. And if they did, they 
are unavailable for researcher or were destroyed in order to render postwar investigation of 
human rights violations and other abuses of power more difficult (Klem 2012). While human 
rights organizations kept records of violations as best as they could, their reconstructions of 
individual conflict experiences are scant and incomplete.6 Drawing on personal conversations 
with people who have experienced and participated in the war was thus the only method that 
allowed me to reconstruct mobilization paths and support relations during and after the armed 
conflict. Moreover, as Wood (2006: 126) and Malthaner (2014: 173) empathize, research 
based on personal conversations with research subjects in their own environment is 
particularly useful and important in situations where populations are marginalized or 
repressed and where participants have reasons to hide their beliefs and perceptions. 
I collected the data, this PhD mainly draws from, during three rounds of field research in 
Switzerland, Sri Lanka and the UK. I started with a more exploratory round in Switzerland, in 
December and January 2017, during which I talked to several researchers who have long term 
                                                 
6 One of the only systematic documentations of human rights violations during the Sri Lankan armed conflict has been done 
by a local organization called the University Teacher for Human Rights. All reports are available on their webpage 
http://www.uthr.org/index.html. While these reports provide highly relevant information on violent acts committed by all 
conflict parties, they provide limited insights into the perceptions of individuals.   
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experience with conducting research in Sri Lanka and could help me with the preparations for 
my own field research as well as with contacts to facilitate initial access to the field (see next 
paragraph). Moreover, I conducted pilot interviews with Tamil civilians who had experienced 
the beginning of the war before they migrated to Switzerland as well as with two former 
members of the LTTE who currently live in Switzerland.7 The experience gained through 
these “pilot” interviews helped me to get an idea about particularly sensitive topics and how 
to best address them as well as how to respond to challenging questions about my own 
position towards the LTTE (see the discussion below). Moreover, the contacts established 
during this exploratory period were crucial for my initial access to the field, as many of my 
interviewees in Switzerland gave me contacts of relatives and or friends who then supported 
my research in Sri Lanka.  
The second and main round of field research I conducted in Sri Lanka from May to July 2018. 
During this period, I collected the main bulk of data this PhD is based on. In total, I 
interviewed 28 former members of the LTTE as well as 15 civilians who lived in the conflict 
areas during the war. Moreover, in order to gain additional material about mobilization 
dynamics and in order to contextualize and triangulate my data from combatant and civilian 
interviews, I conducted 15 expert interviews with local researchers, activists, social workers, 
religious leaders and journalists (for more details see below). Finally, a third round of field 
research was conducted in January 2019 in the UK. I mainly used this period to talk to 
researchers working on the Sri Lankan conflict in order to clarify open questions and doubts 
resulting from the analysis of the data collected in Sri Lanka as well as to conduct two 
additional life history interviews with former LTTE members who mobilized in Colombo, the 
                                                 
7 There were two main reasons why I chose Switzerland for this first round of field research. First, the Tamil diaspora community in 
Switzerland is relative to the population size one of the biggest in Europe; there are approximately 50,000 Sri Lankans living in 
Switzerland, of whom approximately 90-95 percent are of Tamil ethnicity (McDowell 2005). Second, as I am Swiss myself, it was easier 
to gain initial access to the community, mainly through existing friendship ties.    
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Sri Lankan capital, which I needed for the first chapter of this PhD (see the additional 
information on methodology there).  
In the following, I will discuss in more details the different methods I used to gather the data 
for this dissertation. As already noted, the principal method for data collection were 
interviews. All of the interviews were recorded and later transcribed fully (life history 
interviews) or partly (expert interviews) for the analysis. Moreover, during the different 
periods of field research I had many informal conversations with colleagues, friends, hosts, 
tuk tuk drivers etc. which helped me enormously to contextualize interview data and to better 
understand the broader political context before, during and after the war as well as various 
aspects of Tamil culture. I continuously carried a notebook with me in which I took notes 
about useful information, interesting questions as well as positions and ideas mentioned 
during these conversations. This data was later included in the writing of this PhD. Apart 
from interviews and conversations, I used participant observation as well as existing 
documentation and secondary literature to collect further data.  
More precisely, the following data gathering methods can be distinguished:  
Life history interviews In total, I conducted 32 life history interviews with former members 
of the LTTE and 15 with civilians. Instead of focusing on interviewees whole life history, 
however, I concentrated the interview on reconstructing their experience of the conflict 
period. More precisely, the interviews were divided into four sections: 1) life before the 
conflict, 2) path to militant activism or perception of militancy (for civilians), 3) experience as 
a member of the LTTE or life during the war (for civilians), and 4) life after the end of the 
war. Each life history interview thus followed a similar format. However, in order to observe 
how each respondent would compose his or her own life story – how they would select and 
causally connect the events that they considered as most significant – I intervened only to 
encourage a full exposition of conflict biographies and relevant topics, not to suggest 
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particular directions that the narrative should take (Blee 2003). I considered life histories the 
best choice to gather accurate data for this PhD for four interrelated reasons. First, life 
histories allow us to understand how combatants perceive and make sense of the world around 
them and their place within it. They tell us how activists identify themselves, what they 
perceive as the major events that shape their activism and how they position themselves in 
relation to other actors (ibid.). As Della Porta (1992: 173) notes, life histories “emphasize the 
importance of understanding the way in which history is transformed in individual cognition, 
how public events intervene into private life, how perceptions of the world influence action”. 
Second, as life histories generate rich and contextual data about how activists perceive the 
world around them and act based on these perceptions, they allow researchers to better 
understand how individual motivations emerge and are transformed during the conflict as well 
as to explore how they are embedded in and interact with social contexts to generate 
mobilization (ibid.). Third, life histories organize live events in sequences and therefore can 
help to disentangle the causes and effects of participation, making possible judgements as, for 
example, whether ideological conviction precedes or follows from participation in militant 
groups (Blee 2003). And finally, conducting interviews in the form of life histories helps to 
avoid “pushing” interviewees towards specific explanations but rather give them the 
opportunity to develop their own narratives and to focus on the events and motivations they 
themselves consider as most relevant for their participation in militant activism (Della Porta 
2014; Viterna 2013).  
Life history interviews lasted on average 90 minutes and mostly took place in Tamil with 
translation by somebody I had hired to help me out. This was necessary as most former LTTE 
members I interviewed as well as the civilians I talked to come from poor rural backgrounds 
and therefore often lacked formal education (I provide more information on my sampling 
strategy below). However, eight of the life history interviews were conducted in English as 
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respondents’ language capacity was good enough and I preferred, whenever possible, to 
interact with interviewees without translation. All interviews took place in respondents` 
homes where people felt most safe and comfortable to share their experiences. 
Expert interviews In addition to the life history interviews, I conducted 15 expert interviews 
with local researches, religious leaders, political activists, social workers and journalists. 
These interviews were conducted in English and mostly took place in peoples’ offices. They 
were usually structured interviews focusing on conflict dynamics, the different conflict actors, 
the internal organization, recruitment strategies and symbolic politics of the LTTE and Tamil 
cultural practices. They thus helped me to gain additional information to triangulate and 
contextualize data from life history interviews. Moreover, occasionally, I used these 
conversations to deepen and/or clarify themes that emerged during the life history interviews 
and discuss their relevance for my research. This was particularly the case with a few local 
researchers as well as political activists with whom I met repeatedly and developed a more 
continuous and reciprocal relationship. This dissertation benefits considerably from numerous 
conversations and discussion with these people. 
Observations Observations can be helpful for researchers to deepen their understanding of 
the places and topics they study as well as to handle some of the biases of interview data (I 
return to this below) (Sluka 1990). During my field research, I made conscious efforts to note 
down everyday observations I considered helpful for my work as well as reflections on them. 
Moreover, in addition to these casual observations, I deliberately visited several places and 
participated in events I considered as helpful to make more systematic observations about 
different aspects. For example, for a better understanding of the post-war situation, it was 
vital to go to discussions and demonstrations mostly related to the topic of missing persons 
and reconciliation. Observations as well as informal talks during these events helped me to 
better grasp the tensions and conflicts dominating the post-war context.      
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Documents and existing data Official documents did not play a central role in my research, 
partly because statistics and official documents were not available, incomplete, and difficult 
to get (see also Klem 2012: 8) and partly because the available data was not so relevant to my 
substantive focus. I, however, used two forms of primary sources which proved relevant for 
my project. First, I collected available programmatic texts produced by the LTTE 
(programmatic statements, leaflets, poems, video material, online material published on LTTE 
affiliated webpages etc.). Although there are only few documents available, these texts 
provided me with important information about the group’s attempts to justify the armed 
struggle to different audiences and its strategies to recruit fighters. Second, a biographic 
account or testimony of a former members of the LTTE provided another source of 
information (see the additional information on methodology in the first empirical chapter). 
While (auto-)biographies have to be treated with caution, they grant us with interesting 
insights in the subjective world and beliefs of participants (Della Porta 1995). Finally, a last 
category of material I used, were secondary texts dealing with the LTTE and the civil war 
more broadly that provide valuable information on conflict dynamics in general and helped 
me to triangulate and contextualize the data from the interviews.  
3.2 Challenges and Potential Data Biases  
While the above descriptions about data gathering methods give some indication of empirical 
evidence gathered, they tell us little about the validity and reliability of these data and the 
dilemmas involved in gathering them. The following paragraph discusses in more detail how I 
have dealt with key methodological challenges encountered during my field research as well 
as while analyzing my data.  
Field research in a sensitive context: There is nothing altogether exceptional about field 
research in a post-war context. Most of the of the normal challenges of qualitative field 
research – biases, lack of access, confidentiality, and unreliable data – equally apply to 
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research in sensitive contexts. What is specific is that these dilemmas are plausibly more 
pronounced (Malthaner 2014: 175). In my case, field research was particularly shaped by 
state surveillance, suspicion and extreme social polarization. Perceptions about what is going 
on, how that came to be, and who is right or wrong were deeply entrenched and research thus 
tended to be very political. Moreover, all form of political activism was tightly controlled and 
ex-combatants, with whom I predominately wanted to talk, were under close surveillance by 
the Sri Lankan military. Although, as a foreign academic I was in no danger of being arrested 
or maltreated (the only danger was to be extradited), there were indirect restrictions on my 
activities. The majority of people I met, were extremely careful to whom to talk and what to 
say, as “talking to the wrong person” or “saying the wrong things” could result in 
questionings and potential problems with the military. This, in turn, generated relevant 
challenges for gaining access and establishing trust as well as acute ethical questions about 
possible negative implications of fieldwork for respondents (Malthaner 2014; Klem 2012; 
Wood 2003).  
Access While a more ethnographic type of field research allows researchers to spend long 
periods of time in local settings and to establish trust through repeated everyday interactions, 
my more limited timeframe made it necessary to rely on so-called gatekeepers who helped me 
to gain access to networks and establish trust with respondents. For initial access, I asked 
Tamil friends and interviewees in Switzerland to provide me with some contacts of family 
members and/or friends living in Sri Lanka who could then help me to establish further 
contacts and introduce me to potential interview partners. “Activating” these personal 
networks before I went to the field proved crucial in allowing me to get access to respondents 
relatively quickly once I arrived in Sri Lanka. As Malthaner (2014: 179) notes “informal 
personal networks are particularly important in conflict settings as they can create trust 
through common acquaintances and introduction by a familiar person who, in some way, 
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“vouches” for the researcher”. “Being connected” to someone who guaranteed my 
trustworthiness allowed me to get in touch with people relatively fast who then invited me to 
visit them in their homes and gave me further contacts of people with whom I might be 
interested to talk. Apart from the support of Swiss Tamils, a research colleague who has been 
working on Sri Lanka for many years, put me in contact with a political activist in Sri Lanka 
who became a second entry point and invaluable research assistant and friend during my stay 
in Sri Lanka. She not only introduced me to a range of former LTTE members she knew from 
her time as an activist but acted as a translator if needed and helped me to contextualize the 
knowledge gained through the interviews. Finally, a local research I met at the beginning of 
my stay provided another point of access to interviewees he knew from his own research on 
ex-combatants. However, entering the field through personal networks entails particular 
ethical responsibilities and might create bias in the sample of respondents (see the next 
sections of this chapter). Moreover, the fact that I had to work with translators led to some 
limitations and filters that unavoidably dilute the richness of my findings.   
Trust Trust is a recurring theme in the literature on fieldwork. As Ryen (2007: 222) stresses 
“trust is the traditional magic key to building good field relations”. From my experience, two 
themes proved crucial to establish the trust needed to get access and collect valid data. First, 
as has been already noted, personal networks and pre­existing relations that “introduced” me 
to respondents and provided me with “spillover effects of trust” were crucial to build an initial 
base of trust. Second, interactions before and during the interviews were equally relevant to 
confirm and deepen initial trust. I made the experience that particularly empathy and curiosity 
as well as an open and honest self-representation proved crucial in this regard. Before I started 
interviewing respondents, I often shared a tea and a small meal with them and talked about 
my difficulties to get used to the Sri Lankan climate, about how much I liked Tamil curries 
and shared some personal information about my family. These initial conversations were 
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often crucial to “break the ice” and make respondents feel more confident. At the same time, 
some respondents, particularly those who had hold higher ranks in the LTTE as well as some 
public officials, used these initial conversations to “test” my position towards the LTTE`s 
struggle and/or my knowledge about the conflict. At the beginning, I tried to not take any 
position by referring to my neutrality as a researcher, I, however, soon realized that this would 
not be accepted by most of my respondents. At the same time, however, I discovered that 
honesty (I used to express my sympathy with the Tamil cause but criticized later excesses of 
violence) was the best strategy, especially if combined with a detailed knowledge about the 
LTTE`s strategy and organization. Generally, respondent accepted my position (even if 
critical) if they sensed my sincere interest in their story and my willingness to understand 
their point of view. Moreover, I never hesitated to express my empathy for peoples` suffering 
and their struggle to survive in an environment ridden of violence and insecurity. In general, I 
believe that the willingness to engage “as a person” on a level beyond academic research is 
crucial to gain and maintain respondents’ trust.  
Ethical considerations The basic ethical requirement with respect to participants in social 
science research is informed consent; that is, the duty of researchers to present themselves as 
such to participants, to inform them about their research and possible consequences, and to 
obtain their explicit agreement (Wood 2006: 379–80; Malthaner 2014). While I did my best to 
explain to respondents who I was, what I do in my project and for what I will use the data 
etc., hardly any of my respondents would have been comfortable signing a form and give their 
explicit consent to participate in an interview. I therefore only described my research project 
and asked participants for their verbal consent. Moreover, I always clarified that whenever 
they felt uncomfortable to talk about a topic, I would not insist but move to the next aspect. 
Another issue of “informed consent” is that participants should be clear about the risks and 
consequences involved in the research, which, in the context of armed conflicts or 
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authoritarian regimes, can be severe (ibid.). To mitigate these risks, I relied on the knowledge 
of respondents themselves who, when it came to the local implications of participating in an 
interview, obviously knew much better than I did what the potential risks and benefits were, 
or I asked my assistants or local researchers for advice to make the interviews as safe as 
possible. Moreover, in order to protect participants’ identity, I decided to not mention any 
names of respondents and to refer only to the district, not the village, where the interview was 
conducted. Finally, I faced an ethical question, I was largely unprepared for, when I started 
my interviews, namely challenges about what respondents expected from me. While I always 
made clear from the beginning that I won`t pay them for the interviews, I soon realized that 
people nevertheless hoped for some kind of support. Often they would ask me, if I could help 
them to find a job or to get the necessary documents to go to Switzerland. While, at the 
beginning, I always refused to give anything, I felt increasingly ashamed about not helping 
them, who were so obviously in need of support. After talking about this issue with two local 
researchers, I therefore decided to do the following: I would ask interviewees to prepare 
breakfast or lunch for me before or during the interviews and I would pay them for the meals 
(obviously I gave them an amount considerably higher than their expenses). While this 
approach might contradict “standard rules of field research”, I felt ethically unable to continue 
not giving them anything.  
3.3 Sampling and Selection of Research Areas 
Often in qualitative research it is impossible or far too time consuming to select interviewees 
randomly and generate a representative sample of the target population. This is particularly 
true in a conflict environment where necessary data about ex-combatant populations are 
missing and/or unavailable (Della Porta 2014). The sample of interviewees and other research 
participants is thus mostly built by “snowball sampling,” that is, through an evolving network 
of contacts (Wood 2006: 375). The dilemma about this sampling process is that the researcher 
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has only partial control over the selection of respondents, and samples drawn in this way are 
obviously never statistically representative. Nevertheless, researchers can use several 
measures in order to increase the representativeness of the sample. First, I tried to not rely on 
one point of access, thus on one network, to get contacts for interviewees but tried to use 
different referrals and contacts (Blee 2003). I drew on contacts I had established during my 
previous field research in Switzerland, I located interviewees through other researchers, and 
finally, Nalini, my research assistant, was another valuable contact for respondents (see 
above). Second, it is possible to select respondents more strategically according to certain 
criteria and thereby enhance the representativeness of the sample (Viterna 2006; 2013). I 
therefore tried to identify former militants with various backgrounds in order to guarantee a 
certain variety within the sample, especially with regard to some critical dimensions which 
might influence mobilization pathways. In particular, I included activists who mobilized in 
different conflict phases as well as in districts with varying degrees of territorial control by 
the LTTE. With regard to the latter, I included 14 respondents who mobilized in areas 
controlled by the LTTE in the Northern part of Sri Lanka and 16 respondents who mobilized 
in areas where control was contested between the government and the LTTE, mainly in 
North-Eastern Sri Lanka. Those respondents who mobilized in LTTE controlled zones, 
mainly lived in Jaffna, where the LTTE had full territorial control till 1995, but then was 
forced to withdraw to the Vanni after the Sri Lankan military took back control over the area, 
or in Mullaitivu an area located in the Vanni where the LTTE had full control and established 
its own de facto state over an extend period of the war (Stokke 2006) (for more details see 
next chapter). By contrast, my respondents from contested areas mainly mobilized in 
Batticaloa, where the LTTE was present; control, however was contested between the LTTE, 
the Sri Lankan army as well as other militant and paramilitary groups (see Figure 1) 
(Fuglerud 1999). Apart from geographical variation, I aimed at including a similar number of 
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male and female ex-militants into my sample (see Appendix II for a detailed overview over 
all interviewees conducted). And third, including a broad variety of viewpoints, including 
diverging or dissident positions (Wood 2006: 375), can also help to counter biases in data. 
This was one of the reasons, why I conducted 15 expert interviews with people from various 
locations, group affiliation, professions, caste and so on, as well as with activists from rival 
groups of people openly critical about the LTTE and its struggle.  
Apart from trying to get a sample as diverse as possible, I decided to also conduct life 
histories with people who shared important characteristics with interviewed ex-combatants 
but who did not join any armed groups. This approach departs from most studies on 
mobilization during war which tend to focus on combatants exclusively, while neglecting to 
gather data that allow for comparisons with civilians (Viterna 2013). This, however, might 
result in biases as without data on civilians it is impossible to control if non-combatants share 
similar factors (embeddedness in networks, biographical availability, exposure to repression 
etc.) that emerged as relevant for combatants` motivation to join an armed group. I therefore 
decided to include 15 civilians into my sample and selected them to match the characteristics 
of ex-combatants as close as possible with regard to gender, mobilization period and 
geographical location. And finally, most works tend to focus their research on combatants 
selected almost exclusively from an elite subset of combatants: urban, middle-to-upper class, 
educated, and active in present-day movement organizations (Kriger 1992; Viterna 2013). 
Other research (Paige 1997; Viterna 2013), as well as my own interviews, however, indicates 
that often the majority of recruits are poor, uneducated, and from rural areas, and that most of 
them don`t remain active in civil society after the war is over. I therefore decided to focus on 
interviewing rank and file soldiers who mostly mobilized from socio-economically 
disadvantaged urban backgrounds and often lacked formal education.  
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3.4 Processes of Memory Formation 
That this dissertation relies principally on in-depth interviews, of course, raises difficult issues 
of interpretation which have to be taken into consideration when conducting the interviews 
and at a later stage analyzing the data. There are at least three factors that might have shaped 
the responses of my interviewees: the accuracy of the respondents’ memories, the subsequent 
shaping of those memories through social and cultural processes, and the respondents’ 
objectives in the interview itself (Auyero 1999; Wood 2003; Viterna 2013). I discuss each of 
them in turn. First, a number of studies have shown that experiences and events that rank as 
highly intense (in a variety of cognitive, emotional and biological measures) tend to be better 
remembered in both the short and long term. With regard to research about violent armed 
conflict, these findings suggest that violent events, respondents witnessed or took part 
themselves, should be among those – highly intense and most often very unpleasant – events 
that are most likely to be well remembered (Waagenar and Groeneweg 1990; Witvliet 1997). 
While conducting the life history interviews, I was often impressed about the many details my 
respondents remembered with regard to significant events. They were able to describe in 
detail how they felt when hearing about a close relative`s death or how it affected them 
emotionally when talking to victims of the Black July riots that killed numerous Tamils. 
Moreover, following Viterna (2013) in her work on women`s mobilization during the civil 
war in El Salvador, I tried to structure my interviews around significant events, which, as we 
have seen, are more accurately remembered (What was the first conflict event you remember? 
When did you first learn about the LTTE?), and then followed with hints aimed at generating 
more narrative accounts of mobilization experiences (How did you feel when learning about 
the Black July violence? How was it to participate in an LTTE recruitment session?). 
Second, memories of political events, however well they are initially remembered, may be 
later reshaped by social and cultural processes that affect which memories were retained, 
which emphasized, and which forgotten (Ayuero 1999; Passerini 1987). There is a broad 
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range of dynamics that might shape memories. Particularly relevant for this PhD are the 
impacts of group identification and polarization on memory formation. For example, Taylor 
and Quayle (1994) find that members of terrorist groups, independent of the group`s specific 
goal, unanimously view their involvement in violence as a provoked reaction requiring 
defense against an enemy. The authors suggest that this perception is most likely a result of 
socialization dynamics within the group, rather than the “genuine” motivation for 
mobilization. The recruit may have learned to interpret his initial movement into the group to 
heighten the positive image of the group as well as to confirm the group`s ideological 
commitment (Horgan 2008: 86-88). I tried to partly mitigate this concern by using life history 
interviews which generally refrain from asking very detailed questions about motivations and 
beliefs.8 Life histories allow interviewees greater latitude in how they talk about their lives 
(see above). This, however, is not to say that data from life histories is unaffected by memory 
shaping dynamics. For the purpose of this PhD, however, this is not necessarily problematic. 
As I am primarily interested in how participants in violence perceive the world and how these 
perceptions shape their mobilization, understanding and analyzing processes of memory 
formation and its impact on mobilization is part of the goal of the study (see Della Porta 1995: 
19) However, awareness of the topic is highly important as a very detailed understanding of 
conflict dynamics are needed in order to grasp when and how memories of respondents were 
shaped by group dynamics.  
Third, the telling of personal and community histories is also shaped by respondents’ present 
day identities as well as their political loyalties, beliefs and personal objectives. Portelli 
(1997) points out that while oral history interviews are a personal exchange between the 
interviewer and interviewee, they are also testimonies intended as public statements and thus 
                                                 
8 As Horgan (2008: 87) notes researchers therefore have to be mindful of how they ask interview question, such as asking “How did you 
become involved?” rather than “Why did you become involved?” as the latter is more likely to elicit ideologically shaped answers. 
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involve interpreting and legitimizing past actions and perceptions. Moreover, because the 
telling of stories of past injustice and resistance shapes present propensities for mobilization 
and political identities, they may be told for precisely that purpose, rather than to convey 
accurate accounts of events as remembered (Wood 2003). I was confronted with this issue 
when interviewing senior former LTTE members. They obviously saw the interview as a 
platform to “tell the true story about the LTTE” which – according to them – is generally 
unknown due to the propaganda war of the Sinhalese government. These interviews, however, 
were the exception. The vast majority of my participants seemed to be genuinely interested in 
telling me how they came to think about participating and/or supporting violence, how their 
beliefs about the war changed in the course of the conflict etc. Often, they would tell me that 
nowadays they question how they thought and acted in particular moments but still, at that 
time, it was what they believed was the necessary or right thing to do. My research thus 
confirms Della Porta`s (2014: 271) observation that rank and file members tend to provide 
more honest accounts of their perceptions and beliefs and how they shaped their actions as 
they are less exposed to role pressures and concerns about their public standing. Still, when 
analyzing the data, I tried to be very careful about statements that could potentially be 
distorted due to post-war identities and, if I had doubts, excluded them form the analysis. For 
example, the account of one of my respondents who occupied a position in a local 
government office, conveyed a much “nicer” picture of the government`s rehabilitation 
program than other respondents and his language resembled the official discourse developed 
by the Sri Lankan government. I therefore decided to exclude his account from my analysis of 
reintegration dynamics.      
3.5 Data Analysis and Theoretical Contribution 
As most researchers who rely on qualitative data, I was confronted with the problem of how 
to transform numerous of pages of interview data into “valid accounts” and of how to use the 
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data to contribute to theory. Although I am aware that life histories can make no claim to be 
representative, I believe that there are strategies to analyze the data in a way that it can be 
used to make links to existing theory and contribute to theory building and development. In 
the analysis of my material, I alternated two strategies which I found useful to organize and 
interpret my data. First, I used an approach which is best described as thematic field analysis 
(Faraday and Kenneth 1979: 784-85). For example, I was interested in exploring the factors 
that shaped activists’ motivation to join an armed group. I therefore wrote a summary for all 
life histories which contained all the relevant factors, such as contexts, events, networks, 
emotions etc., mentioned by interviewees as relevant for their decision to join. Then, I tried to 
identify patterns in the summaries by singling out the factors or the combination of factors 
which seemed relevant in various life histories. Based on this first idea of a pattern, I would 
then go back to the interview transcripts and code them based on the patterns identified. My 
analysis thus followed the typical two-step process generally applied in qualitative text 
analysis (Saldana 2009).  
While, in my opinion, data analysis is always done with an “analytical lens”, trying to single 
out congruencies as well as deviations from existing concepts and theories, I more 
consciously engaged with theory after having established a pattern in the data and started to 
think about how to connect it with existing approaches. I thus aimed at what is mostly called 
exploration or generation of concepts and potentially theories through the identification of 
patterns in the life history data (Faraday and Kenneth 1979: 784-85). This approach worked 
well in my case partly due to the fact that, during the interviews, I made sure that all of them 
cover some of the topics I expected to be central for mobilization dynamics based on the 
existing literature. This markedly improved the comparability of different life histories and 
made it easier to establish patterns (see Viterna 2013) and, based on them, to develop more 
general models for explaining mobilization. A second strategy I used to analyze my data and 
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connect it to theory, was to see if existing analytical frameworks can explain the observed 
patterns in my data. For example, in many of my chapters, I refer to Kalyvas (2006) model on 
territory and control during war and used my data to discuss the applicability of his findings 
to my data as well as to develop ideas on how to extend his model. This second strategy thus 
concentrates more on the examination and potential extension of existing models and 
concepts. Here, it was again helpful that I used existing theories which I knew would most 
probably be relevant for my research topic as a basis for my sampling strategy and interview 
outline. Through this, I made sure that I would have data from respondents living in areas 
with different degrees of rebel control as well as data on how interviewees experienced 
different forms of territorial control, which I could then use to discuss existing theories and 




4 The Sri Lankan Civil War and the LTTE`s Struggle for an 
Independent State 
4.1 Conflict Antecedents  
The origins of the Sinhalese and Tamil communities in Sri Lanka can be traced back to early 
patterns of migration from India. The ancestors of the present day Sinhalese community – 
who speaks Sinhala – migrated to Ceylon from the North of India and eventually settled in the 
South, West, and central parts of the island. In contrast, the predominantly Hindu Tamil 
community, who speaks Tamil, originated from Southern India (Richards 2013: 8).9 The 
Tamil community is the largest minority group in Sri Lanka and, since 1946, has made up 
between roughly 11 and 18 per cent of the population (ibid.).10 The Sri Lankan Tamils are the 
majority in “their traditional homelands”, the North and East of Sri Lanka (see Figure 1), and 
there is a sizeable minority population in Colombo, Sri Lanka’s capital. In religious terms, the 
Sinhalese are overwhelmingly Buddhist (with a few Christians), while the Tamils are more 
than 90 per cent Hindu with a small minority of Christians. Muslims and Tamils are often 
identified as the Tamil speaking community but while Muslims speak the Tamil language, 
they use religion as their primary identity and – partly as a result of the conflict – identify as a 
separate ethnic community (Klem 2011).  
As Tambiah (1996) has shown tensions and conflicts between the Sinhalese government and 
Tamil oppositional groups are a relatively recent phenomenon, dating back to the time of Sri 
Lanka’s independence from British colonial rule in 1948. Parts of the Sinhalese elite 
                                                 
9 The Tamil community in Sri Lanka consists of Sri Lankan Tamils and Indian Tamils. The latter arrived as indentured labourers in the 
1830s and live predominately in the central provinces. Although many were attacked during the anti-Tamil riots of 1977 and 1983, the 
community has played a minor role in the separatist conflict (De Votta 2009).  
10 According to the Sri Lankan census conducted in 1981 at the beginning of the conflict the ethnic composition of the country was as 
follows: Sinhalese 73.95%, Sri Lankan Tamils 12.7%, Indian Tamils 5.52%, Moors (Muslims) 7.05%, and Others 0.77%. However, the 
civil war has caused a drop in the number of Tamils living in the island, according to the 2012 census making up now 11,2 % (Sri 
Lankan Tamils) and 4,2 % (Indian Tamils) of the population.  
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suspected the Tamil minority to have benefited disproportionally during the colonial period, 
mainly as a result from the usual British divide and rule strategy. As the preferred minority, 
they had privileged access to English education programs provided by missionaries (Bloom 
2003: 58-60). Moreover, residing in areas where land was scarce and infertile, Tamils focused 
on education as a means of advancement (Richards 2013: 9). This, in turn, made them better 
prepared for jobs in the colonial civil service as well as other highly paid position in the 
medical, legal and banking sector (Bloom 2003). Tamils held 60 per cent of the professional 
positions employed by the state at independence in February 1948 (Richards 2013: 9). In 
order to rectify these imbalances, Sinhalese political leaders adopted a series of policies and 
constitutional changes which increasingly reduced Tamil people’s access to education, land 
and employment. In 1956, Solomon Bandaranaike, the leader of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party 
(SLFP), was elected to power on a Singhalese only platform – a proposal to make Sinhala the 
only official language. Consequently, Sinhala dethroned English as the language of 
administration and education for higher employment (Bloom 2003: 60). On the ground, 
resentment between the Sinhalese and Tamil communities was also heightened by 
government-sponsored resettlement schemes which were given new impetus in the post-
independence period, and which resettled at least 165,000 Sinhalese in Tamil-dominated areas 
in the North and East between 1953 and 1981 (Richards 2013: 10).  
The adoption of the “Sinhala-Only-Act” led to a non-violent civil disobedience by Tamil 
political groups. The Federal Party (FP) – which was founded in 1946 as the leading political 
party in the Tamil areas – organized a series of so called satyagrahas – a form of nonviolent 
protest originally developed by Mahatma Gandhi in the Indian independence struggle (Bloom 
2003: 61). Despite increased Tamil agitation, however, in 1972, increasingly discriminatory 
legislation was enacted under a new constitution. It made Buddhism the state religion, 
eliminated protections for minorities contained in the post‐independence constitution of 1947, 
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and – perhaps most far‐reaching of all – introduced quotas and unequal examination 
requirements to prevent Tamils from entering university and public and professional service 
(especially in medicine and engineering) on merit alone (Bose 1994: 69–71). This 
‘standardization’, as it was called, had a significant effect of reducing the numbers of young 
Tamils who gained access to higher education, thereby limiting their employment prospects 
(De Votta 2009); Bose (1994: 71) describes them as the ‘urban petty bourgeoisie’ who were 
important as a breeding ground for the LTTE. Aware that the consensual strategy of the FP 
had largely failed to produce any meaningful improvement, younger Tamils began to 
contemplate armed struggle as the only way forward (Hopgood 2005: 9). In the 1970s there 
was a proliferation of Tamil militant movements: new ones emerged and old ones split 
(Thiranagama 2010). One of them was called the Tamil National Tigers (TNT), which was 
founded in 1973 by Vellupillai Prabhakaran and renamed the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE) in 1976. Moreover, the increasing frustration among the Tamil community 
culminated in the victory of a coalition of Tamil parties, the Tamil United Liberation Front 
(TULF), that fought the 1977 election on the sole issue of obtaining a separate sovereign 
state, Tamil Eelam (De Votta 2009: 1028).  
In 1979 the government promulgated the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), which allowed 
security forces to detain suspects for up to 18 months without trial. Moreover, for the police 
and the army the law was a convenient excuse to arrest without warrants, search and seizures, 
and long-term detention without trial or communication with family (De Votta 2009: 1028; 
Bloom 2003). However, rather than suppressing increased militant violence, the PTA 
provoked Tamil militants to escalate violence in the 1980s. Attacks by the LTTE and other 
militant groups on the police and the military as well as on so-called anti-social elements 
increased in intensity and frequency (Swamy 1994: 65). This, in turn, led security forces to 
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react with even more repressive countermeasures, leading to a spiral of increasing brutality 
and tit for tat violence (Bloom 2003: 62).  
It was, however, in 1983 only, after massive anti-Tamil riots, that recruitment to and support 
for militant activism exploded and small scale militancy turned into a large-scale armed 
conflict. The initial catalyst was an LTTE attack on an army convoy on 23 July 1983 outside 
Jaffna, in which thirteen soldiers were killed (Swamy 2003: 1-7). Anti‐Tamil riots began the 
following day in Colombo, after the army publicly displayed the soldiers’ corpses, and spread 
throughout Sri Lanka (Tambiah 1996: 15, 21-22). The riots left as many as 2,000 dead on 
Tamil estimates (350 according to the government), created up to 100,000 Tamil refugees, 
and destroyed thousands of Tamil‐owned homes, shops, and businesses (ibid. 22). For many 
Tamils “Black July” constituted a crucial turning point. It led to a heighten sense of alienation 
form the Sinhalese community paralleled with a strong identification with “their own 
community”. As one of my respondents describes: 
For the first time we saw that people can be killed in this country and that houses can be burned, so in a 
young mind it was a trauma although you did not experience it yourself you would not sleep for 4 to 5 days. 
During nights you start to cry, you realize how normal people are affected. At that age, the hatred feeling 
emerged and we were thinking why are people treated like animals, we should not allow that to happen and 
also we realized that it is my community who is suffering. So should I simply stay home or should I maybe 
do something? Actually, the riots were one of the main reasons why people started to join the movements 
(C 7). 
After the “Black July” riots, Tamils came to believe that their very survival was possible only 
in a separate state. Militancy thus suddenly became popular. Young people voluntarily left 
their everyday lives behind to join militant groups (Thiranagama 2013a). While the LTTE 
counted no more than 30 fighters by March 1983, the number of militants increased to 10,000 
after the riot (Bloom 2003: 64). People sympathized with the militant groups and were often 
proud of their willingness to resist.  Moreover, they were seen to be seeking redress for the 
suffering that the Sri Lankan government had inflicted on the Tamils, and people thus 




4.2 Escalation and Evolvement of the Armed Conflict  
One of the main consequences of the July riots and the escalation of violence between Tamil 
militants and the Sri Lankan army was that the Indian government, and influential politicians 
in Tamil Nadu, a southern state of India where the majority of the Tamil community lives, 
began to train and equip Tamil militant groups, many of them in camps in India (Bloom 2003: 
65-66). Moreover, in 1987, thousands of troops from an Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) 
were sent to Sri Lanka under the terms of an India–Sri Lanka Accord.11 However, the IPKF 
was unwelcome among Sinhalese as well as among Tamils, particularly the LTTE, who 
quickly realized that India was hardly interested in the plight of Sri Lanka’s Tamils and was 
merely using Tamil rebels to undermine an exceedingly pro-Western Sri Lankan government 
insensitive to India’s security considerations and regional hegemonic status (De Votta 2009: 
1029). By October, the LTTE and the IPKF were at war with each other and, in 1990, the 
IPKF was forced to withdraw after new Sri Lankan President Premadasa allied himself with 
the LTTE in order to drive the IPKF out of the country. Once the IPKF had left, warfare soon 
resumed between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan state. The government employed scorched 
earth policies and tried to defeat the LTTE with overwhelming numerical force. Official death 
squads and show killings for demonstration effect were used to terrorize the Tamil population. 
There were massive human rights abuses in the north and east as well as assaults by air and 
sea (Bloom 2003: 69). Government violence was organized and routinized through a 
systematic campaign of disappearances, turning a blind eye towards the use of rape, 
checkpoint searches aimed at dehumanizing Tamils, widespread torture and the elimination of 
                                                 
11 In May 1987, the Sri Lankan military launched a major military offensive designed to wipe out the LTTE. The resultant destruction 
coupled with political pressure from Tamil Nadu caused Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to impose the Indo-Lanka Peace 
Agreement on Sri Lanka and the LTTE. Sri Lanka and India negotiated the agreement, but the LTTE leader was kept confined to a hotel 
room in New Delhi until he too accepted its conditions. As part of the agreement, the LTTE agreed to decommission its weapons; the Sri 
Lankan government agreed to recognize Tamil (and English), in addition to Sinhala, as official languages, merge the Northern and 
Eastern Provinces, and institute a provincial council system through which Tamils in the northeast were afforded autonomy. India 
promised to militarily assist Sri Lanka to ensure the island’s sovereignty and territorial integrity (De Votta 2009: 1029). 
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whole villages in remote areas (ibid. ; see also Ganguly 2004). However, the LTTE responded 
with equally relentless violence against the Sri Lankan army as well as “internally” against all 
potential opponent voices, including other militant groups who had been fighting for an 
independent Tamil state: 
One by one their rivals and opponents among the Tamil separatist groups succumbed to the relentless 
violence of the LTTE. An essential feature of the process was the physical elimination of the leadership 
of several important Tamil separatist groups, rivals and one-time associates of the LTTE. At its 
foundation […] the LTTE was only one of several separatist groups operating in the Jaffna Peninsula […] 
between 1977 and 1986 the TULF consistently lost ground to the LTTE which dominated public life in 
Jaffna and Tamils in the Peninsula. The LTTE seized the leadership of the movement and was soon 
strong enough to engage in a struggle on two fronts, against the security forces of the Sri Lankan state, 
and in internecine warfare in which it systematically eliminated all rival groups (De Silva 2000: 407-408).   
Having established itself as the sole representative of the Tamil cause, the LTTE became 
increasingly hostile against all Tamils voices other than that of the LTTE itself (Fuglerud 
1999: 636). People who publicly opposed them or their tactics were branded as traitors, killed 
or otherwise silenced (Hoole 2009). From mid-1980s onwards, Tamils became accustomed to 
finding people tied to lamp-post and executed during the night, often carrying posters around 
their necks describing the crimes they had committed against the Tamil nation (Fuglerud 
1999: 50). The treatment of minorities who live or lived among Tamils in the North and East 
has likewise been brutal. The Sinhalese population of Jaffna was ethnically cleansed after the 
LTTE took over in 1990. The LTTE attacked Muslims in the northern and eastern provinces 
at regular intervals between 1984 and 1990 killing over 300 people. Notable among the 
clashes was the August 1990 massacre of 120 Muslims at a mosque in Kattankudy in 
Batticaloa during evening prayers (Klem 2011). Moreover, in October 1990 approximately 
75,000 people – the entire Muslim population of Jaffna – were expelled. The LTTE 
announced over loudspeakers in the streets of the Muslim settlements in the Northern 
Province that the Muslims must leave their homes, villages, and towns, leaving all their 
valuables behind or face death (Imtiyaz and Iqbal 2011). As a result of this terror, the initial 
closeness between civilians and the LTTE started to erode. As we shall see, however, the 
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willingness of LTTE members to sacrifice their lives as well as the presence of the ruthless 
outside enemy, the Sri Lankan army, had a strong impact on support relations between the 
LTTE and Tamil civilians and, to a certain extent, tended to redeem the LTTE of their sins. 
While Tamils increasingly criticized their relentless violence few were ready to completely 
denounce them (see also Fuglerud 1999: 53).   
Between November 1994 and April 1995, the war was interrupted for approximately six 
months as the LTTE and the new government of President Chandrika Kumaratunga 
conducted peace talks. Their failure was notable because it led in October 1995 to the capture 
of Jaffna by the Sri Lankan Army (SLA), causing a so-called exodus of hundreds of 
thousands of Tamils to the South into a sparsely populated area called the Vanni (see Figure 
1). The war continued with increasing ferocity until, in 2001, the LTTE and the government 
signed a ceasefire agreement brokered by the Norwegian government.   
4.3 Failure of Peace Negotiations and Defeat of the LTTE 
In the ceasefire agreement the conflict parties consent to abstain from any offensive military 
operation. Moreover, the armed forces were separated and buffer zones installed between 
government-controlled and rebel-held areas (Höglund 2005). However, despite the strong 
emphasis put on creating the conditions conducive for peace negotiations, the ceasefire period 
was marked by mutual violations (ibid.). Moreover, in 2004, the LTTE Eastern commander 
Karuna split with the LTTE and formed an alliance with the government. Defecting with 
around 5000 militants, he claimed to represent the aspiration of Eastern Tamils. Resentment 
arouse form the fact that, while the higher echelon of the LTTE was dominated by Northern 
Tamils, many of the young cadres fighting on the frontline came from the socio-politically 
disadvantaged rural areas in the East (Walker 2016: 8). Furthermore, another reason for the 
split seem to have been internal rivalries between senior commanders. While peace 
negotiations were ongoing, Pottu Amman, the LTTE intelligence chief, accused Karuna of 
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corruption and summoned him to the North to face corruption charges. However, with a 
potential death sentence awaiting, Karuna chose to defect with a sizeable amount of Eastern 
cadres (Staniland 2012). 
Shortly after defection, an internal war between the LTTE and the Karuna faction broke out, 
forcing the latter to seek shelter from the government (ibid.).  The split within the LTTE 
military wing also coincided with a period of political change in which the Government of Sri 
Lanka began to adopt a more militaristic policy. Under pressure from nationalist elements 
within her party and political base to halt negotiations with the LTTE, President Kumaratunga 
intervened by declaring a state of emergency and used her executive power to dissolve 
parliament. Following subsequent presidential elections in November 2005, Rajapaksa won 
the presidency on a hard-line Sinhala-nationalist ticket. Rajapaksa’s new administration 
stepped up arms purchases and began planning for a resumption of war with a commitment to 
destroy the LTTE (De Votta 2009: 1038-39). Throughout the period of increasing hostilities 
and brutality which followed between 2005 and 2009, the Sri Lankan government adopted 
increasingly aggressive military tactics aimed at ensuring military victory at all cost. 
Disappearances (re-)gained increasing prominence and the intimidation of politicians, and the 
staff of local non-governmental and international organizations became regular occurrences. 
Moreover, although the Sri Lankan government insisted that it was operating a zero-casualty 
policy and was mounting a ‘‘humanitarian rescue’’ of Tamils from the LTTE, the Sri Lankan 
army repeatedly bombed hospitals and, eager to end the war, an area it had designated a no-
fire zone while claiming otherwise, maiming nearly 30,000 and killing over 20,000 Tamil 
civilians. Throughout these final phases of the war, the LTTE’s military wing was completely 
annihilated and the LTTE’s political structures and institutions in the north-east were 
gradually closed down and abandoned as the insurgents lost territory that was incrementally 
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won by the SLA, resulting in the military defeat of the LTTE in May 2009 (Thiranagama 
2013b). 
Sri Lanka has paid a horrendous price for its civil war. The conflict stanched development, 
exacerbated the “brain drain” from the country, militarized and brutalized society, displaced 
about one million people, and killed over 100,000 people including 23,000 government 
troops. Government figures indicate that 6,261 soldiers and 22,000 LTTE cadres were killed 
and 21,551 soldiers wounded in July 2006-May 2009 alone. This means the LTTE lost over 
40,000 cadres during the conflict, considering its own reported casualty figures up to 2006. A 
study by the Harvard Medical School and the University of Washington asserts that at least 
220,000 people perished in Sri Lanka’s civil war from 1975 to 2002 (De Votta 2009 1046-
47). 
4.4 The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam – Ideational and Organizational 
Characteristics 
4.4.1 The LTTE`s Political Program and Symbolic Struggle   
The LTTE`s ideological project was overwhelmingly nationalist. In their political program, 
they portray themselves as ‘the national liberation movement of the Eelam Tamils waging a 
relentless military and political struggle for the total independence of the Tamil homeland’ 
and further explains:  
The LTTE holds the view that Eelam Tamils possess all the basic elements that define a concrete 
characterization of a unique nation. We have a homeland, a historically constituted habitation with a well-
defined territory embracing the Northern and Eastern Provinces, a distinct language, a rich culture and 
tradition, a unique economic life and a lengthy history extending to over three thousand years. As a nation 
we have the inalienable right to self-determination (LTTE 2005: 299).  
This emphasis on protecting and liberating the Tamil nation is a salient, recurrent theme in the 
LTTE’s discourse and propaganda. The LTTE leadership was very skilled in rooting their 
ideology in Tamil tradition and culture and thereby legitimizing themselves as the protector of 
the Tamil nation represented in culture and language (Terpstra and Frerks 2017). For 
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example, the LTTE portrayed their struggle as continuing in a long historical martial tradition. 
LTTE members would generally explain that the name and logo of the insurgency, the 
‘Tiger’, refers to the old royal emblem of the Chola Kings. In the collective memory, those 
were great imperial Kings under whom Tamil culture and Tamil power expanded and 
flourished (Hellmann-Rajanayagam 1994: 56). Songs about the LTTE connected the 
greatness of Prabhakaran with these Kings and presented the LTTE as capable of stepping 
into their footsteps and conquer the north-east of Sri Lanka. Moreover, the geographical 
borders for the imagined Eelam, the ‘historical’ homeland of the Tamil population, coincided 
with the areas where the Tamil-speaking community historically lived (Terpstra and Frerks 
2017).  
While the LTTE was overwhelmingly nationalist, there were some socially progressive 
elements in their political project too. In the early phase of the movement, the LTTE`s 
political advisor, Anton Balangsingham, brought a Marxist-Leninist analysis with him when 
he became more heavily involved in the LTTE form 1979. This influence didn’t go as far as 
that the LTTE had adopted a Marxist ideology but it included some progressive points in its 
program.12 The LTTE presented their objective as a fight against ‘oppression’, ‘exploitation’ 
and ‘social injustice’ that had traditionally characterized the Tamil society and that need to be 
changed, particularly with regard to gender and caste (Bose 1994; De Votta 2009). It actively 
promoted the participation of women in their ranks. Today it is assumed that between 30-40% 
of LTTE fighters were women (Hellmann-Rajanayagam 2008: 9). They eventually went 
through the same training as their male colleagues and were deployed in offensive missions as 
well as in suicide commandos. Moreover, their attire and behavior were very different from 
those of traditional Tamil women (Alison 2003). There is a large debate within the literature 
whether women participation in the LTTE had contribute to the emancipation of Tamil 
                                                 
12 Expert interview researcher, Jaffna, 28 May 2018. 
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women.13 Several scholars content that the main reason why the LTTE recruited women was 
due to a shortage of male recruits while a liberation rhetoric was only used to legitimize this 
strategy (Allison 2003). Moreover, other scholars see the recruitment of Tamil women as a 
form of subjugation to a male, nationalist and oppressive order (Frerks 2016) and claim that 
“[u]nless feminism is linked to humanism, to non-violence, to hybridity and a celebration of 
life over death, it will not provide society with the alternatives that we so desperately seek” 
(Coomaraswamy 1997: 10). However, some authors take a more nuanced stance and stress 
that, while often transformations of gender roles cannot be consolidated in post-conflict 
societies, this doesn’t mean that there aren’t lasting changes in the thinking of female 
combatants themselves. As will be shown in the empirical analysis, participation in armed 
groups can alter female fighter`s perceptions of women`s role in society and raising their 
awareness of the social problems facing women (see also Bose 1994; Hellmann-Rajanayagam 
2008). Moreover, as (Alison 2003: 52) notes women’s commitment to fight for their ethnic 
community or perceived nation can be a form of emancipation and be perceives as just as 
important, or more so, than one’s needs ‘as a woman’.  
Apart from women’s participation in the war, the LTTE deliberately attempted to overcome 
the Tamil caste system which was harsher than its Sinhalese counterpart and represented a 
cleavage that had long contributed to disunity (De Votta 2009). While the success of this 
policy is difficult to assess, it seems that it led to a higher degree of mobility between castes 
than was possible before LTTE rule. The departure of many belonging to the upper Vellalar 
(farming) caste from the north during the conflict helped in this regard. Moreover, Tamils 
from lower castes were represented in significant number in the administrative, political and 
military wings of the LTTE (Terpstra and Frerks 2017; Manoharan 2015). In particular, the 
                                                 
13 For a good overview over the literature see Alison (2003), Hellmann-Rajanayagam (2008), Coomaraswamy (2003), Rajasingham-
Senanayake (2001).    
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LTTE initially drew its membership mostly from Velvetithurai, Vadimaratchi and Point Pedro 
– three major fishing villages in the Northern Province. The leadership of the LTTE 
(including Prabhakaran, who was from Velvetithurai) and a majority of LTTE members were 
consequently from the same fisherman caste (Karaiyar) (Richards 2013: 19). This, however, 
is not to say caste consciousness ceased to exist. Particularly, some conservative Northern 
Vellalar families resented the LTTE for its egalitarian caste practices, and the LTTE was 
relatively circumspect when dealing with certain members of the upper castes (Terpstra and 
Frerks 2017: 298; De Votta 2009). 
Apart from their nationalist ideology, the LTTE used a range of symbolic elements to justify 
their fight and mobilize support among Tamils. Martyrdom – the sacrifice of LTTE cadres – 
was the most central element of this symbolic portrayal of the struggle. As Hellmann-
Rajanayagam (2005: 115) notes, the death of a martyr may reaffirm the cohesion of a 
particular group, may legitimize the group’s convictions and strengthen their self-respect. The 
glorifying cult around cadres transmitted in LTTE propaganda made it clear that these fighters 
were not normal Tamils: they lived exceptional lives and died exceptional deaths. In line with 
this understanding, the LTTE disparaged the term “suicide bombers,” claiming that the 
sacrifice of Black Tigers was best understood within the context of “giving oneself” 
(thatkodai) and not “killing oneself” (thatkolai). LTTE literature also equated the act of dying 
with being “sown” (vitaital), while dead bodies were compared with “seeds” (vittukal) (De 
Votta 2009: 1035). Moreover, Prabhakaran often pointed to LTTE cadres who had perished to 
justify continuing the struggle for eelam despite increasing hardship and suffering (De Votta 
2009: 1035). The LTTE fighters’ commitment to sacrifice is mostly associated with two 
specific symbols which best embody cadres’ devotion to the cause. One is a glass capsule 
containing cyanide which all LTTE members wear around their necks and which is to be used 
in case of capture. Fighters are supposed to bite through the glass and swallow the poison, 
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after which death, painful but relatively quickly, normally follows (Fuglerud 1999: 52). Apart 
from its instrumental use to prevent fighters from giving away information, the cyanide had 
an equally relevant symbolic meaning. It evidences the extraordinary commitment and 
devotion of LTTE fighters and legitimizes the LTTE’ s cause. There are even LTTE songs 
and poems praising the taking of cyanide, thereby reinforcing its legitimizing impact (Roberts 
2005: 496). The other symbol is the Black Tigers, the LTTE`s suicide commando. The Black 
Tigers have been responsible for a number of spectacular military actions and individual 
assassinations of political opponent, and have come to embody the LTTE’s spirit of sacrifice 
(Hopgood 2005). Finally, the LTTE invested considerable resources in institutionalizing the 
cult of martyrdom in rituals, performances and memorials. Black Tigers and other cadre who 
died fighting for eelam were honored with statues, paintings, songs, and photographs, 
invoking and highlighting the price they paid for eelam (De Votta 2009: 1035). During the 
whole year, a range of commemorations of fallen cadres took place where these heroes were 
accorded a type of sainthood. Bavinck (2014: 20) describes in his diary the festivities 
organized during Black Tiger’s Day:  
Today is the day of the Black Tigers, the suicide commandos. Everywhere one sees flags, posters and 
little commemoration chapels with photographs of the fallen heroes. Loudspeakers are blaring martial 
music all day long. The great leader wrote an article in the papers in which he very idealistically calls 
these Black Tigers spiritual heroes, who give their lives for others. 
Within LTTE controlled territory, a “sacred topography” (Robers 2005) has been composed 
through cenotaphs and cemeteries as well as more isolated gravestones where LTTE martyrs 
are buried. These sites are augmented on ritual days by billboard and pictures of specific 
heroes placed at nodal points in the populated areas. The LTTE even set up an Office of Great 
Heroes in 1995 to oversee the memorial sites and mold the martyr’s cult (ibid. 497). Such 
practices helped to reaffirm and cement the existing bond between LTTE members on the one 
hand, and, on the other, to deepen and expand Tamil patriotism and support for the LTTE 
among civilians.         
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4.4.2 The LTTE as a Military Organization – Structure and Recruitment   
The LTTE began their armed struggle in the 1970s as a small guerrilla organization, 
numbering not more than 30 fighters. They used hit and run tactics as well as ambushes and 
bank robberies to attack the Sri Lankan security forces as well as internal opponents and to 
finance their struggle (Swamy 1994). However, from the early 1990s, the LTTE transformed 
their military strategy from guerilla tactics to coordinating large maneuvers with embattled 
frontlines, a form of conventional warfare simulating that of the Sri Lankan state (Klem and 
Maunaguru 2017: 638). Central to this change in military strategy were the consolidation of 
territorial control and the imposition of LTTE rule over the “Tamil homeland” (see below) 
(Klem 2012). The LTTE’s military wing equally transformed from a guerrilla organization to 
a type of regular army with a conventional fighting force (Richards 2013: 16–17). By 2002, 
the military chain of command consisted of a deputy commander under Prabhakaran and a 
number of special commanders in charge of specific subdivisions including the LTTE army 
(the ground forces), the navy (the Sea Tigers), the air force (the Air Tigers) and the LTTE 
intelligence wing, as well as the Black Tigers, the LTTE’s suicide commandos (Terpstra and 
Frerks 2017: 286). The military units were divided into regiments and smaller sub-units 
including brigades, and at the lowest level, squads, and a conventional system of ranks similar 
to the Sri Lankan national army was introduced (Richards 2013: 16). Moreover, new recruits 
had to go through an intensive training phase, meant to socialize them to group norms and to 
promote their identification with their comrades as well as the LTTE as a group (Wood 2008). 
This socialization happened primarily during the initial phase where recruits’ anxiety and thus 
vulnerability to organizational influence is likely to be highest (Van Maanen and Eastin 
1977). All recruits had to go through mandatory basic training that mimicked the training 
systems used by conventional national armies and included both military and political 
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components (Richards 2013: 18).14 Individuals who successfully passed through basic 
training went on to begin advanced training and were assigned to a particular unit in order to 
learn a more specialized set of skills. Punishment was harsh for those trying to escape from 
LTTE training camps and military units, and could include beatings or death (Richards 2013). 
Generally, discipline in the LTTE military wing was historically rigid and upheld over time. 
Cadres had to follow a strict code of moral conduct in which cigarettes, alcohol, and casual 
relationships with the opposite sex were strictly prohibited (Terpstra and Frerks 2017: 287; 
see also Bose 1994). Moreover, they were required to wear a cyanide capsule in the form of a 
pendant at all times with the instruction to commit suicide if they were in imminent danger of 
being captured in order to prevent the enemy from gaining information on the LTTE 
(Richards 2013). Moreover, LTTE cadres were not allowed to get ‘too friendly’ with civilians 
(Terpstra and Frerks 2017). In accordance with this strict policy on discipline, throughout the 
LTTE’s existence, its chain of command was authoritarian and hierarchical, and all cadres 
were obliged to swear an oath of allegiance to the struggle for Tamil Eelam, and more 
particularly to Prabhakaran (Richards 2013: 18). Their performance during battle was closely 
monitored and any unsatisfactory results and breaches of the codes of conduct would be 
punished. All cadres were made aware of the LTTE`s system of punishment, which detailed a 
range of penalties for unsatisfactory performance and for breaches of the code of conduct 
(ibid.).   
Over the course of the conflict, the LTTE relied on a range of strategies to recruit fighters. In 
the first phase, militancy, as Thiranagama (2013a) points out, was popular. Young people 
voluntarily left their everyday lives behind to join militant groups. Following the riots in July 
1983, thousands of young Tamils, both male and female, flocked to Tamil militant groups, 
                                                 




including the LTTE. Many of them came to believe that peaceful co-existence with the 
Sinhalese community is no longer possible and violence is the only mean to get equal rights 
for Tamils (Richards 2013). There was therefore no active LTTE recruitment; rather the 
LTTE was very selective in its recruitment policy and accepted only the most committed 
individuals15. It was only form the early 1990s, after the LTTE had transformed their military 
strategy to a form of conventional warfare and had turned themselves into a quasi-state with 
their own administrative structures (see below), that they started to actively recruit fighters. 
Confronted with falling numbers of volunteers, the LTTE stepped up an extensive recruitment 
campaign to pull youngsters into the movement and mobilize the number of fighters needed to 
coordinate large maneuvers with embattled frontlines (Thiranagama 2013a).16 LTTE 
recruiters regularly visited the schools in areas under LTTE control to screen videos of 
successful LTTE missions and atrocities perpetrated against Tamils. Moreover, children 
attending schools in these areas participated in the Student Organization of Liberation Tigers 
(SOLT) and were taught a history of Sri Lanka which promoted the LTTE’s mandate and 
quest for separatism (Richards 2013: 11).17 Similarly, the LTTE’s cultural unit organized a 
range of street performance in order to spread the LTTE narrative and pull youngsters into the 
movement (De Votta 2009; HRW 2008). Enlistment at that time was voluntary, in the sense 
that there was no physical threat. However, as will be discussed in more detail in the 
empirical part, LTTE recruiters used different forms of material and psychological pressure to 
“convince” new recruits to join. Seeing that the LTTE gave preferential treatment to the 
family members of combatants, some parents of low income families felt compelled to let 
their children go to the LTTE “in order to be fed” (Richards 2013). Moreover, the LTTE 
enforced an unwritten rule that every family was obliged to provide at least one child for the 
                                                 
15 Expert interview priest, Jaffna, 25 May 2018, expert interview researcher, Jaffna, 4 June 2018. 
16 Expert interview, political activist, Jaffna, 4 June 2018. 
17 Expert interview, local researcher, Jaffna, 4 June 2018. 
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struggle (Lilja 2009). And finally some families were threatened with property confiscation or 
physical violence if they appear unwilling to contribute their sons for the cause (HRW 2008).  
While prior to 1998, forcible recruitment by the LTTE had been limited to a few cases, this 
changed markedly after the 2002 ceasefire. The agreement allowed the LTTE to open political 
offices in government-controlled areas. Although the LTTE claimed that these offices were 
used to educate civilians only, human rights activists have shown that the offices were used 
for recruitment purposes, including forced recruitment of children (Richards 2013: 32). 
Moreover, the one child per family policy was extended and implemented more forcefully. 
Often more than one child was taken. LTTE recruiters also went from house to house, made 
radio announcements, and conducted community meetings. If families refused to hand over a 
child, youngsters were often taken by force, particularly in the eastern district of Batticaloa 
(HRW 2008). After September 2008, forced recruitment was resumed more aggressively, just 
as the LTTE began to find itself on the verge of military defeat. During this period, the LTTE 
altered its mandatory rule of one recruit per family to require two or more recruits per family, 
contingent on the size of the family. All the former cadres who had left the LTTE and had 
married and settled down with their families were all being re-recruited. The LTTE also 
enforced progressively tighter restrictions on the movement of civilians in order to prevent the 
escape of potential conscripts. Furthermore, as conflict worsened in early 2009, the LTTE 
continued to conduct more aggressive forcible recruitment campaigns. Often bunches of 
children were taken from places where they used to gather, such as temples and churches. Or 
they were forcibly taken when walking in the streets (Richards 2013: 34-35; HRW 2008; 
Walker 2009). 
4.4.3 LTTE as De Facto State  
As the war escalated in the 1980s and 1990s, the LTTE managed to establish control over 
shifting territories and begun to experiment with institution building and to mimick state 
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functions, thus creating a complicated geography of rebel controlled, government controlled 
and contested areas (Stokke 2006; Mampilly 2011). For militants as well as civilians this 
meant that various different political orders existed next to each other and governed their 
everyday lives (Korf, Engeler and Hagmann 2010). Already in the 1980s, LTTE leaders 
started adjudicating local disputes. The Northern part of Sri Lanka was divided into sections, 
within which the respective commanders exercised control. Makeshift institutions were 
erected to preserve a minimal infrastructure and administer civilian life. Pamphlets with the 
LTTE’s official seal stipulated rules and proper behavior for the Tamil community (Klem and 
Maunaguru 2017: 637). Moreover, once the LTTE had established control over the Jaffna 
peninsula in 1990, it started to experiment with institution building (Stokke 2006). The 
creation of an LTTE bank and a new currency and the establishment of a police force and 
courts gave shape to a so-called “Eelam” state in Jaffna ((Klem and Maunaguru 2017: 637). 
This process was disrupted when the government drove the LTTE out of Jaffna in 1995. In 
the following “exodus” the LTTE forced a large part of Jaffna’s population to abandon the 
peninsula and flee with them to the Vanni, the sparsely inhabited region to the south. The 
movement controlled most of that region from 1996 until their defeat in 2009, and it was there 
that the LTTE de facto state took on its most elaborate form (ibid.). The LTTE set up its own 
administrative structures, such as police, judiciary and tax collection, while allowing the 
continuation of the Sri Lankan state services in the general administration and the provision of 
social services. These state services, however, functioned in close collaboration with, if not 
under the complete control of, the LTTE (Terpstra and Frerks 2017: 287). Moreover, the 
group also created institutions to oversee exit/entry, development, broadcasting, banking, 
education, revenue collection, health, sports, farming, environment, and industry, with plans 
and blueprints created for road and railway links, seaports, and airports (De Votta 2009: 
1033). The LTTE thus bolstered their claim to be the sole representative of Tamils by creating 
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the basic institutions of the future Tamil Eelam. Indeed, and partly as a result of LTTE 
propaganda, many of my interviewees would describe that they felt as if they lived in “their 
state”, implying that eelam was extant, yet only had to be consolidated territorially and 
recognized internationally (see also Klem 2012; De Votta 2009). By contrast, in the Eastern 
part, territorial control was much more fragmented and remained contested over the course of 
the conflict. Some pockets were controlled by the LTTE while in the rest of the territory, 
mainly the coastal towns and main streets, the state security forces were dominant but the 
LTTE had a strong covered presence and influence (Korf, Engeler and Hagmann 2010: 393). 
Moreover, it is the most ethnically and religiously diverse part of the country. Tamil, 
Sinhalese and Muslim communities often live within walking distance from each other in 
smaller and larger pockets (Goodhand, Klem and Korf 2009: 685). For the population living 
in these areas this meant that levels of security and insecurity were constantly changing as 
front lines shifted back and forth (Fuglerud 1999). Moreover, political orders changed with 
these shifting power differentials and civilians thus had to deal with different orders of rules 
and rulers over time and space (sometimes between day and night) (Korf, Engeler and 
Hagmann 2010: 393).  
In addition to their control over significant territory, the LTTE established an international 
support structure that was highly successful in generating financial and ideational support 
from the Tamil diaspora communities living in North America, Western Europe and the Asia-
Pacific. Much of the Tamil Diaspora stems from a wave of Sri Lankan emigration that was 
first triggered by the July riots in 1983. Moreover, once violence escalated into large-scale 
violence in the late 1980ies, emigration increased, leading to large Tamil diasporic 
communities in several Western states. These communities – which are often referred to as 
“little Jaffna’s” – constitute self-administered Tamil zones with their own media, shops, 
services, and business outlets (Chalk 2008). In the 2000s, the Tamil Diaspora was estimated 
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to number between 600,000 and 800,000.18 In countries where large numbers of Tamils have 
settled, the LTTE has moved to set up front organizations to help manage, control, and 
integrate the support of the respective expatriate community (ibid.). Generally, the LTTE’s 
global diaspora support network was active in two main areas: publicity and propaganda and 
finance generation (Wayland 2004). The main goal of the LTTE’s international propaganda 
campaign was to galvanize international support port for its political cause, while 
simultaneously discrediting the Sinhalese government. The message conveyed was consistent 
over the years and contained three principal elements: Tamils are the innocent victims of 
Sinhalese discrimination and repression, The LTTE is the only group capable of defending 
and promoting the interests of the Sri Lankan Tamil community and there can be no peace in 
Sri Lanka until the country’s Tamils are granted their own independent state (Chalk 2008). 
The message distributed by LTTE support organizations addresses both national governments 
as well as Tamil diaspora communities. The latter were mobilized in support of “their 
homeland” through regular social gatherings and community events (McDowell 1996; 
Wayland 2004). The effectiveness of the LTTE`s propaganda campaign can be measured by 
the high degree of legitimacy the group has been granted by most Tamil diaspora 
communities as well as their host government. Certainly for most of the 1990s and despite its 
involvement in numerous terrorist attacks, the LTTE was perceived as a genuine national 
liberation movement that fights for independence against an oppressive Sinhalese dominated 
state (Chalk 2008).19  
Alongside propaganda, the LTTE proved very sophisticated in establishing a international 
revenue-generating structure that draws from three main sources: direct diaspora 
                                                 
18 Most Tamil migrants concentrate in the following seven countries: Canada (320,000), the United Kingdom (300,000), India (150,000), 
France (100,000), Germany (60,000), Australia (53,000), and Switzerland (40,000) (Chalk 2008). 
19 It was only towards the end of the conflict that those states most closely associated with the Tamil Diaspora have moved to take a harder 
line against the LTTE, thereby contributing to their defeat. The UK government banned the group in 2001, with similar measures 
enacted in Canada and the European Union (EU, which has pertinence for both Germany and France) not until 2006. 
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contributions; funds siphoned off from contributions given to NGOs, charities and benevolent 
donor groups; and investments made in legitimate, Tamil-run businesses. The exact amount 
generated from each of the described sources is unknown. Combined, however, they are 
thought to provide an annual income base of between $200 and $300 million (Chalk 2008).  
4.5 Securitization and Reintegration of Tamil Combatants  
After the war was declared over, 285,000 Tamils from the war zone were interned by the state 
in mass camps for ‘‘security clearance’’ and kept there for nearly a year (Thiranagama 
2013b). In these camps former members of the LTTE were separated from civilians and taken 
into custody. Most of the 12,000 identified ex-cadres then had to undergo a rehabilitation 
period in so called Protective Accommodation and Rehabilitation Centers run under the 
Ministry of Defense that lasted between several months and several years (McRaith 2012). 
While the government proclaims its rehabilitation program a “complete success” that 
provided ex-cadres with a range of programs to develop their socio-economic skills as well as 
access to psychological counselling, independent studies as well as my own research show 
that most ex-combatants did not benefit from training programs or psychological support 
during their time in the rehabilitation centers. Rather, they experienced rehabilitation as an 
unproductive waiting period till they were finally released and reunited with their families 
(Ibid.; Friedmann 2018).  
Once rehabilitated and released, ex-combatants faced further difficulties when trying to 
establish “new lives” as civilians. Reintegration occurred in a post-war context that is best 
characterized as ‘victor’s peace’. Emerging out of a military victory, the Sri Lankan 
government adopted a triumphant attitude and used its victory to consolidate its hegemonic 
power rather than to address the root causes of the preceding conflict (Subedi and 
Bulathsinghala 2018). Since the end of the war, the government prioritized infrastructure 
development as part of its peace-through-development policy (ibid.), and used ethno-
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nationalist policies and repressive practices to deal with the Tamil population in general and 
ex-combatants in particular (Höglund and Kovacs 2010). Militarization was one of the key 
elements of the strategy used by the government to control the Tamil community and prevent 
potential relapse into violence. The state securitized certain identities (the Tamil population, 
particularly the youth and former combatants) and geographical areas (the conflict-affected 
areas, particularly the Vanni). Securitization was then used to legitimize and justify 
militarization as the only means to counter threats posed by these securitized areas and 
populations (Satkunanathan 2016). In Northern Sri Lanka, particularly the Vanni and to a 
lesser extent in the East, the army`s influence ran very deep, with excessive scrutiny and 
surveillance of ex-combatants, communities, non-governmental organizations and every 
potential of grass-root initiatives, even if a simple gathering of a handful of people. Prior 
notification was required to be given to the army of any meeting or workshop held. Even 
when notification was given, if there were participants from outside the Vanni, sometimes 
army officers attended the meeting and observed the proceedings (Jegatheeswaran and 
Arulthas 2017). Alongside militarization, the government aggressively built a hegemonic 
narrative of the war that was solely about (Sinhalese) victory and the (Sinhalese) valiant 
soldier. There was no public acknowledgement of the loss and grief experienced by civilians 
who lost family members in the armed conflict. Moreover, with the glorification of the 
warrior-citizen, a collective (majoritarian) memory was created through celebrations of the 
war victory, military parades and the construction of memorials of members of the Sri Lankan 
armed forces who died in battle (Subedi and Bulathsinghala 2018). And finally, the military 
effectively controlled the local economy and has emerged as a high-level economic player in 
the north and east. Military personnel is involved in different forms of agricultural business 
using land that had been taken over from local villages. There are grocery shops and 
department stores run by the military in the north as well as a brand of hotel. And finally, the 
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military also influences the school environment. In the northern districts, the Civil Defence 
Unit of the military had been running 344 primary schools, employing 689 Tamil women as 
teachers (Jegatheeswaran and Arulthas 2017). These actions of the government created a 
sense of alienation amongst Tamil communities and led them view post conflict development 
with skepticism (Satkunanathan 2016; Thiranagama 2013b).  
However, the change in the government in January 2015 has opened up more space for 
political discussion around transitional justice and reconciliation and decreased the degree of 
militarization in the north. The military continues to engage in farming and local businesses; 
however, its influence in local development decision-making has reduced, as the civilian 
authorities are now increasingly making local development decisions (Subedi and 
Bulathsinghala 2018). Notwithstanding these positive developments, there are still a range of 
conflict issues which hinder reconciliation and question the state`s willingness to promote a 
sustainable peace in Sri Lanka. Insignificant progress has been made in the investigations of 
enforced or involuntary disappearances. However, for affected communities knowing the 
truth about what happened to lost family members is a crucial first step to post-war healing 
and reconciliation (Höglund and Orjuela 2013). Moreover, Tamils, as well as Muslims from 
the North and East, are convinced that the development process is intended to deliberately 
alter the demographic imbalances in the North and East, as more Sinhala business people and 
non-business people migrated from the South and settled in the North (Subedi and 
Bulathsinghala 2018).20 And finally, progress to guarantee the political inclusion of the Tamil 
and Muslim minorities in the decision-making process by devolving more power to the 
provincial councils in the North and East is slow and marked by repeated setbacks.21 
However, considering that the armed conflict was centrally rooted in a flawed post-colonial 
                                                 
20 Expert interview, political activist, Jaffna, 4 June 2018; expert interview journalist, Jaffna, 11 June 2018. 
21 Expert interview social worker, Jaffna, 8 July 2018. 
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state building process, which excluded minorities from the centralized state system, national 
reconciliation in Sri Lanka has an inherent political dimension that must be addressed through 
structural changes that ensure devolution of power, political inclusion and good governance 




5 Joining the LTTE – Pathways to Militant Activism 
When I started to interview former members of the LTTE about their decision to take up 
arms, I expected them to have joined because of prior political activism, their commitment to 
an independent Tamil state, family networks etc. –  all the factors that have been singled out 
as critical in the literature to explain mobilization. But to my surprise, most of my respondents 
faced difficulties to clearly identify the factor that made them take up arms; rather, when 
talking about their motivation to join, they would describe in length how everyday life was in 
their villages and that it was due to this everyday life context that they began to think about 
joining the LTTE. 
Civil wars have a tremendous capacity to segment space and authority. While one area is fully 
controlled by the state’s security forces, another area is controlled by rebel groups and in 
other areas control is contested between different actors. It is thus not uncommon in a war 
context that different political orders exist next to each other and that people living in 
different regions within the same state territory are exposed to quite different everyday lives. 
While people living in rebel controlled zones might lead a relatively stable life in a de facto 
“rebel state” and be gradually socialized into a “rebel society”, someone living in a contested 
area might be constantly on the run, trying to avoid being trapped in the crossfires. These 
different everyday contexts, in turn, shape how civilians make decisions on the ground 
(Arjona 2014; Kalyvas 2006). As Petersen (2001: 1) argues: “Whether individuals come to act 
as rebels or collaborators, killers or victims, heroes or cowards during times of upheaval is 
largely determined by the nature of their everyday social, economic, and political life.”  
The local socio-political context is certainly not the only factor influencing individual 
decision making but most studies about mobilization into militancy include situational 
contexts as one of the relevant dimensions to understand how and when individuals join 
armed groups (Bosi and Della Porta 2012; Hwang and Schulze 2018; Viterna 2013). Most of 
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the works exploring pathways to militancy, however, analyze variation in situational contexts 
over time while neglecting variation of contexts across space. Socio-political contexts of 
mobilization, however, not only change in time but differ across space. An individual who 
lives in a rebel controlled zone mobilizes in a very different socio-political context than 
someone living in a contested area. The ambition of this chapter is thus to attempt a more 
systematic account of the role of variation in socio-political contexts during armed conflicts. 
More precisely, it looks at the first stage of my interviewees’ militant trajectory, namely 
participation, the path through which they joined the LTTE. In particular, I argue that, 
depending on the area where individuals live during civil wars, they are exposed to different 
political orders and thus experience the conflict in different ways. These differences, in turn, 
influence their decision to take up arms, thereby leading to different paths towards militancy 
across space. 
Building on the narratives of former LTTE militants combined with theory-oriented, 
deductive thinking based on existing literature on civil wars and political violence, this 
chapter, first, argues that we can analytically distinguish between three different mobilization 
areas which might emerge during war and which result in variation with regard to some of the 
central factors consequential for mobilization, such as the type of repression civilians are 
exposed to, the networks that facilitate recruitment and individual motivations that underpin 
militant engagement. Second, I use the narratives of my interviewees to demonstrate 
empirically that, depending on the area where they mobilize, recruits follow different 
pathways to militancy.  
5.1 Territory and Control during Civil Wars   
With regard to armed conflicts, practitioners of violence, such as Mao (1961), Guevara (1969) 
or Marighella (1970), have long ago pointed to the relevance of territory and control to 
understand dynamics of violence. In their writings, they stress the importance of challenging 
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control over territory and gaining safe zones in order to facilitate rebellion. Building on these 
practical accounts, territory became a central element in major theories of armed conflict 
(Staniland 2010: 42). Various scholars have stressed the importance of so-called “safe 
havens” to explain the emergence, persistence and decline of armed groups. Rebels might use 
safe territories to confront the legitimacy of the state by proposing to the local population “an 
alternative entity in which to place their loyalty” (Bosi 2013: 81) and create collective 
identities based on affective attachment to “traditional homelands” (Toft 2002), to facilitate 
recruitment (Kubota 2011), and/or to gain access to financial and logistical resources 
(Korteweg 2008). Moreover, scholars have shown that the control over territory impacts the 
violent tactics armed groups are able to employ and hence their bargaining capacity (De la 
Calle and Sanchez-Cuenca 2012), and provides a central precondition for armed groups to 
build different forms of rebel governance (Arjona 2016). Finally, control over territory affects 
the type of violence against civilians during war (Balcells 2010; Kalyvas 2006).  
While scholars have analyzed the relevance of territory for different aspects of political 
violence, research on mobilization into militancy has largely focused on singling out one 
causal factor or a set of factors that typically lead individuals to take up arms (Collier and 
Hoeffler 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Popkin 1979). This has often led scholars to de-
contextualize mobilization and isolate it from its socio-spatial environment (Goodwin 2004). 
However, while many of these works pay indeed little attention to socio-spatial contexts, 
criticism that contextualization is generally lacking in studies on mobilization into armed 
groups is only partially correct (Malthaner and Waldmann 2014: 981). Comparative 
sociological research as well as scholars using approaches from social movement theory have 
empathized since the 1980s that micro-mobilization dynamics are embedded and shaped by 
political and social contexts (Della Porta 1995; Popkin 1979; Wickham-Crowley 1992). 
Moreover, more recent accounts on micro-mobilization have shown that individuals follow 
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different paths towards violent activism and that each of these paths is the result of an 
interplay of different factors, among which situational contexts figure prominently (Bosi and 
Della Porta 2012; Hwang and Schulze 2018; Viterna 2006: 2013). However, a s has been 
mentioned already these works analyze variation in mobilization patterns over time, while 
neglecting variation across space. In order to address this gap in the literature, in the next 
sections, I discuss analytically and empirically how variation in socio-political contexts result 
in differences in mobilization patterns among militant activists. 
5.2 A Typology of Mobilization Areas  
This section discusses different mobilization areas which might emerge during civil wars and 
which provide the local everyday context in which mobilization occurs, and posits how these 
socio-political contexts shape individual trajectories into militant activism.22 As a starting 
point to categorize different territorial areas, I build on Kalyvas work (2006) and distinguish 
three different mobilization areas according to the actors in control of the area and the degree 
to which they exert control. 
In rebel controlled areas state security forces are prevented from acting within the zone and 
typical government functions, such as tax collection, security and welfare are absent or 
controlled and/or provided by the armed groups. This, in turn, allows them to relatively 
“safely” manage legal and/or illegal activities, recruit, train, and obtain resources, foster an 
oppositional consciousness, and legitimize their vision of society (Bosi 2013: 81; Korteweg 
2008, 64). Examples of armed groups with substantive control over territory include the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) who controlled large territory in the 
Columbian rainforest and mountains where they engaged in a broad range of activities in 
                                                 
22 I do not imply that the places described cover all potential places in all forms of political violence. Rather, my effort is to provide a 
framework of mobilization places that might be relevant for many conflicts and that might be used as a reference for finding further 
contexts relevant for shaping micro-mobilization. 
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support of their armed campaign, such as training, the collection of resources, the provision of 
state services and recruitment (Arjona 2016) or the New People’s Army who controlled large 
areas in Northern Philippines which served as their recruitment and support bases (Podder 
2012).  
In government controlled areas state authorities exert effective administrative and coercive 
power and armed groups – if present – are forced to operate clandestinely. While prevented 
from operating openly, armed groups, such al-Jamaa al-Islamiyya in Egypt (Malthaner 2015), 
the Armed Islamic Group in Algeria (Hafez 2000) or the Farabundo Martí National Liberation 
Front in El Salvador (Wood 2003), can still “capture” neglected or partly protected locations, 
such as universities or churches, as well as shantytowns in the suburbs of larger cities that 
offer some degree of protection from state persecution and, more importantly, constitute 
spatial foci where armed groups can establish and maintain ties to local populations and 
thereby mobilize support for their campaign (Malthaner and Waldmann 2014).  
Beyond the constraints of these two zones lie contested areas in which both, government and 
rebel groups, tend to hold semi-controlled territory and exercise only incomplete authority. 
Moreover, contested places are areas of operations where armed groups regularly engage in 
guerilla attacks or, depending on their military capacity, in more conventional warfare against 
state security forces. Rebels face more difficulties to engage in open recruitment in these 
zones; however, they can often capitalize on so-called push factors, such as the experience of 
high levels of violence and the destruction of livelihoods, that motivate people to join 
(Kalyvas and Kocher 2007; Borum and Fein 2017).      
Distinguishing between these different areas is relevant as variation in control and authority 
within these areas lead to variation with regard to some of the central factors considered as 
relevant to shape mobilization (Bosi and Della Porta 2012; Viterna 2013). In the following, I 
will discuss each of the three mobilization areas in more detail and develop analytically how 
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mobilization patterns can be expected to vary as a result from the mentioned differences in 
territorial control and the degree of rebel authority. I focus in particular on expected variations 
regarding the networks most consequential for mobilization, the degree and type of repression 
and the central motivation underpinning mobilization. This discussion constitutes the basis for 
the empirical analysis in the next section, which will demonstrate empirically how the 
mechanisms that shape pathways to militancy vary in the different areas.  
 
1) Rebel controlled area: In rebel controlled areas armed groups act as the main authority 
and therefore are in a privileged position to distribute incentives, change beliefs and 
transform available alternatives in ways that make mobilization more likely (Arjona 
2016: 267). The rebel networks can thus be expected to be particularly consequential in 
shaping mobilization pathways in this areas. The main areas where this influence can 
transform incentives to mobilize include the provision of public goods and services to 
civilians in order to increase rebels` reputation while, at the same time, making non-
cooperation costly (Mamphilly 2011: 54), the militarization of local authorities and 
public institutions, especially the education system, which allows rebels to more easily 
spread their narratives and socialize people into their world views (Wood 2008) and the 
self-presentation of rebels as the powerful individuals who can harm, thereby eliciting 
admiration and excitement among youngsters who crave for adventure and status (Vale 
2018: 13). While, exposure to government repression can be expected to play a minor 
role in shaping mobilization trajectories in this area, rebel control facilitates the use of 
more coercive recruitment techniques by armed groups as they can more easily penetrate 
networks and obtain information while civilians have few options in terms of migration 
or denunciation (Eck 2014: 383). Following from the mentioned characteristics of rebel 
controlled areas, a sense of moral and social obligation to contribute to the fight resulting 
from processes of socialization and indoctrination (Arjona 2017), and fear of punishment 
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in cases of non-compliance (Eck 2014) are the motivations that most likely underpin 
mobilization in this area.  
2) Government controlled area: Mobilization in government controlled areas is 
characterized by the fact that armed groups have to operate clandestinely. This means 
that their capacity to mentally “seize” populations and socialize them into their 
worldview as well as to promote mobilization via the provision of public goods tends to 
be limited (Kubota 2011). However, processes of socialization and connection to militant 
activities might still occur in and through personal networks, such as small circle of 
friends – what Della Porta (1995) calls “micro-mobilization-contexts” – where 
individuals adopt frames and interpretations that stress the need and justify violence and 
are presented with concrete options to participate in militancy (Borum and Fein 2017; 
Malthaner and Waldmann 2014). Moreover, the repressive measures adopted by the 
government to undermine oppositional activities by targeting alleged or real supportive 
milieus, such as ethnic or religious communities, tends to further radicalize supporters as 
a reaction to what they perceive the persecution of “their” community by the police or 
due to societal suspicion more general (Della Porta 1995: 163; Malthaner 2014: 644). 
The motivations promoting mobilization are thus most likely a sense of frustration and 
humiliation about repression exerted against their communities and/or the instrumental 
belief that violence is the only or most effective means to change the (perceived) 
injustice (Bosi and Della Porta 2012). 
3) Contested area: In contested areas civilians are often affected by violence in a repeated 
and direct way and repression can therefore be expected to be the factor most 
consequential in shaping mobilization in this areas. Particularly in irregular wars where 
rebel fighters depend on civilian support, the latter become a convenient target for 
security forces who often lack the necessary information on who is a rebel. People 
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therefore often feel trapped between “two evils” (Kalyvas 2006: 224) and mobilize in 
order to get some form of protection and stability (Kalyvas and Kocher 2007: 186), to 
express moral outrage about the killing of their loved ones (Wood 2003: 233) or to 
protect their communities (Bosi and Della Porta 2012). While rebel groups have less 
direct access to people`s everyday lives in contested areas and thus might face problems 
to recruit people through socialization and indoctrination, they might capitalize on the 
violence exerted against civilians by security forces by presenting themselves as the 
“good guys” that offer protection from violence (Viterna 2014) and a potentially a better 
future for the communities they are fighting for (Sanín and Wood 2014).  
5.3 Some Chapter-specific Notes on Methodology  
As mentioned in the introduction, the general idea for the typology emerged from the 
empirical analysis of data collected through my first round of field research between May 
2017 and July 2018 in North-Eastern Sri Lanka. After this first round of interviews, I 
transcribed all interviews and started to analyze them focusing on variations in mobilization 
patterns. However, as has been pointed out most of my respondents faced difficulties to 
clearly identify the factor that made them take up arms but would rather start to describe their 
everyday life context as central for their decision to mobilize. When focusing my analysis on 
these everyday contexts, I found that, depending on their geographic location, respondents 
followed different paths to militancy. Based on this pattern, I went back to the literature on 
civil wars and political violence and analytically constructed the presented typology of 
mobilization areas. For the further analysis of my data, I then used the developed typology to 
describe variation of paths depending on socio-spatial contexts. However, as I only conducted 
interviews with ex-combatants who mobilized in either rebel controlled or contested areas23, 
                                                 
23 14 respondents mobilized in areas controlled by the LTTE in the Northern part of Sri Lanka and 16 respondents mobilized in areas where 
control was contested between the government and the LTTE, mainly in North-Eastern Sri Lanka (see chapter on Methodology). 
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in January 2019, I did another round of field research with the aim to explore the pathways to 
militancy of former LTTE members who mobilized from government controlled territory or 
from places outside Sri Lanka. Due to security concerns, it was, however, not possible to 
conduct further field research in Sri Lanka and I therefore tried to identify potential interview 
candidates from within the diaspora communities in the UK. Through this second round of 
field research, I managed to conduct two additional life history interviews with former LTTE 
members who joined the LTTE from Colombo, the Sri Lankan capital, that was under 
government control during the whole conflict. Moreover, in order to gain further evidence on 
this potential path, I used one detailed biographical account, describing the path to militancy 
of another former LTTE member mobilizing from Colombo. While the data allows me to 
tentatively show that there seems to be a third path people within government controlled 
territory follow to militancy, it is important to note that these findings don’t equal the depth of 
data for the other two paths and therefore have to be treated with more caution.   
5.4 How Socio-Political Contexts Shape Mobilization Paths 
In the following paragraph, I use the narratives of my respondents to ideal-typically show 
how interviewees who lived in different areas during the Sri Lankan civil war followed 
different paths to militancy. All of my interviewees mobilized between 1989 and 2003, thus 
once the war had been ongoing for several years and different mobilization areas as described 
in the theoretical part had emerged. Each of the following sections will focus on one of the 
described mobilization areas: the first section analyzes mobilization paths of those 
respondents who lived in areas controlled by the LTTE (type 1 – rebel controlled areas), the 
second section focuses on those respondents who mobilized in areas where control was 
contested between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government (type 2 – contested areas) and 
the third section discusses mobilization paths in government controlled areas (type 3 – 
government controlled areas). The analysis will demonstrate that the pathways individuals 
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follow in the different areas differ with regard to the networks relevant for mobilization, the 
degree and type of repression experienced as well as the individual motivations underpinning 
mobilization.  
5.4.1 Militarization and Everyday Lives in Rebel Controlled Areas 
All of the respondents following this path to militancy mobilized in areas in the North of Sri 
Lanka that were controlled by the LTTE. Their full control over territory allowed LTTE 
members to militarize the educational system and to penetrate young people`s everyday lives, 
thereby exposing them to a particular LTTE narrative that promoted fighting as a moral 
responsibility for young people and made them belief that they should contribute to the armed 
struggle. Mobilization paths by respondents living in LTTE controlled territory were thus 
strongly marked by their socialization into a militarized environment dominated by the LTTE. 
They grew up knowing LTTE members from their early childhood. They lived “among them” 
as they would often describe it. The continuous exposure to the LTTE narrative during their 
impressionable years – the time when they become more aware of the social and political 
world and seek a sense of self (Fillieule 2013: 2) – influenced their perception of the conflict 
as well as their beliefs about their role in society. 
Most of my respondents learnt about the history of the conflict and the reason why the LTTE 
was fighting through LTTE propaganda events or when talking to elders or relatives who 
were members of the LTTE:  
In the streets here, the LTTE organized meetings (…). This is how I learned about why LTTE is fighting. 
We were in a fully controlled LTTE area; we only knew what LTTE said, there was no opportunity to 
learn what the government was thinking. And also the LTTE campaign was in such a way to really 
convince that the government oppresses us. And we were thinking this is right because we had nothing to 
compare it with (5). 
It was thus a particular LTTE narrative that was reproduced by symbols and propaganda to 
which young people were exposed to (Thiranagama 2013a). This narrative stressed the 
continuous suffering of Tamils and portrayed violence as the only possible means to protect 
95 
 
the Tamil community, fostering a `sense of we` based on shared perceptions of grievances 
and threat (Benford and Snow 2000). Moreover, the narrative made it clear that youngsters as 
“the `bearers` of the future” (Marks 1996: 150) have to lead the struggle for a better future for 
their community:  
My school was in an LTTE controlled area, so they will come and talk to the children (…). They talked 
about the history, how the Sinhala government treated us (…). They said, we don`t have rights, we don`t 
have a land, we are a minority, whatever we say in parliament is not taken seriously, so we have to fight 
and get our own country. It should be reached by you, then we can have a good life. If you sacrifice your 
life the future generation will have a good education and a good life. When they deliver a speech, it will 
really motivate us (8). 
While forced recruitment was rare before the very last period of the war, LTTE recruiters 
were very skilful in penetrating the social spaces of students and pulling even unwilling 
youngsters into the movement: 
There was a team assigned for recruiting people, they will wait in these junctions (…) then they will stop 
them and start to talk, talk, talk, and they will convince them to join. I mean if you are a strong 
personality you would say no, I will not join, leave me alone but our boys and girls here, they do not have 
this kind of personality. If LTTE recruiters stand next to them and pressure them, many will go.24 
Especially listening to the personal stories of LTTE cadres made respondents believe that it is 
their responsibility to protect their community and contribute to the fight: “When they deliver 
the speech they share their own experience. And then I thought, they also left their parents, so 
why shouldn`t I do the same? (9)” After these talks, many of my respondents felt that it is on 
them to do something to support the struggle and that it would be selfish to focus on their 
studies and their future while LTTE members – “they were like us” (3) – were sacrificing 
their lives. Particularly within those families or circle of friends where someone had joined 
the LTTE, the pressure to do the same grew:  
When I did O level, when I was 16, my aunt, my mother`s sister she was a captain in LTTE and she died. 
And the uncle he also was a commander but then he was sent abroad. And one of my best friends he joined. 
All were there. I did my O level and I was studying bioscience in advanced level but I felt I need to do 
something I cannot study anymore. That time in April, I decided to join with LTTE (12). 
                                                 
24 Interview researcher, London, 30 January 2019.  
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The social and moral pressure to contribute to the struggle was reinforced by LTTE members 
who – in propaganda sessions in schools as well as in personal talks in the street – would 
continuously praise those youngsters in the neighbourhoods who had joined and compare 
their bravery to the selfishness of those who stay home and study while “their community is 
dying” (for more details see next chapter): “When they talked to boys they always said 'do 
you know this girl in the neighbourhood? She is a girl and she is younger but she joined. Why 
don’t you join? ' Are you afraid? It was really hard to say no. And we felt we should 
contribute” (5).  
While respondents living in LTTE controlled territory were rarely personally exposed to 
violence by the government forces, atrocities committed by the Sri Lankan army were present 
in all LTTE propaganda and recruitment sessions as well as in memories and stories of family 
members. Most of the LTTE produced documentaries and movies would show in detail how 
Tamil civilians – especially women and children – are tortured and killed (Brun 2008). Many 
of my respondents remember how they felt “the urge to do something and go” when watching 
the LTTE movies during recruitment sessions, with friends or during tuition classes and 
seeing all the atrocities against Tamils. 
In addition to the social and moral pressure exerted on youngsters, the LTTE also attracted 
youth with their militant lifestyle. Living in LTTE controlled territory meant that respondents 
were continuously surrounded by LTTE cadres with arms and uniforms as well as exposed to 
LTTE rituals and symbols, evoking admiration, excitement and curiosity: “When I saw these 
cadres, LTTE girls especially (…) they were able to carry heavy artilleries, they were able to 
handle them equally to boys. It was really impressive“ (19). As Thiranagama (2011: 213-214) 
notes the military culture, best exemplified in the symbolism of heroism and sacrifice, 
implemented by the LTTE in areas they controlled, created a new route to status and power 
for youngsters. Many of my respondents would describe how their excitement about the 
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LTTE`s militant lifestyle combined with the respect LTTE members got by community 
members made them want to be part of the LTTE:  
They had very nice uniforms and arms and everyone admired them when they were walking along the 
streets. There as a lot of respect in the community. You could see it in the body language of people. At 
that time, I was fascinated by that. And I liked to wear the LTTE uniform of my brother. 
Then, one day, some big LTTE persons were coming and told me, you come and join us 
then you can wear this uniform, so I went with them (7). 
It was thus the continuous exposure to LTTE recruitment attempts combined with a 
fascination about their militant lifestyle and status in the community that pulled my 
respondents into the LTTE movement and that made them feel that they should join. In most 
of my respondents this feeling developed over a longer period of time till they finally went. 
Moreover, most of them couldn’t explain why it was exactly after a particular recruitment 
session or at a specific LTTE event that they took the final decision. However, it is still 
important to note that all of them joined either after a personal talk with an LTTE recruiter in 
the street or during events organized by the LTTE, such as the hero’s day or temple festivals. 
Even if the motivation to join existed before, these encounters or events thus exerted a trigger 
function and made respondents take the ultimate decision. Some of them would note that the 
pressure exerted by LTTE recruiters during a talk was particularly strong or that the emotional 
mood during a specific event was very moving and that it was due to this that they went.  
What unites my respondents following this path is thus the fact that all of them have been 
socialized in a militarized environment dominated by the LTTE. The continuous exposure to 
the LTTE narratives, recruitment attempts and the group`s lifestyle was crucial in shaping 
their thinking about their role in society and creating a sense of responsibility, pressure and 
excitement about participating in the fight. Moreover, it was encounters with or events 
organized by the LTTE which triggered the final decision to go.     
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5.4.2 The Disruption of Routines in Contested Areas  
Respondents following this path mobilized in areas in the North and East of Sri Lanka where 
territorial control was contested between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE and other 
armed groups. Most of them remember their childhood as a completely disrupted time where 
violence, displacement and hardship dominated their everyday lives and destroyed their 
routines or what they would call “a normal life”. The majority of my respondents who 
mobilized in contested areas thus felt pushed towards militancy. For them, joining the LTTE 
was the only way of escaping insecurity and powerlessness and gaining back agency over 
their lives. 
When talking about the violence they experienced in their neighborhoods the accounts of my 
respondents are very similar. Mostly, the LTTE would set off a claymore mine against the 
army or the police. Whether intended or not, these attacks provoked a backlash against Tamil 
civilians by the security forces who often reacted randomly, beating up and shooting civilians 
living close to the site of the attack (Muttukrishna 2018: 7): 
When I was 12, I understood that there was a militant group and the army and that the army is always 
searching for the militant group. And that the army is mostly arresting those who are not LTTE. They 
harassed normal people, civilians not LTTE. I knew that most of the men from each house they run to the 
bush or the jungle, they hide themselves every day. And when men are running and hiding but they were 
shot by the army anyway, they would simply say they are LTTEer (20). 
For those of my respondents who were “in the right age” (17), this meant that they were 
constantly on the run, trying to hide in different places to survive. Moreover, for most of my 
respondents round-ups and interrogations were part of their everyday lives. Often the army 
would gather people in public places, such as temples, and then so-called informers whose 
face was covered by a black mask would identify “tigers” by nodding with their heads. The 
everyday lives of respondents were thus dominated by permanent insecurity about what will 
happen next and about who can be trusted and who is an informer. Many of them stress how 
they felt completely powerless as they did not know how to behave “in the right way”. 
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Everything could be considered as suspicious and people risked their lives by merely selling 
groceries to an LTTE cadre: 
My father was a fisherman but then they gave him an electric treatment and after this shock he could not 
walk properly anymore, so he started the shop. And he knew to talk Sinhala as well. At that time there was 
a restriction not to bring products from the Sinhala area here but due to his knowledge of Sinhala he 
managed to bring more things. Then the army suspected that he is giving to LTTE but he did not. He did 
not give them anything. But as he brought more things they simply assumed that he is giving to LTTE. So 
they shot him (21). 
Most respondents lost at least one closer relative due to the war and would describe how they 
struggled with the anger and especially the powerlessness they felt when trying to deal with 
the loss: 
I witnessed my father’s dead body. Although he was wearing a sarong, I could see that his whole body was 
cut and people have seen how he was tortured alive, they cut and cut and cut him before killing. And when 
he was tortured he was crying and saying I want to see her face, call Kita I want to see her face. They killed 
and tortured my father, I had to join and take revenge. There was such a grudge and frustration and hatred 
(17). 
Moreover, female respondents lived in permanent fear of sexual harassment or even rape. 
Often the military would come to “check out” the girls living in the villages or they would 
insist on body checking them when they had to pass checkpoints to go to school: 
I was in the paddy field with my brother and my uncle and then on day the army came and they asked me 
to come inside the house as they had to check it. This meant they wanted to do some sexual violence that 
is why I refused to go and then they hit me and the brother also. Then they went away and I was hiding in 
different houses. I was 16 at that time and they wanted to have me (18). 
For most of my respondents going to school and continuing to study was the last bit of 
normality that gave their lives some routine and worth. Many would describe how despite 
arrests, killings and disruption they tried to keep up with studies, carrying book over long 
distances, changing schools and studying under trees. However, due to displacement, the 
death or injury of fathers and brothers or the destruction of their livelihoods most families 
struggled with poverty. Many respondents would describe how difficult it was to get enough 
food and how, finally, they had to stop going to school and do small works in order to earn 
enough money to survive. 
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When talking about why they eventually joined the LTTE, most of my respondents struggled 
to identify when exactly they made the decision; rather they would describe how their 
frustration was constantly increasing. Their decision to join can thus be best understood as 
resulting from the accumulation of experiences of death, fear, poverty and displacement that 
destroyed their everyday life routines or what they considered normality. They were 
permanently afraid that they or their family members could be killed. Due to poverty and 
displacement they could not go to school anymore. They lost their friends they were used to 
spend time with and often family life was disrupted due to death and trauma. In short, they 
realized that they had no `normal life` anymore and that they could no longer bear to “live like 
that”: 
It was a terrifying time. I thought today I survived but what if they arrest me tomorrow then only I started 
to seriously think about joining LTTE. (…) And on the other hand my father was a drinker he was always 
drunk and hit us and there was no proper food this also influenced me. I thought, I don`t have to worry 
about the father about food about the army, I am free from all that. Better to go (20). 
Fighting can thus be understood as the externalization of the powerlessness individuals felt; 
they had nothing left to loose and thus preferred to act than to be further victimized (Bosi and 
O Dochartaigh 2018: 38) “Even die while fighting is better than dying in their hands“ (22).  
While their motivation to join grew over time, most of my respondents took the final decision 
to join when talking to friends who faced similar hardship. Many would explain that one day 
someone in their peer group said “we should join” (21) or “better to go and fight” (29) and 
then a group of friends, mostly two to six youngsters, would go together to the next LTTE 
camp and join: “I went together with a friend. She lived next to us and we always talked about 
all the problems we are facing. One day she said we should go, we will be killed anyway, so 
better to fight” (19). While most respondents thus joined in groups, this wasn’t true for all of 
my interviewees following this path. Particularly those who lost a close family member due to 
the war and wanted to join mainly in order to take revenge for the loss wouldn’t mention 
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friends as relevant for their path; rather they seem to have taken the decision individually and 
went alone to the next LTTE camp – sometimes travelling for days.  
It is important to note that my respondents following this path had no political aspirations; 
most of them had no closer contact to LTTE members before joining and thus knew little 
about why exactly the LTTE was fighting. Rather, for them, the LTTE appeared as some kind 
of savior, as a way out of everyday hardship: 
The military was so scary that we could not move we could not do anything so it was good that there is 
someone who safeguards us and fights for us this gave the interest. Because I was so fed up to see what the 
military is doing and at that moment it was like the savior came. I was really excited (24). 
The LTTE would reinforce this perception by portraying themselves as the only ones who can 
give protection to civilians (Bose 1994). Moreover, those few respondents who had closer 
contacts to LTTE members prior to joining would tell that they framed joining as a means to 
get redress for experienced losses or to find protection and thus tapped into feelings of anger 
and fear felt by many individuals living in these areas. 
The majority of my respondents living in contested zones were thus pushed towards 
militancy. They joined to escape an everyday life they could not bear anymore and to win 
back agency. Agency in the sense of self-determination. For my respondents joining meant 
not being pushed around, not having to run and hide all the time. In short, joining for them 
meant acting instead of being acted upon. They preferred dying while fighting than being 
victimized day by day.   
5.4.3 Securitization and Alienation in Government Controlled Areas  
Respondents following this path lived and mobilized in Colombo, the Sri Lankan capital, that 
was under full government control over the whole course of the conflict. The dominant factor 
that shaped their mobilization trajectories was the repressive everyday context interviewees 
faced and their conviction that the state is targeting Tamils in an arbitrary and unjust manner. 
102 
 
They would describe in length the discrimination they faced every day and talk about the 
outrage they felt of not being able to do anything against the injustice. 
In the mid-90s, an increasing number of LTTE attacks in Colombo transformed the capital in 
a “warzone” (Subramanian 2005: 8). The Tamils living in Colombo at that time were the first 
to feel the security measures the police put in place to prevent further LTTE attacks. One of 
the special regulations Tamil were subject to, was police registration: Tamils had to register 
their address with local police stations and carry the certificate with them all the time; 
moreover, they were liable to arrest should they be caught in a place different from the one 
registered (Thiranagama 2011: 85). There was, however, no unified procedure for registration 
– “every police station was its own kingdom” (Subramanian 2005: 10) – sometimes Tamils 
had to provide recent photographs, sometimes the signature of a landlord, sometimes 
registration was only granted for a couple of weeks. From my respondents’ point of view, the 
police made registration as difficult and as humiliating as possible:   
As a Tamil we faced a lot of discrimination at that time in Colombo. I was arrested three times because of 
my Tamil name. And one day, I was travelling in public transport and one guy in the bus he told the bus 
driver that I am a suspicious person because I have this deformation in my arm. So, they thought I am an 
LTTE. Then they stopped and checked me and then it was fine but this kind of things happened to me so 
many times. And we had to register with the police station and we had to carry the report wherever we 
went. But only Tamils, this was harassment, every day (31). 
Moreover, the policing of Tamils contributed to spread paranoia among Sinhalese. The latter 
were encouraged to report any suspicious activity in their neighborhoods, resulting in a 
climate of permanent distrust and fear among Tamils. Respondents were afraid to speak Tamil 
in the streets in order to avoid being caught up in the “Tamil equals tiger” equation 
(Subramanian 2005: 31; Thiranagama 2011: 250-51). My respondents would stress that it was 
due to the humiliation and outrage they felt about the permanent policing and suspicion that 
they started to believe that Tamils need their own state and that the armed fight is the only 
way to get it (32). For Sarva (cited in Mohan 2014: 277) it was “the rage, the helplessness, the 
103 
 
desire to level the uneven playing field” that made him think about joining. He remembers 
one day when a scene he observed made him desire to go and take retribution: 
Like that day when he was fourteen, standing in the Vavuniya bus station with his aunt, looking at a 
soldier kicking a youth, pounding his boots into the boy`s face till he was bleeding, till his mother was 
wailing, throwing herself on her son, cursing the soldiers in stricken Tamil. Every so often, such a scene 
had confronted Sarva, forcing him to take a stance. […] Anger and pride pulsed through him. This mix of 
emotions had burnt fiercely all through his life: in his childhood, when his one-day-old sister died and he 
was sure the Sinhalese nurses had been neglectful; as a young man when, when he roamed the streets 
unemployed.  
As many social movement scholars have noted, when individuals come to think that their own 
governments are against them, and complicit in the continuous humiliation of their 
communities, the desire for revenge becomes a strong motivation for action (Gould 2009; 
Della Porta 1995). The outrage and humiliation respondents felt were reinforced by the fact 
that people within their communities – parents, religious leaders, politicians – who should 
have had the authority to react against the discrimination, would themselves be trapped in 
cycles of humiliation, fear and threat (32). Against this background, respondents began to see 
the LTTE as the only one who can do something against the injustice and that they do “a 
honorable job” in fighting against all the discrimination: “When you live here [in Colombo] 
you get checked all the time, we were so frightened. I always asked me: `Why do they only 
check Tamils?` Because of that, I started to like the LTTE” (32). The repressive environment 
thus did little to prevent respondents from supporting the LTTE but, on the contrary, 
delegitimized the state by creating “injustice frames” – the idea that the state had violated the 
rules of the game (Gamson, Fireman and Doresey et al. 1982).  
My respondents, however, would not take action and join out of feelings of outrage and 
humiliation alone; rather it was during periods of personal insecurity that the idea of joining 
would become concrete. One of my interviewees begun to think about joining after his aunt 
had died in a Sinhalese hospital and he was convinced that she didn’t receive all the necessary 
treatment as she was a Tamil (32). The other responded made the decision to join when he 
faced a longer period of unemployment and blamed the government for the fact that no 
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company wanted to hire him: “It was such a difficult time and I thought that I have to do 
something against all this harassment. Then I started to make plans to travel to the Vanni and 
to join them” (31). At the same time, however, it was not one specific experience that made 
them join. Rather their belief that fighting is necessary developed over a longer period and in 
reaction to the difficulties they experienced in their everyday lives. The personal crisis that 
made them take the decision thus needs to be seen as a trigger rather than the reason for 
joining.  
It is difficult to determine in how far the LTTE influenced the motivation of people who 
mobilized in government controlled territory. My respondents would tell that they admired 
the LTTE for their fighting skills and the “honorable job” they do for Tamils; none of them, 
however, mentioned contacts to LTTE members as relevant for their decision to join. 
Moreover, they did not mention any recruitment attempts by LTTE members in government 
controlled territories.25 Rather, once they had decided to go, my respondents travelled to the 
North and went to an LTTE camp where they finally joined.   
It was thus mainly the repressive everyday context respondents faced and their conviction that 
the state is targeting Tamils in an arbitrary and unjust manner that made them consider joining 
as the only way to react upon the repression they experienced day by day.    
5.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
This chapter aimed to contribute to the literature on mobilization into militancy by directing 
the attention of scholars to how mobilization trajectories vary across space. It posits that the 
tendency of violence to transform space and authority results in different socio-political 
contexts that influence how individuals experience their everyday lives, thereby shaping the 
paths they follow to militancy. The empirical case on mobilization trajectories of LTTE 
                                                 
25 This does not mean that there was no LTTE recruitment in these areas. The LTTE had clandestine cells operating in Colombo to plan and 
carry out attacks, there is however, little knowledge on whether they engaged in recruitment too.  
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members illustrated that, depending on the mobilization areas where respondents joined, they 
followed different paths. This could, first, be observed with regard to the factors that were 
most consequential in shaping mobilization. In rebel controlled territory, the armed group as 
recruitment network and the way it socialized people into adopting beliefs that support 
mobilization proved particularly relevant to understand why individuals decided to take up 
arms. Moreover, it was during talks with LTTE recruiters or during LTTE organized events 
that respondents took the final decision to join the movement. By contrast, in contested 
territory it was mainly the frustration about violence, death, poverty and the loss of 
“normality” that made interviewees believe that joining is the only way of escaping 
powerlessness and gaining back agency over their lives. This belief was sometimes reinforced 
by LTTE narratives but the latter were not decisive to pull individuals into the group. Rather, 
respondents following this path took the decision to join within peer networks and it was also 
together with a group of friends that they finally went to the next LTTE camp. It was thus 
networks of friends rather than the rebel network that was most consequential in shaping their 
paths. Finally, in government controlled territory, everyday experiences of discrimination and 
marginalization were most relevant in increasing respondents’ feeling of alienation and 
frustration. This frustration about everyday harassment, in turn, shaped their perception of the 
LTTE`s armed campaign and made them see violence as a necessary means for political 
change. Moreover, the situations of personal crisis which triggered the final decision to join 
were also linked to the exclusionary government policies, thereby reinforcing respondents 
willingness to do something against the discrimination.   
Second, pathways to militancy within the different mobilization areas vary with regard to how 
factors matter to shape mobilization. Repression, for example, affected mobilization 
trajectories in different ways in different socio-political contexts. In contested and 
government controlled zones, frustration and outrage about continuous and arbitrary 
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repression and/or discrimination had a direct and central impact on mobilization, while in 
LTTE controlled areas repression had, first, a less decisive and, second, only an indirect 
impact on mobilization (for example through LTTE narratives about government atrocities). 
Moreover, different forms of repression were most crucial in shaping participation in the 
different zones. In contested areas it was the experience of indiscriminate violence by the Sri 
Lankan army against Tamil civilians that was most central for individuals’ decision to take up 
arms, while in government controlled areas forms of soft repression, such as institutional 
discrimination or stigmatization, were more relevant.  
Finally, focusing on how mobilization paths vary in different socio-political contexts shows 
under what conditions specific factors become relevant. My findings, for example, suggest 
that feelings of obligation to a community was the most relevant motivational force shaping 
mobilization within rebel controlled areas where social control is tight. By contrast, the desire 
to escape highly constrained circumstances and assert one self’s agency is more likely to be 
the central motivation in contested areas where exposure to violence is high.   
Focusing on variation in socio-political contexts thus enhances scholarly understanding of 
which factors are most crucial in shaping mobilization in different contexts as well as of how 
similar factors matter in different ways in different contexts and get activated under different 
conditions.  
Apart from understanding mobilization, a focus on variation in socio-political contexts can 
help to illuminate other aspects of political violence. First, focusing on different mobilization 
areas might help scholars to analyze, if and how recruitment strategies armed groups employ, 
vary across space. My data suggest that armed groups adapt their recruitment narratives to the 
socio-political context within which they operate in order to increase their salience for people 
living in these contexts. In contested zones, for example, LTTE recruiters portrayed joining as 
a means to get redress for experienced losses or to find protection and thus tapped into 
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feelings of anger and fear felt by many individuals living in these areas. By contrast, in rebel 
controlled areas, they mainly stressed the social and moral obligation of youngsters to join the 
fight and highlighted the status joining would bring. Moreover, recruitment strategies armed 
groups can employ are also constrained by contexts. For example, only if controlling 
substantive territory armed groups are capable of implementing a conscription system as they 
need access to detailed information on people living in an area. Second, focusing on different 
pathways individuals follow across space might shed light on organizational dynamics within 
armed groups. How do armed groups manage to socialize people with very different conflict 
experiences and political consciousness into a coherent fighting force? Are there internal 
conflicts between fractions who mobilized from different areas? And finally, do people who 
follow a specific path stay longer in the movement than others who followed another path? 
Third, micro-level findings on mobilization in different socio-political contexts have 
important implications for macro-level explanations of popular mobilization. Specifically, my 
analysis supports and extends models that consider territory controlled by armed groups as an 
important factor that facilitates collaboration and recruitment. While my micro-level data 
confirms that territorial control facilitates support, it also shows that control does not 
automatically result in collaboration, nor that coercion is the central means through which 
support is generated within rebel controlled territory. My evidence rather shows that armed 
groups have to actively translate control into support, that is to say to actively build and 
maintain supportive relations with their communities through different mechanisms. My work 
focused in particular on how the socialization of young people in a militarized environment 
shapes their motivations to join, thereby proposing one relevant mechanism – the 




6 Recruiting an Army: Strategies employed by the LTTE to 
recruit Members  
While emotions have been rediscovered as relevant to understand social movements and 
dynamics of mass protest, works in the field of civil war studies have paid limited attention to 
the role of emotions in mobilization processes. We know little about how different emotions 
influence an individual`s decision to join insurgent groups, to continue fighting or to leave 
violence behind (Costalli and Ruggeri 2015). This chapter addresses this gap in the literature 
by focusing on the role emotions play in recruitment strategies employed by armed groups. It 
argues that armed groups use “emotion work” – the effort to evoke or shape emotions 
(Hochschild 1979) – as a part of their strategy to convince individuals to take up arms, trying 
to appeal not only to people’s self-interest or reason but to their values and normative 
judgements. 
The chapter proposes an analytical framework to examine the use of emotions in recruitment 
processes by linking different types of collective action frames with different emotions they 
provoke and the mechanisms through which they facilitate recruitment. In doing so, it again 
looks at the first stage of activists’ militant trajectory, but focusing on how armed groups – 
through recruitment – shape their participation path. More precisely, the chapter suggests that 
armed groups use different types of frames to evoke specific emotions which have been 
identified as relevant to shape individual perceptions of conflicts and motivation to 
participate. By provoking specific emotional responses, armed groups thus intend to activate 
social mechanisms, such as polarization among groups, which then facilitate participation. 
This framework is drawn inductively from an analysis of the role emotions played in the 
recruitment strategies employed by the LTTE. Once confronted with falling numbers of 
youngsters who volunteered to join, the LTTE stepped up an extensive recruitment campaign 
targeting young Tamils living in the territory they controlled (Thiranagama 2011). Emotions 
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were a central element of this recruitment strategy. The LTTE used speeches, street 
performances, movies and poetry to deliberately provoke emotions to make youngsters more 
willing to join.  
6.1 Recruitment, Emotions and Armed Conflict  
Recruitment into armed groups can be understood as the process through which individuals 
leave their civilian life behind and become members of an organization involved in violent 
activism. Recruitment thus always involves two sorts of agents: the individual who joins the 
group and the armed group that accepts him or her as a member (Guichaoua 2011). The 
literature, however, rarely conceptualizes recruitment as a two-sided, interactional process and 
therefore focuses almost exclusively on the individuals and their motivation to join. The other 
facet of recruitment – the agency of armed groups and the way this agency can influence an 
individual`s motivation to mobilize – is often neglected. In order to fully capture mobilization 
into armed activism it is, however, equally relevant to focus on recruitment strategies armed 
groups employ and to explore how the interactions between individuals and recruiters create 
and shape motivations for participation (Eck 2014). 
The literature dealing with participation in armed groups departs from a collective action 
problem. Since risk of participation is high and the success of a rebellion unlikely, incentives 
to participate in militant activism are minimal. The solution for armed groups then is to 
distribute selective incentives in order to motivate individuals to join. In particular, the 
literature focuses on material benefits (salaries/natural resources/protection) or social 
incentives (status rewards/sense of collective belonging/pleasure of agency) armed groups can 
use to facilitate recruitment (Kalyvas and Kocher 2007; Petersen 2001; Wickham-Crowley 
1992; Wood 2003). Few studies, however, explore the role emotions might play in motivating 
individuals to join armed groups during civil wars. Those that integrate emotions into their 
explanatory frameworks, however, show that they play an important role in shaping 
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mobilization during armed conflicts. For example, Elizabeth Wood identifies moral and 
emotional benefits as the factors most relevant to understand why many campesinos decided 
to take up arms despite high risks. Similarly, Costalli and Ruggeri (2015) find that indignation 
played a crucial role in deepening polarization between social groups and thereby to explain 
the outbreak of the Italian civil war. Moreover, in the literature on civil wars, fear is implicitly 
present in several studies applying the security dilemma to understand the onset of armed 
conflicts. In these theories, fear between social groups – either as a consequence of archaic 
situations, such as state collapse, and/or purposefully instigated by political elites – is 
considered as a necessary precondition of armed conflict. Out of fear, both sides have strong 
incentives to take preemptive military action to eliminate the threat (Horowitz 2000; 
Figueiredo and Weingast 2000; McDoom 2012; Posen 1993). Finally, Roger Petersen (2002) 
develops a theory of ethnic conflict which is primarily based on emotions. In his approach, 
structural changes activate fear, hatred, resentment, and rage which then trigger violence 
against specific ethnic groups. Moreover, in a more recent work, he explores how political 
entrepreneurs use emotions strategically to influence western intervention in the Balkans 
(2011) (Petersen 2002; Petersen and Liaras 2006; Petersen 2011). And not least, the 
sociological literature on the role of emotions in war has shown that emotions are an 
important factor that needs to be taken into consideration in order to capture mobilization 
processes during armed conflicts. Particularly relevant for this chapter, Hefferman (2016) 
shows how, during the English Civil War, the Royalist or Parliamentary factions strategically 
used emotions in propaganda material in order to justify violence as well as to propagate 
militant activism.   
The limited attention the literature on civil wars has paid to emotions is thus surprising 
considering the relevance of emotions in research on conventional inter-state wars as well as 
the rediscovery of emotions in the literature on social movements and mass protests in the last 
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twenty years.26 In particular, the emotional turn in the social movement literature points to the 
relevance of emotions to explain the emergence, persistence and the decline of social 
movements and other forms of contentious politics (Bosco 2007; Brown and Pickerill 2009; 
Cadena-Roa 2002; Pearlman 2011: Rosenberg and Winkler 2014). Particularly relevant for 
this paper are studies exploring the strategic use of emotions by activists to achieve different 
objectives. For example, one way in which protesters can create emotions is through 
generating “moral shocks” as a reaction to perceived grievances (Jasper 1998: 287). 
Moreover, Juris shows that emotions are strategically deployed by protest organizers to build 
affective attachment to the cause among activists and create specific moods in order to 
strengthen commitment among participants (Juris 2008). Gould (2009) explores how 
movement activists use different emotions at different stages of the conflict as they have 
different impacts on mobilization and are thus relevant in different phases. Finally, Cadena-
Roa (2002) finds that the public`s emotional response to the use of strategic dramaturgy was a 
crucial element in mobilizing and sustaining support for Superbarrio, a justice movement in 
Mexico City (Cadena-Roa 2002). Research focusing on emotions during war can thus benefit 
from existing approaches and findings on the role of emotions in mobilization processes in the 
literature on social movements and contentious politics.   
6.2 Analyzing the Strategic Use of Emotions in Recruitment – An Analytical 
Framework 
This section proposes an analytical framework to analyze the use of emotions in recruitment 
strategies employed by armed group. It argues that armed groups use collective action frames 
in order to provoke different types of emotions which then foster mobilization. To derive the 
proposed framework, I went back and forth between the interview transcripts, the existing 
                                                 
26 For a good overview over existing research see James Jasper, “Emotions and Social Movements: Twenty Years of Theory and Research,” 
Annual Review of Sociology 37, (2011): 287. 
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literature on emotions and the literature on social movements in order to inductively ‘code’ 
the transcripts and to understand how specific types of frames are connected to specific 
emotions and mechanisms facilitating recruitment (Saldana 2009). The framework presented 
in the following thus focuses on the frames, emotions and mechanisms that emerged from my 
empirical data as the most relevant ones to explain recruitment dynamics. This doesn’t mean 
that the identified combinations are the only ones that shape recruitment; they are, however, 
general enough to be of relevance in many conflicts. 
According to frame theory we can broadly distinguish between two key tasks of framing: 
consensus mobilization and action mobilization. Frames aimed at consensus mobilization – 
which I call interpretative frames27 – commonly identify a problem a group is facing, blame a 
perpetrator responsible for it and propose a way to resolve the problem. Motivational frames, 
by contrast, aim at fostering action and urge people to join a movement in order to affect 
change (Benford and Snow 2000: 615). This distinction is relevant as it indicates that 
acceptance of a certain interpretative frame does not necessarily translate into active 
engagement, a particularly relevant distinction for armed groups interested in recruiting 
fighters rather than mobilizing support among the broader population. Especially with regard 
to armed conflicts, there is a difference between adopting grievances and actively fighting in 
the name of theses grievances (Desrosiers 2015).   
Building on these findings, it is argued that armed groups use interpretative and motivational 
frames to provoke specific emotions which then reinforce the cognitive message transported 
by frames and push people towards concrete action. For the purpose of this paper, emotions 
are understood as “a socially prescribed set of responses to be followed by a person in a given 
situation” (Averill quoted in Jasper 1998: 400). Scholars have identified several ways through 
which emotions influence people`s beliefs and behavior. For the following argument, 
                                                 
27 I combine here what Benford and Snow call diagnostic and prognostic frames (Benford and Snow 2000). 
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however, two effects of emotions are particularly relevant. First, emotions influence how 
people define their interests. While individuals generally have several preferences such as 
security, wealth and justice, emotions can direct attention to one desire that is then considered 
as most valuable at this specific juncture. Under the influence of indignation, for example, 
someone might value justice overall and disregard any trade-offs with wealth or security 
(Petersen 2011: 25-26). And second, emotions are powerful motivators of action. The more 
intense the emotions, the more likely they are to make a direct impact on behavior (Pearlman 
2013). Anger, for example, tends to decrease the sense of risks and might motivate people to 
join armed groups despite the dangers involved (Frijda and Mesquita 2000: 68). Emotions 
thus generally orient beliefs and behavior. However, not all emotions are equally apt to 
encourage participation (Jasper 2011: 85). Whereas emotions like hope, anger or outrage are 
emboldening and tend to encourage mobilization, others such as fear or depression have 
opposite effects.28 As the objective of this article is to explain recruitment, the framework 
focuses on emboldening emotions which tend to encourage rather than inhibit action.   
While intertwined in practice, I analytically distinguish between two different ways armed 
groups provoke emotions through framing in order to facilitate recruitment. They can first use 
interpretative frames to provoke resentment. Often armed groups spread narratives about how 
the group they claim to represent is dominated by another group and thereby focus attention 
to the subordinate and unjust position of “their community”. As Petersen (2011: 40-42) notes, 
resentment arises from the perception that one`s own group is politically dominated by 
another group. The everyday experience of being in a subordinate position, of being 
“underneath”, makes people aware of who is superior and who is oppressed. It focuses 
attention to the unjust position of one`s own group. If widespread enough, resentment thus 
                                                 
28 Pearlman (2013: 392) makes a difference between emboldening emotions that motivate action and dispiriting emotions that have opposite 
effects. See also Jasper (2011) who distinguishes between activating and deactivating emotions. 
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tends to activate polarization – a mechanism which has been identified as crucial for 
mobilization into militancy (McDoom 2012). More precisely, resentment triggers different 
dynamics that are commonly at work in group polarization. First, when resentment grows, 
group identities that distinguish the in-group from the out-group become more relevant. 
Moreover, resentment increases the need for in-group-solidarity, it thus strengthens the 
identification of individuals with their communities. Finally, resentment often leads to out-
group negativity, thus tends to encourage beliefs that denigrate the out-group. By provoking 
resentment through interpretative frames armed groups might thus deepen polarization and 
convince people that more radical means including violence are a necessary mean to change 
existing power relations (Petersen 2011: 40).  
However, polarization rarely motivates people to take action and engage in violence. When 
experiencing resentment, individuals detach from the status quo and realize that the actual 
situation is unjust; support for a cause, however, does not necessarily imply active 
engagement. Armed groups therefore use motivational frames, such as stories about atrocities 
committed against one`s own group, to provoke anger and shame which combined with 
resentment are meant to push people into concrete action. In contrast to resentment, anger is 
based on the cognition that an individual or a group has committed some perceived wrong 
against oneself. Hence, anger is an emotion about the self (or about close relatives), where a 
person has suffered a wrongdoing and therefore reacts emotionally against the perpetrator. 
The (perceived) suffering of a wrongdoing heightens the desire for punishment (Petersen 
2011: 35). Anger thus urges people to fight and turns them into “intuitive prosecutors” (Frijda 
1986; Lerner and Tetlock 1999). Moreover, anger lowers someone`s estimation of risk and 
might therefore make people take up arms despite high risk (Petersen 2011: 35).  Similarly, 
shame is an emotion about one`s own identity or action. When feeling shame, attention is 
focused on the unworthiness of one`s action or identity. Shame makes a single unworthy 
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action or characteristic to be the whole of a person`s identity (Lindsay-Hartz, de Rivera and 
Mascolo 1995). By provoking shame, armed groups thus try to shift the focus to dishonor and 
to make people believe that refusing to fight is dishonorable and makes them complicit in the 
continuous suffering of their communities (Petersen and Liaras 2006: 322). At the same time, 
the frame fighting as the only right thing to do and thereby propose joining as a way to 
“repair” their deficiencies (Kim 2002).   
When evoking anger and shame, armed groups thus activate personalization – a mechanism 
that makes an action more relevant for a particular individual. People do not only agree that a 
situation is unjust, they feel personally affected by the injustice. Or they believe that, if they 
don`t act, this would be dishonorable and make them partly responsible for the continuous 
suffering of their families and communities. More precisely, personalization may trigger 
action in several ways. First, when experiencing anger or shame, the goals and ideas, such as 
fighting back to take revenge, propagated by armed groups become much more essential to 
targets of mobilization (Benford and Snow 2000: 621). Secondly, by provoking anger and 
shame armed groups personalize grievances; people feel affected personally and the idea of 
taking action against injustices becomes less abstract and distant but relevant to their 
everyday life. They experience the injustice themselves and through this personal affection 
feel the need to take action against it. And finally, as emotions like anger and shame are often 
generated when norms or moral principles are violated, the experience of these emotions 
might clarify or even activate these values and thereby increase people`s readiness to take 
action against violations of values central to them (Gamson 1992: 73).  
In addition to resentment, anger and shame, hope and pride do not directly contribute to 
mobilization but they can reinforce existing action tendencies. As Jasper stresses, the 
combination of positive and negative emotions, such as pride and shame or hope and anxiety, 
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– what he calls moral batteries29 – are particularly effective in energizing action. Hope 
anticipates future improvement of one`s status and/or situation and, similarly to pride, 
increases self-confidence and one`s sense of self-worth even in “situations where we 
understand our own agency to be limited” (McGeer 2004: 103). Armed groups might thus 
create hope and pride to reinforce the action tendency of anger and shame and motivate 
individuals to take up arms despite high risk and low prospects of success (Petersen and 
Liaras 2006: 332). Figure 1 summarizes the framework, linking different frames with 
different emotions and the respective mechanisms facilitating mobilization.    
 
6.3 Analyzing the LTTE`s Use of Emotions in Recruitment Strategies  
This section uses the case of the LTTE to illustrate the use of emotions in recruitment 
campaigns employed by armed groups. It focuses on the period starting in the early 90s when 
the LTTE had established considerable territorial control in the North, mainly the Vanni, and 
had turned itself into a quasi-state with its own administrative structures. As a reaction to the 
decreasing number of youngsters volunteering to join, the LTTE used its authority and its 
privileged access to youngsters living in the territory they controlled to step up an extensive 
recruitment campaign aimed at pulling youngsters into the movement. In the following, I use 
the narratives of those of my respondents who lived within LTTE controlled territory to 
                                                 
29 According to Jasper (2011: 291) an emotion can be strengthened when we explicitly or implicitly compare it to their opposite, just as a 
battery works through the tension between the positive and negative poles. 
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analyze the role emotions played in the recruitment strategies employed by the LTTE and 
how these strategies affected participation trajectories. More precisely, the two subsections 
serve to analyze the LTTE`s recruitment strategies according to the two uses of emotions 
proposed in the analytical framework. First, the focus will be on how the LTTE used 
interpretative frames to create resentment and thereby deepened polarization between 
communities. Then, the motivational frames and how these frames aimed at generating anger 
and shame to push people towards militancy are analyzed.  
6.3.1 Mobilizing Support for the Armed Struggle – Resentment and Polarization 
Coming of age in the 90s in LTTE controlled territory meant that young Tamils were 
continuously exposed to LTTE propaganda campaigns. They attended public meetings and 
street performances regularly organized by the LTTE and participated in LTTE affiliated 
students’ organizations and recruitment sessions in school. During these events, LTTE 
recruiters used speeches, performances and sometimes videos to spread their interpretation of 
the conflict. While the particular narratives varied, the central messages conveyed in these 
events were very similar. Recruiters would frame the existing war as a conflict between “the 
violent oppressor”, the Sinhalese majority government, against “the oppressed”, the Tamil 
community. Moreover, the threat posed by state repression would be presented as gradually 
intensifying over time and therefore leave Tamils with no other opportunity than to fight back 
and use violence to defend themselves against the violent attacks by the government. Finally, 
the LTTE presented itself as the national liberation organization that fights “for the liberation 
of our people against racist tyranny, against military occupation, against state terror”.30 By 
spreading this narrative, the LTTE provoked and reinforced resentment among Tamils. When 
                                                 
30 This vocabulary is also used repeatedly by Vellupilai Prabhakaran in his annual speeches at Hero`s Day as well as by Anton Balasingham 
who was LTTE`s chief strategist, see for example Vellupilai Prabhakaran Hero`s Day speeches 1996. 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 online on 
TamilNet https://www.tamilnet.com/ and Anton Balasingham, War and Peace: Armed Struggle and Peace Efforts of Liberation Tigers. 
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talking about how they felt when attending these different propaganda events, many 
respondents described how they started “to boil inside” when they learned about the 
“discrimination against Tamils” and how they had this „urgent feeling“ to „get the rights for 
the Tamil people“: 
They explained, why we need to fight for Tamil Eelam. It was a political explanation, the changes in the 
university recruitment and the quota system and the Tamil students that they are ignored and the loss of 
work opportunities and the land grabbing all those things they explained. That is why, we felt that we are 
not free that we are the minority and that we are not free and that they are dominating us and not giving 
the equal rights to us (11).  
Apart from spreading their narrative through public gatherings villages where LTTE members 
informed people about the conflict and the LTTE`s role in it, the LTTE used other techniques 
to spread their narrative, such as street performances, which were particularly popular among 
Tamils. These performances had been organized regularly to inform people on the conflict 
and create emotional responses (HRW 2004). When asked to describe what the street dramas 
were about, one of my respondents explains: “They were telling the history of how we were 
oppressed, the Tamil community, how they [the Sinhalese] destroyed our culture and 
tradition, how our people are getting suppressed day by day” (9). These street performances 
seem to have been quite popular among Tamils, as they skillfully mixed elements of 
traditional Tamil culture with people`s everyday experiences during the civil war.31 
Moreover, during the performances, people were encouraged to express the emotions 
performances evoked in them, such as their indignation or resentments about the 
discrimination done to them. This expression would then, in turn, evoke emotional responses 
from the broader audience, thereby aiming at generating collective emotional experiences. 
Harrison, who observed one of the street performances, reports how, after the performance, 
“people who have lost their land are encouraged to express their anger and one woman breaks 
down in tears saying she wants to go back to her home to die but it is in a military high 
                                                 
31 Interview local researcher, Batticaloa, 10 June 2018. 
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security zone.”32 Additionally, street plays stressed the moral responsibility of all Tamils to 
contribute to the fight. The following scene of a street drama illustrates this well: 
It was a very emotional drama about the struggle. […] The story of the drama was that of a family—a 
father, mother, and two children.  One child gets shot and killed by the SLA. The remaining child—in the 
drama, he was of school age, still a child—then decides to join the movement.  In the drama, the mother 
resists and begs her remaining child not to join the movement, saying she only has one child left.  The 
mother is hysterical.  Then the father speaks.  He is calm and rational, although also very sad.  He talks to 
the mother, saying that the correct thing for them to do is to give their remaining child to the LTTE.33 
The story provokes outrage among the audience about the brutal killing of a young Tamil and 
connects it with the moral responsibility of every family to contribute to the fight. The plot 
makes it very clear that the right thing for every Tamil family to do, is to sacrifice one child to 
the struggle. The LTTE narrative thus fostered an increasing in and out-group thinking while, 
at the same time, uniting Tamils of different caste, class and religion against a common 
enemy (Bose 1994).  
Finally, the LTTE supported the foundation of student associations in which students would 
talk about the discrimination against Tamils and how to react to it. The following quote of a 
former member of the Student Organization of Liberation Tigers (SOLT) summarizes well 
how many youngsters thought and felt when listening to and discussing the LTTE narrative:  
You know there was this Sinhala only act, we used to discuss about that, what is the impact of this policy 
on Tamils. And because of this, we also thought about having a separate homeland for us. Those days 
were completely disturbed. It was a restless life, we were so frustrated and angry. And we were in a 
crucial age 17, 18, 19 years. This period is very important, very energetic. We felt that we have to do 
something (30).  
As a result of the continuous exposure to the LTTE narrative, many young Tamils began to 
see Sinhalese as their enemies and to believe that Tamils could never live in peace in a state 
dominated by the Sinhalese majority (Thiranagama 2011). Moreover, many respondents 
mentioned how they started to identify more with “their community”: 
                                                 
32 Frances Harrison, “Tamil Tigers seek Voters` Support”, Story from BBC News, March 13, 2004, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3585143.stm. 
33 Description of a street performance by a Tamil civilians in Human Rights Watch, “Living in Fear. Child Soldiers and the Tamil Tigers in 
Sri Lanka,” 23-24. 
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In the campaign they explained why the Sinhala state is destroying us. Why they are killing us. This 
motivated me, I had such a grudge, these people are killing us. And they said we have to support the fight. 
Then only we all will get freedom. This was another reason why I joined. I thought if all Tamils are 
united we don`t have to suffer like that anymore (1). 
Spread through different channels, the LTTE narrative thus evoked resentment among Tamils 
and thereby activated and deepened polarization between the two communities, and, at the 
same time, strengthened in-group solidarity among Tamils.  
6.3.2 Provoking Anger and Shame – Pushing Youngsters to Take up Arms  
As already mentioned, the LTTE organized regular recruitment sessions in schools and 
tutorials. Normally, LTTE recruiters would then talk about how Tamils had been oppressed 
by the Sinhalese majority, about the importance to oppose this domination and about the need 
to join (8, 4). The LTTE thus used the interpretative frames to provoke resentment as has been 
analyzed in the last section. However, in order to push youngsters towards action, they added 
motivational frames provoking anger and/or shame. These frames were mostly detailed 
descriptions of atrocities committed against Tamils by security forces. Moreover, in order to 
strengthen the impact of these frames, they would not only be told in the form of oral 
narratives but the LTTE used videos and movies to confront youngsters with visual material 
of atrocities (Brun 2008; 8). The LTTE was very skilled in using modern technology for 
recruitment purposes. They had their own video documentary unit that recorded all sorts of 
LTTE activities; footage that was then used to produce movies and documentaries. Most of 
these films present the history of the Tamil struggle against an oppressive Sinhala state in the 
form of an action movie and were thus especially appealing to youth (Brun 2008: 411; 
Roberts 2014). Many of my respondents described how they were hypnotized by these videos 
and anger and outrage they felt when watching them:   
R: It [the movie] was about the atrocities by the military. Sometimes, they bombed school and 
hospitals. These happened time and again. 
I: And what did they say about the movie? 
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R: They said, this happened to Tamils and we cannot tolerate that, we have to fight against it. And they 
would say that unless we don`t destroy the forces and we establish a separate state, our sisters and 
daughters or families cannot live peacefully. This are the points they will mention and then they make us 
convinced that this is the only way. It was very emotional you know. I had such a grudge. And I felt, I 
should go (5). 
LTTE recruiters thus provoked anger and outrage among students and channeled it into action 
– the fight for a separate homeland for Tamils. Moreover, by presenting the threat that the 
families of youngsters could be affected and that it is their responsibility to protect them, 
LTTE recruiters personalized narratives and thereby increased the emotional impact of the 
recruitment messages. The following description of a movie produced by the LTTE television 
station in 1993, called the dream of the motherland, provides another example of how the 
provocation of anger combined with personalized narratives aims to motivate youngsters to 
join the LTTE: 
It starts by showing a happy family consisting of parents, a daughter and a son, the tiyaki [martyr]‐to‐be. 
They are all happy sitting in the garden celebrating a birthday. They feed each other with hands as signs 
of intimacy. They also have good relations with their neighbours. The son takes the neighbour's young 
daughter to school on his motor‐bike. One day the Lankan air force drops bombs on the school, and the 
boy can only take the body of his young friend to her parents. In his inner vision, he anticipates that this 
could have happened to his own younger sister [tankacci]. He decides he will enter the squad of Black 
Tigers (Schalk quoted in Hopgod 2005: 71). 
Apart from anger, LTTE recruiters also provoked shame in order to convince youngsters that 
they had to go and fight. The following is an example of a popular poem the LTTE used 
during recruitment sessions for girls that illustrates the use of shame very well: 
O sister 
Where are you going? 
Is it to the tutory? 
Are you happy? 
Study well and become a doctor 
You will gain fame. 
You must treat wounds on the body 
Also the wounds of the earth. 
Don`t forget it. 
Do you need education to carry a bier? 
What is the use of having an education when you are a slave? 
You must have self-respect my dear younger sister 
Fight while studying  
Study while fighting.34 
                                                 
34 Quoted in Harendra De Silva, Chris Hobbs and Helga Hanks, “Conscription of Children in Armed Conflict—a Form of Child Abuse. A 
Study of 19 former Child Soldiers,” Child Abuse Review 10, no. 2 (2001): 130. 
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By ridiculing the girl`s ambition to become a doctor while she is living “like a slave”, the 
poem evokes shame among young girls. While generally in Tamil culture youngsters who 
excel in school are highly regarded in society, the LTTE was successful in changing “the 
feeling rules” (Hochschild 1979) by continuously portrayed studying as a selfish and therefore 
shameful act. By contrast, taking up arms and fighting was portrayed as necessary if 
youngsters want to maintain self-esteem. According to the messages conveyed by recruiters, 
studying is useless as long the war is ongoing and, day by day, Tamils are being killed by the 
Sri Lankan Army. Only once the war is over, can Tamils live peacefully and studying 
becomes worth the effort again (UTHR 2015). The message the LTTE conveyed was thus 
again that fighting is the right thing for young people to do. Thereby, recruiters tried to create 
a sense of responsibility among youngsters. Only if they go and fight, they lead a respectful 
life. The following example of Mugil, a female LTTE ex-combatant, shows how shame and a 
feeling of responsibility are channeled into concrete action. Mugil remembered that she had 
decided to join during a recruitment session in school. LTTE recruiters asked her to perform 
to a song called Just twelve, she holds the rifle over her shoulder and after she had finished, 
one of the recruiters would say “The song is about a twelve-year-old girl. You are thirteen.” 
After this performance and the recruiter`s comment, Mugil felt ashamed and guilty and she 
was convinced that she should contribute. The next day she went.35 Moreover, LTTE 
recruiters often shared their own stories in order to make students feel ashamed. In Jaffna, for 
example, the LTTE regularly organized so called “Students` Inspirational Weeks” where 
LTTE cadres talked about their personal decision to join the LTTE: “I too once thought 
studies are important and put my heart and soul into it. I later realized that liberation is far 
more important, so here I am” (LTTE member quoted in UTHR 2000). LTTE cadres thus 
                                                 
35 See the account of the life of Mugil a former LTTE member in Rohini Mohan, The Seasons of Trouble. Life amid the Ruins of Sri 
Lanka`s Civil War (London, Brooklyn: Verso, 2014): 62. 
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motivated youngsters to join by sharing their personal stories about how they themselves 
thought that studying is very important but then realized that, as long as they are oppressed 
and attacked by the military, it is more relevant to fight and achieve a separate state for 
Tamils: 
When they deliver the speech they share their own experience what they were before and what they are 
doing know. And then we thought they also sacrificed their parents, they also left their parents so I should 
do the same (8). 
The recruiters provoked shame by comparing their own willingness to fight with the 
“unworthy” life of students. At the same time, they make young people think that if they 
(LTTE cadres) can do it (fighting) they should and can do the same. The personal narratives 
thus evoked a sense of moral responsibility and thereby increased the salience of frames and 
motivated action.  
The common recruitment sessions in school were, however, not the main recruitment arenas; 
rather, LTTE recruiters used these sessions to find out which students were potentially willing 
to join in order to focus on those in one-on-one talks after school was over. Many of my 
respondents remembered how LTTE recruiters waited outside after the propaganda sessions 
or they would approach them when they were hanging around in streets and junctures and 
engage them in discussions. In their talks, LTTE recruiters normally spoke about personal 
experiences or asked provocative questions with the objective to arouse anger and shame in 
young Tamils and make them more willing to join. One of my respondents remembered how, 
once, LTTE recruiters waited for her and some friends in a juncture and confronted them with 
stories of how girls had been raped by the military and other atrocities to provoke anger:  
Among the girls, they would stress rape cases, what would arouse emotions and make them join. In 
general they would focus on all the atrocities done by the military bombing, shelling, murder, torture 
those kind of things (6). 
Similarly, a University Teacher of Human Rights report describes how LTTE cadres tried to 
make youngsters feel ashamed of not going and fighting while they themselves sacrificed 
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their lives and would still be willing to fight if they had not been injured:  
Koorai, is a village with a population of Indian origin near which there is also an LTTE unit known as the 
Young Leopards. Nearly every village has a recruitment centre. Several of those manning these centres 
are tragic victims of the war who had lost limbs in the course of fighting. There is now no possibility of a 
life for them outside the Movement. They make passionate speeches to the young of the village waving 
their truncated limbs challenging the others to sacrifice themselves as they had. They evoke a mixture of 
pity, horror and shame in others. "If you do not want to go and fight the Sri Lankan forces, give me your 
arm or your leg. I am itching to go back and fight", they would say (UTHR 1996).  
Finally, LTTE recruiters not only tried to evoke anger and shame in students but were careful 
to complement the recruitment sessions with stories and/or movies about the affective ties 
between LTTE cadres and successful battles in order to evoke hope and pride among 
youngsters. For example, LTTE recruiters would screen a video of the LTTE`s victory at 
Elephant Pass36 and then frame it as one of the world`s most remarkably military feats in 
order to create hope and a desire among students to be part of a glorious fight (Subramanian 
2005: 174). Finally, the mere presence of LTTE cadres with their uniforms, arms and 
motorbikes, as well as the team spirit among cadres would evoke pride in many youngsters as 
well as the desire to be part of the movement themselves: 
When I saw all these cadres, LTTE girls especially. who were in LTTE, we were only trained to cook. 
We only knew to light the cooker but when I saw these girls, they were able to carry heavy artilleries, 
they were able to handle them equally to boys. Women, they did the same things, they used the very 
heavy weapons also not only the small ones. When you use them, it will push you behind, so you had to 
be very strong. It was really impressive to see that (4). 
It was thus the combination of anger and shame with pride about the devotion and the skills of 
LTTE members and the hope to contribute to a better future for their community that proved 
most effective in motivating youngsters to join.  
6.4 Discussion and Conclusion  
The empirical analysis showed that the LTTE strategically used emotions in order to recruit 
                                                 
36 In April 2002 the LTTE seized the vast military complex in the area around Elephant Pass. The victory was considered as decisive for the 
LTTE`s struggle for an independent state due to the strategic and symbolic importance of the Elephant Pass which links two important 
parts of the “Tamil homeland”, the northern mainland known as the Vanni with the Jaffna Peninsula. Moreover, the victory changed the 
military balance very significantly in favour of the LTTE (Wickremeserka 2016). 
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fighters. Moreover, combining different types of frames with the emotions they are likely to 
provoke, and with the mechanisms through which they facilitate recruitment, helped to better 
capture how different emotions are created and how they impact mobilization. More 
precisely, two combinations of frames, emotions and mechanism proved to be relevant to help 
understand recruitment. 
First, the LTTE used interpretative frames to depict the conflict as one between an oppressed 
minority and an oppressive majority and thereby provoked resentment among Tamils. Once 
provoked, resentment reinforced the message transmitted by the narrative and, at the same 
time, deepened polarization between the two communities. Tamils began to see the Sinhalese 
as their enemy and increasingly accepted violence as a necessary mean to change existing 
power relations. Second, motivational frames were used to evoke anger and/or shame among 
students and push them to concrete action. LTTE recruiters used videos and stories to expose 
youngsters to the atrocities committed against their communities in order to provoke anger. 
Or they evoked shame by portraying the lives of young people as comfortable and selfish and 
comparing their selfishness with the readiness of LTTE cadres to leave family and education 
behind and sacrifice themselves for their community. By provoking these emotional responses 
recruiters made youngsters believe that they and their immediate families could be affected 
and that it is their responsibility to protect them and join the fight. Moreover, pride about the 
LTTE`s fighting capacity and the commitment shown by LTTE cadres, as well as hope that 
victory is possible, reinforced the impact of anger and shame and thereby the motivational 
impact of action frames.     
Apart from stressing the role of emotions in recruitment in general, my analysis points to the 
relevance of interactions of different emotions. LTTE recruiters succeeded in provoking 
emotions through the display of atrocities against Tamils, at least partly, because they could 
tap into resentment already felt by many Tamils. They identified with the people attacked in 
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the videos because they interpreted the attack not as one against some unknown people but as 
an attack against their own community and it is through this association that they then felt 
anger about the atrocities. Provoking anger in combination with resentment might thus be 
particularly effective in mobilizing people into collective violence.  
However, it is important to note that the effectiveness of the LTTE`s recruitment strategy did 
not depend on emotions only. Or to put it differently, the resonance of frames to provoke 
emotions and trigger action depended on other factors. Most importantly, the majority of my 
respondents had no experience with Sinhalese; the only contact they had was with the 
Sinhalese army, either through intense bombing campaigns and shelling, or through personal 
experiences of displacement, checkpoints and death (UTHR 1993). It was therefore 
empirically verifiable that “the Sinhalese are attacking Tamils”. This contributed to the 
credibility of frames and the likelihood of an emotional response. Moreover, it is impossible 
to analyze recruitment during war without paying attention to the influence of power (Liu 
2010). Due to the fact that the LTTE was controlling most aspects of civilian life in the 
territories it controlled, LTTE recruiters naturally exerted pressure on students to comply with 
their expectations. Moreover, many students admired LTTE cadres and their readiness to 
sacrifice their lives for their community; LTTE recruiters thus had a certain status among 
youngsters. This would definitely help to make recruitment frames more credible, especially 
those focused on provoking shame among students for not being ready to join. The resonance 
of emotional frames thus depends on specific contextual factors, such as most importantly the 
empirical credibility of frames as well as the dominant position of the LTTE due to territorial 
control and their role as the “only” representative of the Tamil community.  
By highlighting the role of emotions in recruitment, this article doesn`t deny the relevance of 
other factors that the literature has identified as relevant to understand why people decide to 
join armed groups. Rather, it suggests that they are insufficient to fully explain participation 
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processes and points to the need to analyze how emotions influence these other factors. For 
example, works focusing on how collective incentives, such as a common identity, shape 
participation processes would benefit from including emotions into their analysis, as emotions 
play a central role in building and maintaining boundaries between groups and shaping within 
group processes (Mackie and Smith 2017). Moreover, existing research shows that emotions 
tend to reinforce the motivational power of ideological messages and thereby strengthen the 
impact grievances have on mobilization dynamics (Van Stekelenburg, Klandermans and Dijk 
2000). Further research on mobilization into militancy could thus benefit from integrating 
emotions into their models and analyzing how they interact with other motives for collective 
action. Finally, the insights gained through combining frames, emotions and mechanisms 
could inform future research on all forms of violent and non-violent collective action. First, 
combining different types of frames with specific emotions and mechanisms might help 
scholars to clarify the role different emotions play in dynamics of collective action. It allows 
scholars to disentangle how the emotions are evoked, through what kind of frames, and how, 
through what kind of mechanism, they affect individuals` willingness to participate. Secondly, 
a similar analytical framework could be used to better understand the relevance of emotions in 
other dimensions of collective action. Scholars could, for example, analyze how different 
frames, emotions and mechanisms interact to create and sustain collective solidarity and/or 
maintain the discipline of existing members and thereby clarify the role emotions play in 
fulfilling these different movement tasks. Thirdly, frames are not the only means armed 
groups can use to evoke emotions. For example, scholars interested in tactics used by 
collective actors could focus on how different tactics, such as rituals, are used to provoke 
different sorts or emotions and activate different mechanisms which contribute to the 




7 Socialization into Militancy: Explaining Commitment in 
Armed Groups 
Most conflict researchers and military practitioners agree that combatants` commitment plays 
a crucial role for the persistence of militaries and armed groups. If recruits fight out of fear or 
for material benefits only, they are unlikely to fight well or at all (Gates 2017; King 2006; 
Malešević 2018; Siebold 2007). Nevertheless, there is no agreement on the question of what 
are the key sources of combat motivation. The extensive work on cohesion in the military 
literature emphasizes two explanatory paradigms. Some scholars focus on social bonding 
within the `primary group` as the decisive factor for cohesion, while others identify shared 
military experience and professional performance as the principal source of combat 
motivation (King 2006, 2015; Shils and Janowitz 1948; Siebold 2007). Most of these works 
thus tend to place exclusive focus on one factor, neglecting the interaction of mechanism that 
build and maintain cohesion (Hover Green 2017). Moreover, only few studies try to integrate 
how individual motivations, interactions within the larger group and external (conflict) 
dynamics interact to maintain combatants` motivation (Malešević 2018; Siebold 2007). 
Among scholars of non-state armed groups, studies on combat motivation are still rare. 
Retention is often understood as a mere continuation of recruitment rather than analyzed as a 
separate process (Gates 2017). We therefore know little about the mechanisms that build and 
maintain combatants’ commitment in armed groups.   
Building on this gap in the literature, this chapter focuses on the second stages of activists’ 
militant trajectories and explores sustained participation in the LTTE. It builds on the growing 
body of literature that focuses on the internal dynamics of armed groups, exploring various 
armed groups` institutions and practices (Bultmann 2018). More precisely, the objective of 
this chapter is twofold: 1) to show that socialization is a useful conceptual tool to analyze 
retention in armed groups. This is in line with recent studies which increasingly recognize the 
129 
 
importance of socialization processes to understand the internal dynamics of armed groups.37 
Focusing on socialization directs scholarly attention to the process that induct combatants into 
the norms and rules of the group and foster social cohesion among recruits (Hover Green 
2017). A better understanding of how these processes change combatants` preferences and 
potentially lead to a deeper change in combatants` sense of selves, in turn, is crucial to 
understand how combatants become committed fighters (Checkel 2017); and 2) to single out 
the mechanisms that are most relevant to build and sustain commitment over time. Focusing 
on the mechanism allows for greater specificity in analyzing socialization – a concept often 
viewed as nebulous or over-general (Hover Green 2017). Moreover, by considering how 
different socialization mechanism interact to foster combatants` commitment, this approach 
provides a corrective to existing research on military cohesion that tends to pit different 
factors against each other, thereby eliding the complex interactions between mechanisms that 
foster and maintain retention (Checkel 2017).  
The LTTE`s armed struggle is a crucial case to investigate sustained participation for several 
reasons. The LTTE succeeded in building and maintaining a highly cohesive fighting force 
over almost three decades (Richards 2013). This is surprising considering the fact that, apart 
from the initial phase of the war, it relied (partly)on a conscription system as well as on 
coercion to recruit fighters (Lilja 2009). New recruits often had little knowledge about the 
LTTE`s political cause but joined the group following different motivations and from 
different backgrounds. The LTTE could thus not rely on existing political and moral 
commitments and social ties between combatants; rather it had to invest considerable time 
and resources to socialize new recruits to group norms and foster social cohesion (Bose 1994; 
Gates 2017). Recruits were meant to be “transformed” by taking new movement names and 
shifting their loyalties and duties entirely to the LTTE (Thiranagama 2013a). In order to 
                                                 
37 See the special issue on socialization processes in armed groups in the Journal of Peace Research  
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facilitate this transformation, the LTTE adopted various formal and informal institutions and 
practices intended to socialize combatants to group norms and foster the building of a 
collective identity among recruits. The LTTE thus provides a fascinating case to explore how 
socialization processes within armed groups build and maintain commitment among 
combatants.  
7.1 Theories of Combat Motivation and Retention 
Following each of the major wars since the mid twentieth century, social scientists, especially 
military scholars, sought to identify the most relevant factors that motivate combatants to 
fight. Of particular relevance was Shils and Janowitz`s (1948) pioneering work on the 
Wehrmacht as, for the first time, it articulates the primary group thesis which remains an 
important reference point till today (King 2015). In contrast to what has been assumed till 
then, the authors reject National Socialist ideology as a relevant factor to sustain group 
cohesion38. According to them, what makes soldiers fight are the affective ties they build with 
their primary group – the comrades they have intimate face-to-face contact with.39 While the 
primary group thesis has been confirmed by a range of studies (Stouffer 1949; Little 1964), 
other authors have questioned that personal bonds between soldiers are sufficient to sustain 
cohesion. Rather, in cases where casualty and/or turnover rates in military units are high, 
ideological factors often trump personal bonds in maintaining combat motivation (Bartov 
1989; Ben-Shalom et al. 2005). Moreover, in the last twenty years, an alternative explanation 
for group cohesion has emerged that reoriented the original debate away from interpersonal 
bonds as the main source of cohesion to what is often called task cohesion (King 2015). These 
                                                 
38 There is no consensus about the definition of cohesion. Most scholars, however, seem to agree that it involves trust among group 
members (e.g., to watch each other’s back) together with the capacity for teamwork (e.g., pulling together to get the task or job done). 
Often cohesion is used interchangeably with combat motivation (Siebold 2007).  
39 Primary groups consist of small groups of soldiers of up to perhaps fifty individuals who are held together by bonds of comradeship 
produced by spatial proximity, intimate communication and paternal relations to officers (Shils and Janowitz 1948). 
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studies prioritize teamwork – the capacity of individual soldiers to perform successfully in a 
team – over affective bonds. A number of scholars have since demonstrated that soldiers unite 
around quite impersonal procedures and drills, independent of the existence of personal bonds 
between them (King 2006; Strachan 2006).  
While the studies on military cohesion provide fascinating insights into the working of 
national militaries, the problem with some of these works is that they are designed to give 
policy advice, rather than to advance theory or to single out the sociological processes 
promoting and maintaining group cohesion (Checkel 2017). They thus don’t explore military 
units as particular forms of group dynamics but as a crucial factor to enhance military 
effectiveness (Malešević 2018). Moreover, more recent works tend to define cohesion 
narrowly in terms of collective combat performance, neglecting non-combat related factors 
that affect cohesion. Cohesion dynamics, however, are not only relevant within elementary 
fighting units but operate within and are shaped by larger formations as well as external 
factors (Siebold 2015). And finally, most military scholars place exclusive focus on one 
single factor that is supposed to generate and maintain cohesion, eliding the complex 
interactions and mutual influence of different mechanism that shape combat motivation 
(Bartov 1989; Checkel 2017; Hover Green 2017).  
While cohesion has been a prominent topic in the military literature, studies that explore 
retention in non-state armed groups are still rare. One reason could be that much of the civil 
war literature understands sustained participation to be a mere extension of recruitment (Gates 
2017: 684). However, recruitment and retention are separate processes; it cannot be assumed 
that members who joined for a specific set of reasons will remain in the group for the same 
reasons (ibid.). We thus need studies that focus on how combatants` commitment is reshaped 
and/or maintained after recruitment and identify the most relevant factors that sustain 
participation. Moreover, studies on sustained participation in armed groups would help to 
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clarify if combat motivation differs in different types of violent organizations. Among the few 
available works that explore combat motivation in armed groups, Malešević and 
O`Dochartaigh (2018) explore the factors that promoted retention in in the Army of the 
Serbian Republic in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Provisional Irish Republican Army. 
Similar to the primary group thesis, the authors find that small group solidarities were crucial 
to sustain combat motivation while ideological factors were less relevant.40 In another work 
on social cohesion in the Croatian and the Bosnian Serb Army, Malešević (2018) extents this 
finding by showing that micro level solidarities alone are not sufficient for cohesion. Rather, 
he argues that group solidarities at the micro-level have to be linked with the wider 
organizational goals of an armed group in order to effectively motivate combatants to fight. 
Malešević`s work points to another important weakness of many studies on combat 
motivation. Most scholars tend to privilege either micro-level factors or they over-empathize 
group level processes and institutions without exploring how they result in compliance (or 
resistance) on the micro-level (Checkel 2017). However, retention is always a two-sided 
process (Siebold 2007). Any attempt to understand small group dynamics without analyzing 
how group leaders promote and/or constrain cohesion or how combatants react to 
socialization practices tend to be incomplete (Checkel 2017; Malešević 2018).  
This article builds on works that began to explore socialization dynamics within armed groups 
and argues that analyzing retention in armed groups in terms of socialization, or as the process 
through which actors become committed to a group and its norms, can be a fruitful lens to 
better capture the mechanisms that build and sustain commitment.  
                                                 
40 The authors, however, stress that ideological factors were important in asserting the legitimacy of the use of force by the armed groups.  
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7.2 Theorizing Sustained Participation in Armed Groups through Socialization  
Adopting a socialization lens to analyze sustained participation means to think of combatants 
as embedded in social environments, which not only constrain and provide incentives to act, 
but also reshape interests and identities (Checkel 2017). Following Prewitt and Dawson 
(1977: 9), I understand socialization as an ongoing process of inducting actors into the norms 
and rules of a given community, the target endpoint of which is internalization.41 In other 
words, socialization is a process whose intended result is not simple behavioral adaptation, 
but a deeper change in an actor’s sense of self (Checkel 2017: 594). Combatants become and 
remain committed to the group as they identify with one another and the group and have 
accepted group norms as the right thing to do.42 Moreover, socialization is always a two sided 
process that involves interactions between two sorts of agency. A first, is top-down, and 
focuses on the institutions and practices armed group organizations implement to guide and 
encourage the socialization of new recruits to group norms, such as military training, political 
education and disciplinary regimes, among others (El Akremi et al. 2014: 318; Hover Green 
2017). The second type of agency involved is bottom-up. In this case, the socialization agents 
are the targets who may resist a socializer`s message or they may come to be normatively and 
socially committed to the group and their ideology (Checkel 2017). Socialization must thus be 
conceived as an ongoing and relational process, rather than as the necessary outcome of a 
singular socialization phase, that can potentially involve a range of different factors, including 
in particular individual agency, group dynamics and contextual circumstances (Rodgers 
2017).  
                                                 
41 This does not mean that socialization necessarily result in internalization. Depending on individual factors as well as environmental 
conditions the socialization process might be more or less effective in producing internalization. The focus here is thus more on the 
process that generates and maintains individual commitment to the group than on the outcome of socialization (Long and Hadden 1985: 
41-43). 
42 For group leaders ensuring compliance through socialization is less costly than ensuring it through force (coercion) or material incentives 
(instrumental calculation) and might therefore be the preferred option even from a principal-agent perspective (Gates 2002; Checkel 
2017; Eck 2016)   
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Based on the conceptualization of socialization as a process, this article adopts a mechanism-
process approach (Tilly 2001) to analyse socialization dynamics. By singling out the most 
relevant mechanisms that promote and sustain the socialization process, it allows for a certain 
degree of generalization, as the same mechanisms are likely to be relevant in different 
contexts, while, at the same time paying due attention to case specific factors and conditions 
(Tilly 2001; Gerring 2007). Although in recent years the language of mechanisms has gained 
prominence in social research, there is no consensus on how to define a mechanism. In this 
chapter I follow Gerring (2007: 178) and conceptualize a mechanism as “the pathway […] by 
which an effect is produced or a purpose is accomplished”. The following section discusses 
three mechanisms that emerged from my empirical analysis as most relevant to socialize 
combatants to group norms as well as to maintain their commitment over time. To derive the 
proposed mechanisms, I went back and forth between my interview transcripts and the 
existing literature on social identity theory, organizational sociology, social movement and 
political violence in order to inductively ‘code’ the transcripts and to understand analytically 
how the identified mechanism build and maintain combatants` commitment to the armed 
group. I don’t claim that the identified mechanism are the only possible ones that shape 
combatants` commitment; they are, however, general enough to be of relevance in various 
armed groups and (para-)militaries.  
i. Identification Scholars from different fields have identified a mutual experience of we-
ness or one-ness among members of a group as one of the most relevant source for 
sustained collective action (Fominaya 2010; Polletta and Jasper 2001; Tajfel and Turner 
1986). The stronger the group identification, the more the group`s beliefs and fate are 
incorporated in the individual’s social identity, the more people are prepared to take 
action on behalf of the group (Van Stekelenburg 2014). A collective identity is 
particularly powerful to unite groups as it bonds individuals to one another through 
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emotional, moral and cognitive ties. Reciprocal emotions – the affective ties of love, 
respect and trust that connect group members – are crucial to sustain commitment 
(Jaspers 2017: 209). Moreover, the shared consciousness of struggling for a common 
goal that is considered as righteous is equally effective in sustaining engagement in the 
name and for the sake of the group (Goodwin and Pfaff 2001: 293; Wood 2001). In 
armed groups, the drilling and hazing during the training, followed by the “rebirth” of 
the individual as a group member, can be particularly relevant to meld recruits into a 
cohesive unit (Oppenheim and Weintraub 2016). As a result, solidarity to one another 
are often felt more strongly by recruits than previous loyalties (Wood 2008: 546). 
Moreover, rituals, uniforms, heads shaving, among others, can be powerful practices and 
symbols to create a new sense of collective identity and maintain cohesion 
(Hermanowicz and Morgan 1999). Furthermore, the solidarity bonds that connect 
soldiers to one another often result in a more visceral motivation for combat – revenge. 
The will “to make them pay” for death of comrades as well as to continue the fight to 
ensure that causalities had not been in vain can be a strong source of motivation (Jaspers 
2017). 
ii. Politicization Shared beliefs and particularly the awareness of shared grievances plays 
an important role in group formation, especially in the initial socialization of previously 
unattached people behind a common goal (Goodwin 1997). Through politicization 
within networks, individuals become conscious of their group membership, that is to say 
they become aware of a group’s position within society and, in order to make group 
membership politically relevant, must perceive the position of the group as illegitimate 
or unjust in comparison to other groups (Taylor and Whittier 1992). In many armed 
groups, politicization is promoted through political education, where recruits are 
socialized to view themselves as members of a political movement, expressing political 
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commitment through their engagement in violence. Armed group leaders engage 
combatants in mandatory instruction sessions and discussions about the meaning and the 
purpose of the fight (Hover Green 2016; Oppenheim and Weintraub 2016). They often 
use framing43 to instill beliefs among recruits that are congruent with the group`s goal as 
well as the moral imperative to fight injustice (Nepstad 2004: 46). Political education 
thus aims at preference transformation (the alignment of individual preferences with 
those needed by the group) through the internalization of group purpose and group 
norms (Guttiérez-Sanín and Wood 2014). 
iii. Studies on protest behavior have shown that collective action can result in a sense of 
individual and collective empowerment which then motivates further action (Drury and 
Reicher 1999; Drury, Evripidou and Van Zomeren 2015). Empowerment can be 
understood as a subjective sense of ability and confidence, as the “perceived degree of 
control that members of one group have over their fate” (Drury and Reicher 1999) 
Empowerment is thus different from efficacy that refers to the perceived ability to carry 
out specific tasks; efficacy, however, can be a relevant component of empowerment. 
Moreover, empowerment is closely related to group identification and collective action 
within a group. As members of a collective individuals, particularly if from 
disadvantaged groups, feel more powerful and less as passive objects shaped by 
particular combinations of social forces; they become conscious, active subjects who 
begin to shape their own social activity’ (Gregoire and Perlman 1969: 37). Within armed 
groups the military training, often focused on endless drilling and extreme physical and 
mental stress, not only helps to develop a sense of group identity among recruits which 
is in itself empowering for many but also provides combatants with the skills they need 
                                                 
43 Frames are interpretative schemes that help to render events meaningful and thereby function to organize experience and guide action 
(Snow and Benford 2000). 
137 
 
to effectively participate in battles (Gates 2017; Hover Green 2017). Being able to go 
through the drilling and developing the skills to perform relatively easily with others, in 
turn, can be a highly empowering experience. Moreover, for many recruits adhering to 
the discipline required in combat is a source of pride and self-respect (Shils and 
Janowicz 1949). Similarly, the fact that fighting in an armed group requires 
extraordinary sacrifices such as risking one`s own life for a higher cause can be an 
empowering experience for recruits (Schlichte 2009). At the same time, it makes 
members persistent in their involvement as the failure of the group`s struggle would 
make all the investment worthless (Della Porta 1992: 284).  
7.3 Analyzing Sustained Participation in Armed Groups 
My respondents joined the LTTE for different of reasons, ranging from indoctrination into the 
LTTE`s worldview, outrage about state surveillance, the need to escape highly circumscribed 
lives to the fascination for the LTTE`s militant lifestyle. There wasn’t thus necessarily a 
collective political consciousness or a pre-existing sense of collective identity that united new 
members. Many of my interviewees knew little about the LTTE`s political reasons to fight 
and felt little loyalty for each other or the group (Cohen 2017: 702). This, however, changed 
after respondents had gone through an intense period of training and indoctrination and 
gained first experiences in the battlefield. Most of my interviewees would stress how they 
transformed and developed a new sense of self during this initiation period. They adopted 
new loyalties and responsibilities and became committed to the LTTE`s cause. Contrary to 
what is often assumed, my respondents thus didn’t join because of a pre-existing commitment 
to the LTTE, rather they became committed due to their socialization within the group. This 
chapter focuses on the process that socialized my respondents into a coherent group, united by 
solidarity bonds and a collective consciousness. More precisely, the following subsections 
serve to illustrate the working of the socialization mechanisms discussed in the analytical 
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chapter. I do not claim that each mechanism was equally consequential for all respondents. 
For some group identification was more central while others stresses more the empowerment 
they felt. In most accounts, however, all of the three factors were present and it was their 
combination that sustained interviewees` motivation.  
7.3.1 Politicization   
The commitment to values and political ideas is often sidelined or entirely rejected as a 
relevant factor to explain sustained participation in armies or armed groups. Most 
prominently, in their study on cohesion in the Wehrmacht, Shils and Janowitz (1948: 284) 
argue that “the idea of fighting, living, and dying for the fatherland […] is but a relatively 
distant thought. At least it does not play a great role in the practical motivations of the 
individual [combatant].” The narratives of my interviewees challenge these findings. While 
many of them did not join the LTTE for political and/or moral reasons, they became strongly 
committed to the LTTE`s cause after joining. This commitment developed during the 
mandatory political training where recruits were stepped into the LTTE`s political goal: “there 
we learned why we have to fight” (4). LTTE instructors would incorporate historical and 
recent events of violence and discrimination against Tamils into a larger narrative of Tamil 
suffering and justify violence as the only mean to defend the Tamil community against an 
oppressive Sinhala state: “During the training they were teaching us the status of our people, 
how we are suffering, what the state does to us. And they were saying that the LTTE was 
formed to fight against the suffering of our people. Every day we had these classes. These 
things motivated us” (15). This narrative resonated well with most recruits as they had seen 
and often personally experienced discrimination and violence against themselves and their 
family members and fiends before joining the LTTE (Snow and Benford 2000). Moreover, 
instructors showed recruits videos and pictures of atrocities against Tamils in order to 
reinforce the cognitive impact of the narrative by evoking an emotional response of 
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combatants: “When I joined the LTTE, I studied for 4 months why the LTTE was formed and 
also they showed us videos about how Tamils get attacked by the military. When I saw this, I 
got angry against Sinhalese and the government so I wanted to fight” (4). As the analysis of 
emotions in recruitment has shown, anger can be a powerful motivator pushing people to take 
action and to fight against the injustice done to them (Jasper 2017: 209). The LTTE narrative 
did thus not only resonate cognitively but had an equally strong emotional impact, further 
radicalizing combatants and reinforcing their commitment (Gould 2009).  
Apart from the political training, messages about the importance of the LTTE`s cause were 
integrated in the military training as well. Many of my respondents remembered how, during 
the drilling exercises, trainers would permanently shout “we have to get our land”, “we have 
to fight and get our land”:  
We were always thinking about how to attack the Sinhalese and that we have to go to the warfront to 
fight. Our mentality was like that. This developed during the training time because trainers always told us 
we have to fight, we have to fight, we have to kill, otherwise we will never get our rights. All 
commanders, all trainers continuously repeated that. It was a kind of counselling. We were all below 22 
years old, we were all young, so easily we were converted to this mentality (12). 
The political message thus became integrated into the fighting habitus of combatants. Several 
interviewees would hear trainers saying exactly these sentences while fighting. This, in turn, 
helped them to overcome exhaustion and fear and motivated them to move on during the 
training as well as later in the battlefield.  
Moreover, group rituals and symbolic practices were equally relevant in promoting the 
acceptance and internalization of the LTTE`s political beliefs. For example, the daily oath 
taking where LTTE members swore their allegiance to the struggle for Tamil Eelam 
constantly reminded respondents of “why we are here” or “why we are fighting”: “We were 
swearing the oath every morning. These were very emotional moments and they reminded us 
of our goal. We had to get our land we don`t want others to rule us. We want to rule our 
people. This is the meaning of the oath” (15). Furthermore, the cyanide capsule LTTE fighters 
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were wearing around their neck served a similar function as Prabakharan explains in an 
interview to The Hindu (1986): 
It is this cyanide which has helped us develop our movement very rapidly. Carrying cyanide on our 
person is a symbolic expression of our determination, our commitment, our courage. It gives our fighters 
an extra measure of belief in our cause, a special edge; the cyanide has instilled in us a determination to 
sacrifice our lives and our everything for our cause.  
Rituals and symbols thus served to “sustain the vitality of beliefs, to keep them from being 
effaced from memory and, in sum, to revivify the most essential elements of the collective 
consciousness” (Durkheim 1965: 420).  
Being committed to the LTTE`s cause did not mean that my respondents were interested in 
the strategic aspects of the war. This was the business of LTTE leaders and politicians as they 
would say. Rather, as Bartov (2014: 207) notes, the politicization of fighters served very 
practical purposes: to convince fighters that they fight for a “good cause” and that they defend 
“their community” against an enemy who wants to destroy them. These reasons were credible 
and motivating at the same time and therefore effective in pushing soldiers forward and 
making them risk their lives.   
7.3.2 Identification 
Intimate ties to other LTTE members and a strong sense of group belonging were crucial for 
most of my respondents` commitment. Similar to their political awareness, this feeling of 
“we-ness” and “collective agency” (Snow 2001) emerged as a result of the mandatory training 
all LTTE members had to go through after recruitment:   
In the middle of the training, I cannot remember exactly when, it was so hard; they did not allow us to 
have a bath, it was so difficult, no sleep as we had sentry duty. Me and 4 others we wanted to go home 
and we went to them and told them we want to go back home. But they said no you cannot go home 
because you got trained now, if you want to go you will be punished. Then we tried to negotiate but then I 
saw the younger girls who all did the training. They were very smart in their uniform and with rifles, then 
we got inspired again and thought no we should stay here and pass this training. And then we stayed. 
After that, I was not homesick anymore, we were together with the ones who came after us like brother 
and sister, we all mingled and got friends and I was not homesick anymore (17). 
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Due to their complete isolation from all social relation outside the group as well as the 
common suffering and mutual inspiration during the training, for many of my interviewees 
other LTTE members with whom they shared the same experiences and developed a high 
degree of intimacy, became “their family”: “we became like a family. It was difficult for us to 
leave and to be separated from others; there was a very strong group sentiment” (9). This 
group feeling was reinforced by the LTTE`s organizational structure that resembled an 
extended family and instituted sibling relations “as the valorized mode of egalitarian 
relations” (Thiranagama 2013a: 198). This not only effected relations among members but 
also relations between combatants and their officers. For many respondents the affection and 
admiration they felt for their officers were particularly relevant to build and sustain their 
group identification.44 The officer was the person who consoled and helped them if they felt 
homesick or were injured during battles: “When I joined the LTTE, during the first two 
weeks, I was very homesick and I wanted to go back to my family. But then, a senior LTTE 
took me and talked to me. She became like a mother” (7). Moreover, apart from the battlefield 
where it was clear that orders had to be followed without questioning, relations between 
officers and combatants seem to have been very equal: “It was a good time, we were like 
brothers and sisters, even trainers and masters all were with us, eating together, sleeping 
together” (14). This collective experience, in turn, resulted in a very strong “in the same boat 
consciousness” (Van Maanen and Schein 1977: 247) that united LTTE members and 
sustained their sense of collective identity and commitment to the group. And finally, many of 
my interviewees remembered small indications of affection, such as the organization of 
birthday parties or the celebration of the first period, that strengthened and maintained 
affective ties between fighters as well as between fighters and officers: 
                                                 
44 The military ranks within the LTTE resembled those of the Sri Lankan military with three categories of enlisted ranks, non-commissioned 
officers, and commissioned officers. 
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The older akkas [sisters] looked after us so well, like parents. They used to give us a bath and to comb our 
hair. […] After I had been sent to the Vanni, I received my period the first time and they even did a 
celebration. There were 7 who got the first time their period within a couple of days so we made a 
celebration and we were wearing saris and jewelry (19). 
The loyalty LTTE members felt for each other became particularly evident when respondents 
lost friends during battles. Many of them clearly expressed how they felt a strong need to 
fight back and “kill those who had killed him”: “There was an officer who really motivated 
us. But then in that attack he died. I would have never expected him to die. It was such a 
shock, all of us cried. And then I thought, we have to kill the one who killed him” (20). 
Moreover, many of my respondents would tell that they felt “even more aggressive” and 
“even more willing to fight” (9) when they had seen a comrade dying in the battlefield. The 
death of friends thus strengthened the commitment of combatants to continue fighting and to 
ensure that the death of friends had not been in vain.  
Another crucial factor that deepened and maintained respondents` loyalty to the LTTE was 
their devotion to Prabhakaran. Many interviewees remembered encounters with Prabhakaran 
which, for them, were highly inspirational and motivational moments:  
Most of the ones who are called leaders are not real leaders but he was a leader. He was very focused on 
his goal and he helped people. He sacrificed his children, he did not send them abroad and protect them, 
he never did that. His son died in the war. He treated his children equal to us, he was like a father for us. 
So how could I go home? (13) 
My respondents felt that, if Prabhakaran is ready to sacrifice everything for the cause, they 
should do the same. The identification with one another and with Prabakharan thus resulted in 
a sense of an “inner social obligation to act on behalf of the collective” (Klandermans 2015: 
7). Not acting upon this obligation and leaving the group would instead have felt like 
betraying “their family”: “we would have never thought to go back and leave our friends 
behind” (12).  
Finally, rituals and symbols helped to revitalize and cultivate loyalty and solidarity among 
combatants. As Goffman (1969) notes, groups need to “announce” their identities in order to 
maintain and strengthen their unity. For example, taking the oath every day renewed and 
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deepened combatants’ sense of collective belonging and collective consciousness. 
Furthermore, symbols, most importantly the uniform, weapons and the cyanide capsule all 
LTTE members had to wear around their neck, embodied the “new identity” combatants 
adopted when joining the LTTE and thereby strengthened the solidarity of recruits with one 
another as well as with the LTTE as a group. The sense of collective identity thus extends 
what Shils and Jankowitz called the primary group and includes not only comrades personally 
known to a soldier but all LTTE members based on their belonging to the larger group. As 
Segal and Kestenbaum (2002: 454) argue in their critic of the concept of primary group 
cohesion:  
[N]ot all social cohesion is necessarily limited to small groups. Nor does social cohesion necessarily 
inhere in bonds of particular other persons […]. In the words of Benedict Anderson this is the cohesion 
characteristic of an imagined community […]. This sense of imagined community is precisely what may 
seem to distinguish the armed forces from the rest of society and simultaneously to bind members 
together.    
This identification with the whole group – the imagined community – is especially relevant in 
situation where high casualty numbers or the transfer of fighters from one unit to another lead 
to constant changes in the composition of the primary groups. In these cases, combatants’ 
commitment cannot be sustained by personal bonds to comrades they have been fighting with 
for a long time; rather, it is the identification with the LTTE as a group, or more precisely the 
identification with all LTTE members due to their membership in the group, that allows 
combatants to maintain their commitment even if they barely know their comrades: “We 
didn’t know each other but we became close friends very fast. It was this feeling of fighting 
for the same thing and we all had similar problems, the lack of food and so on, this all united 
us. We always became close friends very fast” (3). Combatants thus identified with the 
comrades they have personal everyday contact with as well as with the LTTE as a group. This 
double identification, in turn, made sure that loyalties among group members were sustained 
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even if organizational changes or battlefield dynamics led to transformations in the 
composition of combat units.   
7.3.3 Empowerment  
Many of my respondents felt rather anxious in the early phase after they had joined the LTTE 
and were waiting till the mandatory training starts. For most of them, however, this initial 
anxiety would be replaced by feelings of strength, confidence and a sense of pride once they 
had completed the training. For most of my respondents the training not only provided them 
with the necessary skills to fight but was also a highly empowering experience: “There was a 
lot of discipline in the group and only those who could go through this discipline were real 
fighter. If you cannot go through that you are not a real fighter” (13). Many respondents 
would describe in detail how they suffered during the training and were thinking many times 
that they would not be able to go through this. After this “shocking encounter phase”, 
however, respondents experienced some kind of a “metamorphosis” (Baetson 2017: 638); 
from this point the training became easier and interviewees begun to feel “fearless”, “very 
confident” and “bold” (2; 22; 26). As Van Maanen and Schein (1977: 255) note simply the 
sacrifice and hard work to go through a rigorous socialization process “serves to effectively 
fuse the newcomer in the prepared-for role”. Completing the training gave combatants an 
impression of personal efficiency for they feel that they are mastering their new tasks, 
resulting in an increase of their motivation (Long and Hadden 1985). 
The training was experienced as particularly empowering for those respondents who had 
joined the LTTE out of frustration about their helplessness and continuous victimization by 
the Sri Lankan army. Learning to fight back, for them, meant to gain back agency and to act 
instead of being victimized. Moreover, the discipline that governed their everyday lives gave 
them a sense of protection: “Before, we lived in fear, we couldn’t go anywhere, there was no 
security. In the LTTE it was not like that, we could move freely and everything was very well 
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ordered and we learned to fight. Because of that I was not afraid anymore” (15). Moreover, 
for many respondents, discipline had a moral worth in itself. They felt that due to the 
discipline and the “good manners” they learned in the LTTE they were better able to control 
themselves and their desires and therefore became better persons: 
Boys and girls we were trained together. But we did not have any bad thoughts about girls we were very 
disciplined. I learned a lot about good behavior and attitude and discipline. We were thought to respect 
other people. We watched the commanders how they behaved and learned from them. They thought us to 
respect women and to treat everyone equally. These were things I appreciated very much (3). 
Apart from discipline, the feeling of being part of something bigger and to fight for a higher 
cause was another source of pride and commitment for many respondents: “There was a 
strong feeling of protection. We knew we need our own land and we are fighting for that. I 
felt very honored that I could be part of this fight, not all had this chance. I had the feeling 
that I achieved something higher” (25). As Jasper (2000: 287) notes, acting according to 
moral principles – “doing the right thing” – can be a highly empowering experience for 
movement participants and therefore intrinsically valuable. Moreover, the moral commitment 
of respondents was directly linked to their self-understanding as the representatives and 
protectors of the Tamil community. Many of my them would stress that whenever they saw 
Tamil civilians who had been displaced and/or injured, they felt that they have to continue 
fighting and get the land where Tamils can live peacefully: 
Before joining I thought my father, my mother my sister is my world. After joining, I understood about 
the Batticaloa people`s problems, about the Trinco people`s problems, all Tamils suffered. And then 
when I saw how they got attacked and displaced, I felt, we had to fight for them. And also the people, 
they trusted the armed groups, so we had this responsibility (22). 
This self-perception was reinforced and maintained by the LTTE leadership that portrayed 
LTTE members as extraordinary figures who sacrifice themselves and their bodies for Tamils 
(Thiranagama 2013: 213). Officers would continuously stress that LTTE members are the 
ones responsible to win back the land from which Tamils had been expelled, and to protect 
the Tamil community from the Sri Lankan army (7; 17; 24). My respondents thus directly 
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linked the LTTE`s political goal – a separate state for the Tamil community – to the well-
being of their families as well as the Tamil community, they identified with. They were 
convinced that only if they continue fighting and “get the land”, “their families” and “their 
community” will be able to lead a safe and happy life: “I had a small brother at that time. 
When I went to visit my family there were bombs all the time and my brother was always 
afraid of the sounds of the bombs, so I took the decision that we have to finish this war. If not, 
my brother will never have a peaceful life (8)”. The outcome of the war was thus not an 
abstract goal that was irrelevant to their personal lives. On the contrary, for my respondents 
the outcome was directly linked to how they saw their own and, more importantly, the future 
of their families and their community.  
The responsibility and empowerment respondents experienced as a result of their capacity and 
willingness to fight for a better future for themselves and “their community” thus further 
strengthened their commitment.   
7.4 Discussion and Conclusion  
The analysis has shown that combatants` commitment is largely a result of different 
socialization mechanisms which foster their identification with one another and the group as 
well as the internalization of group norms and values. Analyzing retention in terms of 
socialization can thus inform research on sustained participation in armed groups and 
militaries in several ways. First, it urges scholars to analyze retention as a distinct process 
instead of a mere continuation from recruitment. While some armed groups might focus on 
mobilizing committed fighters only, most of them don’t. We thus have to analyze the 
mechanisms that turn recruits into committed fighters, especially if they have been 
conscripted or coerced to join. Focusing on socialization provides scholars with a conceptual 
tool to analyze retention as a distinct process and single out the different mechanisms that 
build and maintain (or potentially hamper) combatants` commitment. 
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Second, focusing on the different mechanisms that sustain participation might help to clarify 
the relevance and/or irrelevance of factors which have been singled out as relevant for combat 
motivation. For example, my analysis challenges the widely held assumption that ideational 
factors are irrelevant to explain commitment. The mere fact that a considerable part of the 
LTTE`s training consisted of political education shows that the LTTE (as many other armed 
groups) had no doubt as to the role of indoctrination in motivating combatants. Moreover, 
ideational factors were clearly relevant for combatants` commitment to fight, albeit in a more 
practical way than generally assumed. Few would explain their motivation in clearly defined 
ideological terms; still political beliefs and moral convictions matter to sustain their 
commitment. For example, combatants start to think about the war in terms of ideological 
binaries (Mann 2012), such as the “oppressed fighting against the suppressors” or they 
become convinced that they fight for “a good cause”. It is thus a broader understanding of 
ideology as a set of ideas, images and beliefs that justify the use of violence which is relevant 
to build and maintain combatants’ motivation and which should guide the scholarly analysis 
of the importance of ideational factors in the everyday lives of rank and file soldiers.  
Moreover, with regard to the primary group thesis, this article confirms the crucial importance 
of affective bonds between combatants for retention; it, however, extends existing works on 
small group cohesion by showing that identification works on two levels. Personal ties and 
day-to-day contacts with comrades are crucial in building and maintaining a collective 
identity and evoking a sense of social obligation to fight among combatants. This 
identification with the primary group, however, may be strengthened by a further layer of 
identification with the whole group, the “imagined community”, that includes all members of 
an armed group. This identification with the group, in turn, proved to be particularly relevant 
in upholding commitment if regular transfers of combatants between units preclude the 
building of strong personal bonds. Moreover, as Moskos (1970) shows micro-level 
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solidarities may even be counterproductive to retention by, for example, making fighters more 
likely to band together to desert. Identification with the whole group could help to 
counterbalance these disuniting tendencies of primary group cohesion.   
Finally, my analysis draws scholarly attention to a mechanism rarely dealt with in works on 
sustained participation. Being part of an armed group can be an empowering experience for 
combatants and thereby build and maintain their commitment. This mechanism has some 
commonality with the strand of works in military sociology that focus on how drill and 
professional performance sustains cohesion. However, while most of these works stress 
professionalization and automation as the main factors that maintain combat motivation, my 
findings suggest that they tend to neglect the emotional dimension of collective action in 
militaries or armed groups. Especially, the feeling of doing something exceptional and 
honorable or the moral pleasure to represent and fight for their communities proved to be 
relevant for respondents` commitment. Moreover, for combatants who had been victimized 
repeatedly or had lost close family members due to the war, fighting often meant to take back 
control over their lives and to gain back agency. Empowerment thus involves other dimension 
which together with the pride that results from successful collective performance sustains 
combatants` commitment.   
And third, my analysis suggests that it is the interaction of different mechanism that build and 
maintain combatants` commitment rather than one single factor. Moreover, the mechanisms 
don’t operate independent from each other but are mutually reinforcing. For example, 
indoctrination not only strengthens combatants’ attachment to the group’s cause, it also 
deepens their identification with one another and the group. Group members who are attached 
– emotionally as well as cognitive – to a common goal, simultaneously identify with one 
another as a result of their common consciousness. Moreover, affective ties between 
combatants not only strengthen their identification; the sense of belonging to a group has an 
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equally important empowering – “together we are strong” – effect. Further research on 
sustained participation could thus benefit from paying more attention to how different 
mechanisms interact and mutually influence each other to strengthen commitment. 
Apart from understanding retention, a focus on socialization and its impact on combatants’ 
commitment can help to illuminate other aspects of political violence. First, it can enhance 
our understanding of the persistence and, finally, the disengagement of armed groups. 
Combatants who are successfully socialized to group norms and identify with the group are 
more likely to continue fighting even in light of extreme hardship and potential defeat, 
thereby contributing to the resilience and persistence of the group. Moreover, combatants who 
are committed to a group`s cause are less likely to disengage individually as this would feel 
like betraying; disengagement is thus more likely to be observed on a group level, following 
defeat or a decision of the group leadership (see also Bosi 2013). Second, focusing on the 
socialization of combatants into committed fighters might help to understand why some 
counterinsurgency campaigns are more successful than others or what kind of strategy is most 
likely to succeed. Campaigns that provide combatants with material incentives to disengage 
are unlikely to work if combatants have been successfully socialized to group norms. By 
contrast, they might be more effective if most combatants remain fighting out of fear or for 
material reasons. And third, the degree combatants internalize group norms and adopt a 
different “movement identity” might influence reintegration trajectories as well as the success 
of demobilization and reintegration programs. Depending on their commitment to a group`s 
cause, combatants might face more or less difficulties to reintegrate into civilian lives. For 
example, it is likely that combatants who have internalized group norms are less willing to 
accept incentives for reintegration that don’t recognize their political and moral aspirations 
but focus on material incentives, such as the provision of jobs, only (Nussio and Oppenheim, 
2014). Moreover, combatants who adopted new norms and values that challenge existing 
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traditions and power relations, such as traditional gender norms, might face more difficulties 
to be accepted by their communities when returning. Studies on reintegration could thus 
benefit from exploring how socialization processes within armed groups influence 




8 Variation in Perceptions of Violence and Support for 
Armed Groups  
Using violence to achieve political goals is mostly considered as a deviation from acceptable 
means for political contention and therefore as illegal as well as illegitimate. However, as 
Viterna (2014: 2010) points out, “violence is only radical when it deviates from what is 
acceptable to a specific group”.  If used against a perceived oppressive and unjust regime, for 
self-defense only or to prevent so called “betrayers” from collaborating with the enemy, 
violence may be perfectly justifiable for those who perpetrate it, but also for those who are 
(directly or indirectly) affected by it. Depending on how different audiences perceive 
violence, an armed group`s campaign might thus be seen as perfectly righteous despite its use 
of violent tactics. On the other hand, especially if exerted in an indiscriminate manner over a 
long period of time, violence tends to undermine support and might even lead to a downward 
spiral of escalatory violence and decreasing levels of support, finally diminishing the 
credibility and legitimacy of an armed group (Schlichte 2009; Schlichte and Schneckener 
2015).   
During the last decade an increasing number of scholars has begun to explore the processes 
that shape how civilians perceive violence as well as the impact of different types of violence 
on civilian attitudes. Several works have shown how group identification affects perceptions 
of violence, pointing particularly to in-group biases in blame attribution as well as to the 
increasing acceptance of violence as a legitimate mean of action as a result of growing 
polarization and in-group solidarity (Condra and Shapiro 2012; Della Porta 1995; Lyall, Blair 
and Imai 2013). Another line of studies focuses on how selective and indiscriminate tactics 
tend to have different effects on civilian attitudes, thereby shaping support relations between 
civilians and armed groups in different ways (Arjona 2017; Benmelech, Berrebi, and Klor 
2010; Kalyvas 2006). Finally, scholars have started to explore in more detail how particular 
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narratives, such as gender or civilization, shape if violence is perceived as legitimate or 
outrageous, and consequently how civilians evaluate armed campaigns (Bellamy 2012; 
Viterna 2013; Sanìn and Wood 2014).  
This chapter builds on these works and aims to explore how violence exerted by armed 
groups is perceived by civilians they claim to fight for. It thus focuses on the experiences or 
trajectory of civilians who have been living in the warzone during the conflict, and aims to 
single out the most relevant mechanisms that affect civilian perception of violence and to 
illustrate how these mechanisms – by shaping perceptions – influence support relations 
between armed groups and their constituencies.  In particular, the analysis contributes to the 
existing literature by paying closer attention to how perceptions of violence change over time 
– what mechanisms are most relevant in shaping perceptions in different phases of a conflict – 
as well as across space – in how far do people living in different socio-spatial contexts, in 
terms of rebel control and exposure to violence, evaluate violence in different ways.   
8.1 Violence, Wartime Attitudes and Popular Support  
While practitioners of violence as well as counterinsurgency theorists have long ago pointed 
to the relevance of violence in shaping popular support45, it was in the last decade only that 
we could observe a growing amount of scholarly work trying to understand the processes that 
shape how civilians perceive violence as well as the impact of different types of violence on 
civilian attitudes. In an attempt to summarize the findings of these studies we can distinguish 
between three approaches. 
First, a range of qualitative and more recently also quantitative studies have shown that 
processes of group identification are crucial to understand civilian support for armed groups 
                                                 
45 See Guevara 1961; counterinsurgency theories commonly stress that that in order to win people`s hearts and minds, the killing of innocent 




as well as how civilians perceive violence exerted by different conflict actors (Dutton 2007; 
Horowitz 2000; Sambanis and Sayho 2013). Most of these works are based on findings in 
social psychology which examine how group membership affects individual behavior and 
document the widespread tendency for in-group bias and conformity to in-group norms.46 
With regard to violence and civilian support for armed groups, these studies demonstrate how 
the perception of violence is conditioned on who inflicts the harm and against whom violence 
is exerted. More precisely, as a result of intergroup bias – the tendency to interpret the actions 
of one’s in-group in a more favorable light than those of the out-group – civilians tend to 
evaluate violent attacks exerted by their own group more positively than the same acts 
perpetrated by the out-group. For example, Lyall, Blair and Imai (2013), in their study on 
support for combatants during war in Afghanistan, show that group identification shapes how 
civilians evaluate violence perpetrated against them. While harm inflicted by the international 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) negatively affected civilians` attitudes towards the ISAF, 
Taliban inflicted harm had no similar effect on civilian attitudes towards them (see also 
Condra and Shapiro 2012; Hirose, Imai and Lyall 2017; Lyall, Shiraito and Imai 2016). 
Moreover, once people identify with a group who engages in (mass) atrocities, they tend to 
engage in several strategies of moral disengagement, such as advantageous comparison, 
displacement of responsibility or dehumanization among others, in order to maintain their 
emotional well-being (Bandura 1999; Osofsky, Bandura and Zimbardo 2005). Increasing 
social polarization, particularly in combination with a (perceived) threat towards the in-group, 
thus often leads to the acceptance or even support of violence against “the enemy” (Brewer 
1999; Della Porta 2013; Dutton 2007; Hafez 2000).  
                                                 
46 Processes of identification have been studied intensively using the Minimal Group Paradigm – experiments in which subjects are assigned 
to groups and then make anonymous allocation decisions between an in-group and an out-group member (the categorization into groups 
is based on a common (usually trivial) trait). Consequently, participants tend to indicate that they are more similar to their anonymous in-
group members as well as systematically favour them. (see Brewer 1979; Tajfel and Turner 1986). 
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A second strand of works focuses on how different types of violence may shape civilian 
attitudes in different ways. Based on Kalyvas work (2006) on violence and collaboration, 
most of these studies distinguish between selective violence – instances when individuals are 
targeted based on personalized information about their individual actions (Kalyvas 2006) – 
and indiscriminate violence – the targeting of individuals or groups with no effort to 
determine guilt or innocence (Downes 2007); rather, individuals or groups are targeted 
without making a distinction between combatants and civilians (Lyall 2009) and/or they are 
targeted based on guilt-by association or concepts of collective guilt (Kalyvas and Kocher 
2007). The application of these two types of violence is assumed to have different effects on 
civilian support. If violence is selective and people know when and how it is applied, they are 
more likely to consider it acceptable or even justified (Arjona 2017). For example, a recent 
study on the effect of house demolitions by the Israeli Defense Force on subsequent suicide 
attacks in the Gaza Strip provides evidence that violence against civilians can have opposing 
effects on support in the same context, depending on whether civilians perceive the violence 
as selective or indiscriminate (Benmelech, Berrebi, and Klor 2010). In contrast to selective 
violence, indiscriminate violence is assumed to have a detrimental effect on popular support 
as civilians tend to be alienated by the perpetrator instead of being deterred, and might 
support the opposite side in retaliation for the killings of innocents or to be protected from 
violence (Kalyvas and Kocher 2007; Wood 2003). Most recently, a series of empirical studies 
have tried to empirically test the impact of indiscriminate violence on popular support. The 
results, however, have been inconclusive. While several scholars found evidence for the 
detrimental impact of indiscriminate violence on civilian support (Kalyvas and Kocher 2009; 
Kocher, Pepinsky, and Kalyvas 2011), other studies have shown that under certain conditions 
indiscriminate violence can increase the support for insurgents or incumbents (Downes 2007; 
Lyall 2009).  
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A third strand of qualitative studies has focused on how frames47 or narratives employed by 
armed groups can shape how an armed campaign is evaluated by civilians. As Bakonyi and 
Bliesemann De Guevara stress (2009: 403) collective violence “is preceded by and embedded 
in narrative acts, for example, in form of stories about social injustices, grievances, threats 
and ways to improve the social situation or to escape a problem.” Many of these stories only 
circulate within a certain social group and thus tend to activate social boundaries and 
constitute in- and out-groups (see above). Moreover, these frames and narratives are an 
important tool to justify the use of violence against specific groups and thereby shape how 
violent acts are perceived by different populations (Schlichte and Schneckener 2015). For 
example, Viterna (2014) shows that armed groups can use gender as a tool to mitigate the 
radicalness with which the public perceives their armed campaign. By portraying their 
struggle as a necessary mean to protect women – and especially women`s sexuality, armed 
groups can solidify their reputation as the good guys who commit violence for a just cause. 
Similarly, Bellamy, in his work on genocide and mass killings (2012), shows how 
perpetrators of mass violence use a mechanism, he calls selective extermination, which places 
certain groups outside moral and legal protection and thereby justifies mass atrocities against 
them (which would have been unacceptable against the in-group) in the eyes of those who 
subscribe to it (for similar findings see Dutton 2007).    
8.2 Mechanisms that Shape Perception of Violence 
While the discussed literature has improved our understanding about violence and civilian 
support, we still know relatively little about how civilians form their views of combatants and 
change them over the course of the conflict (Hirose, Imai and Lyall 2017). However, as 
                                                 
47 Framing refers to a concept introduced by social movement scholars to denoted the meaning making and interpretative dimension of 
collective action. Frames are commonly understood as schemata of interpretation which perform this interpretive function by simplifying 
and condensing aspects of the "world out there," but in ways that are "intended to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to 
garner bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists" (Snow and Benford 2000). 
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Dutton (2007: 108) notes “violence generates an evolution in perpetrators; the personality of 
individuals, social norms, institutions, and culture all change incrementally in ways that make 
greater violence easier and more likely.” Similarly, Galula (1964) and Petersen (2001) show 
how support for government and rebels varies at the individual level and shifts across space 
and time in reaction to both rebel and state activities. Few studies, however, explore 
systematically how civilian perceptions of violence might change over the course of a 
conflict, for example as a reaction to changes in the violent repertoire used by conflict actors. 
Moreover, we know little about how variations in socio-spatial contexts might affect civilian 
perceptions of violence. However, armed conflicts have a tremendous capacity to segment 
space and authority. It is thus not uncommon in a civil war context that different political 
orders exist next to each other and that people who live in different conflicts zones are 
exposed to different forms of authority and violence. For example, it is likely that people who 
live in rebel controlled territories are exposed to different types of violence and make 
different conflict experiences than those individuals who live in government controlled or 
contested areas and we are thus likely to observe variation in perceptions of violence across 
space.  
This chapter therefore aims to contribute to the existing literature by paying closer attention to 
how perceptions of violence change over time – what mechanisms are most relevant in 
shaping perceptions in different phases of a conflict – as well as across space – in how far do 
people living in different socio-spatial contexts evaluate violence in different ways. 
In the following section, I discuss the functioning of four mechanisms that emerged from my 
empirical analysis as most relevant to shape perceptions of violence. To derive the proposed 
mechanisms, I went back and forth between my interview transcripts and the existing 
literature on political violence, social movements and organizational sociology in order to 
inductively ‘code’ the transcripts and to understand analytically how the identified 
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mechanisms shape civilian evaluations of violent tactics. I don’t mean to imply that the 
identified mechanisms are the only possible ones; they are, however, general enough to be of 
relevance in various armed conflicts. Moreover, the relevance of the identified mechanisms 
varies with regard to the phase of the conflict as well as the socio-spatial context we focus on. 
I will illustrate this variation in the empirical section and discuss it more thoroughly in the 
concluding chapter.  
i. Polarization Violent conflicts tend to activate and deepen cleavages between social 
groups, thereby polarizing societies in in- and out-group(s) (Bakonyi and Bliesemann De 
Guevara 2009: 403). The intergroup bias resulting from social polarization, in turn, 
shapes perception of violence as individuals are more likely to evaluate the actions of the 
in-group in favorable and situational terms (“they were forced to do it”), while violence 
committed by the out-group confirms existing beliefs about the out-group as evil and 
inhuman (Sambanis and Shayo 2013). Moreover, polarization, particularly if resulting 
from outside threats, strengthens solidarity within the in-group and produces pressures 
for both behavioral compliance and for internalized value consensus (McAuley and 
Moskalenko 2008). Violence committed on behalf of a solidarity-community thus exerts 
moral pressure on the community to uphold support even if parts of the armed campaign 
are seen critical by some members. This pressure towards conformity might be so strong 
that communities accept violence against in-group members if their behavior is seen as 
threating the cohesion of the group (Brewer 1999: 435).  
ii. Representation Armed group`s often claim to take on the grievances of a specific 
community and fight for their socio-economic and political aspirations. Violence might 
thus be seen as legitimate by community members through representation – as it is 
exerted to defend the community`s interests and is committed by fighters who belong to 
and fight for the community (Malthaner 2015: 433). Thereby, representation reinforces 
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solidarity and compliance within the in-group (Brewer 1999: 435; Schlichte and 
Schneckener 2015). The pressure to uphold solidarity tends to be exacerbated if 
combined with martyrdom – the willingness of fighters to give up their lives for a cause. 
From a community members’ perspective, it is difficult not to respect and to a certain 
extent value this type of sacrifice on behalf of the community (Khosrokhavar 2005).  
iii. Institutionalization is based on the third type of belief that according to Weber (2005) 
can make the exertion of power legitimate. Violence can be institutionalized in the sense 
that it is exerted not arbitrarily but according to a set of principles and is thus considered 
as selective and potentially more legitimate by communities (Arjona 2017). For 
example, similar to states, armed groups might establish security institutions, such as 
police forces and courts, which use violence according to certain principles (Schlichte 
and Schneckener 2015). The resulting higher predictability of violence combined with 
(perceived) organizational efficiency can make punishments justified in the eyes of 
communities (Arjona 2017: 766-768).  
iv. Desensitization If people are continuously and over a longer period of time exposed to 
violence, they to tend to become immunized to all sorts of tactics – a process social-
psychologists call desensitization (De Choudhury, Monroy-Hernández and Mark 2014). 
This might even lead to a reaction called freezing: people become unable to react or 
even to assess what is happening around them (Koonings and Kruijt 1999). Armed 
groups may therefore rely on symbolic violence, such as gathering communities to 
witness the killing of locals, in order to make them psychologically incapable of reacting 
in any way but complying (Hollister 1948). Moreover, increasing desensitization 
suppresses space for critical discussions and thereby fosters compliance as, when there 
are no alternative definitions of the situation, obedience to an authority is more likely to 
follow (Arjona 2017: 768). 
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8.3 Civilian Perception of Violence and Popular Support 
The following subsections serve to analyse how the discussed mechanisms shaped civilian 
perception of violence and – through shaping perceptions – influenced attitudes towards the 
LTTE. Each section discusses the functioning of one of the identified mechanisms and shows 
how its working shapes respondents` perceptions of different forms of violence directed at 
different targets and discusses under what kind of circumstances the mechanism is most 
consequential, focusing particularly on the phase of the conflict as well as the socio-spatial 
context.  
8.3.1 Polarization and the Perception of Violence Against Civilians 
Social polarization was present as consequential in shaping perceptions of violence in all of 
my respondents` narratives. The personal experience of discrimination and violence, 
combined with a continuous propaganda campaign that portrayed the Sri Lankan government 
as the enemy who employs brutal force against Tamils, made the LTTE`s armed struggle 
necessary and legitimate in the eyes of my respondents. Moreover, as polarization deepened, 
they began to see all Sinhalese as “the enemy” who – under certain circumstances – deserve 
to be attacked. At the same, violence against those Tamils who openly criticized the LTTE`s 
campaign and thereby threatened the struggle was increasingly perceived as necessary.   
LTTE leaders are very careful to empathize the non-violent background of the Tamil 
movement and would describe in length how they were driven to violence as a mean to 
protect themselves against Sinhalese state oppression – an interpretation that is reproduced in 
the LTTE`s official texts.48 This view is closely in line with what most of my respondents 
would tell me about the beginning of the armed conflict. Even those who became critical of 
the LTTE`s increasing ruthlessness would stress that the cause of the war was just, that the 
                                                 
48 Interview researcher, London, 26 January 2019; interview political activist, Mulaitivu, 26 May 2018; see also Balasingham 2004. 
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“conflict started for a good reason” (C 10). For them, it was the brutal reaction of the Sri 
Lankan security forces that pushed the Tamil movement to change its action from non-violent 
protests to violence resistance. In the 1980s there were mounting instances of Tamil civilians 
being rounded up and detained without access to lawyers or family for prolonged periods of 
time (Swamy 1994). However, rather than mitigate the occurrences of violence, the brutal 
repression by the police and the army escalated violence on the Tamil side, resulting in spirals 
of increasing brutality and tit for tat violence (Bloom 2003): 
We were asking ourselves: why are they attacking us? Why are they turning their guns against us instead 
of fighting the militants? There were so many civilians arrested and tortured, so we realized that they 
fight against all Tamils, also the civilians. Actually, from that point we started to look at the army as 
different people. And the army was completely occupied by Sinhalese, even the media called it the 
Sinhala army. So, we started to look at them as part of a different community that doesn’t accept us as 
people of Sri Lanka (C 12). 
Support for the LTTE`s armed campaign and the perception of the Sri Lankan Armed Forces 
(SLAF) as “the enemy” thus partly resulted from personal experiences of discrimination, 
displacement, loss and destruction which were dominant in all of my respondents` narratives. 
On the other hand, information campaigns organized by the LTTE also played an important 
role in shaping my respondents’ evaluation. The Sri Lankan army as the cruel force that 
ruthlessly attacks Tamil civilians figured prominently in most LTTE events, videos and 
texts.49 Most of my respondents would remember how the attendance in these events helped 
them to link their personal experiences of discrimination and loss to the suffering “of all 
Tamils”. This transformation of private into group-grievances, in turn, was central, as a 
growing sense of collective identification made them perceive violence targeted at any Tamil 
as an attack against their community: 
During the event they [LTTE members] explained what was going on, why it was necessary to take up 
arms and also some of them explained that the conflict didn’t start suddenly but already in the 70s with 
the standardization policy. Then, I realized the connection of the different events, the riots, the 
discrimination and I myself experienced the discrimination and the round-ups so it was easy to 
                                                 
49 Often LTTE produced videos shows SLAF soldiers who drink and dance while Tamils are suffering, thus contrasting their behavior with 
the highly disciplined nature of LTTE members (Brun 2008: 407).  
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understand. And I realized that all Tamils were affected. Before there were many differences between 
Tamils but then I started to see that all Tamils suffered (C 13).   
While during the 1970s the LTTE had mainly targeted police officers, army personal and so-
called traitors (see below), from the mid-1980s killings of Sinhalese civilians became 
increasingly widespread.50 This, in turn, required a shift in boundaries to include as them – the 
out-group – not only members of security services and government officials but also 
Sinhalese civilians. Most of my respondents would describe how, at one point, they started to 
see the Sinhalese as “the other group” and how they felt indifferent or even good “if someone 
dies who is part of the other group [the Sinhalese]” (C 2; C 23). They began to see Sinhalese 
as the enemies and, at the same time, had the inner feeling that “the others” (the Sinhalese) do 
the same with them (C 13). Violence and counter-violence thus contributed to the emergence 
of a Manichean world view (Della Porta 1995) which helped to justify violence against 
Sinhalese civilians. When talking about how the LTTE chased out Sinhalese civilians from a 
village in the East of Sri Lanka, one of my respondents would stress that if  
they [the LTTE] hadn`t chased them [the Sinhalese] out, they would have captured all these places and 
killed all of us […]. It is dangerous to have Sinhalese leaving among us. We knew what they have done in 
other villages. They might kill us tomorrow. Better to ask them to leave. It is a Tamil place here (C 1). 
The way boundaries were created between us – the Tamils – and them – the Sinhalese – was 
similar in most accounts of my respondents. First, the Sinhalese are constructed as the 
enemies who pose a political and military threat to the Tamil community. This, in turn, allows 
to see them as legitimate targets of violence and to portray violence against them as purely 
self-defensive and therefore justified (Shaw 2007: 111). Second, threat constructions are 
combined with guilt attribution. Sinhalese are accused of having collaborated with the 
government and therefore have to be killed in order to prevent the destructive consequences 
                                                 
50 Such attacks included, among many others: Anuradhapura 1985: LTTE members attack the bus station – 150 Sinhalese civilians dead; 
Kituluttuwa 1987: the LTTE unload two buses and kill their passengers on the roadside – 126 Sinhalese civilians dead; Kattankudy 1990: the 
LTTE attack two mosques during Friday prayer – 103 Muslim civilians dead; Kokkadichcholai 1991: an army unit goes berserk in village – 
150 Tamil civilians dead (Fuglerud 1999: 42). 
162 
 
this collaboration could have for Tamils (Dutton 2007: 74). The increased salience of us-them 
distinctions, in turn, influenced beliefs about who had started retaliatory spirals of violence. 
Many of my respondents would stress that the LTTE only reacted to violence committed by 
the Sinhalese: 
If there was a massacre by soldiers, a few weeks later the LTTE carried out a similar attack. They took 
revenge. […] Whenever the army massacred Tamil civilians then the LTTE massacred Sinhalese civilians 
in revenge. It was not out of hatred that they killed civilians, it was a strategy. The LTTE would have never 
started to attack Sinhalese civilians. They only did it as revenge (C 15). 
Even respondents who saw some of the LTTE massacres critically would stress that the LTTE 
only reacted to previous massacres of Tamil civilians by the Sri Lankan forces. While the 
SLAF`s attacks where thus perceived as deliberate hostile acts against Tamil civilians, the 
LTTE`s massacres were seen as situational – “they had to react” – and thus as an acceptable 
form of self-defence.  
The activation and deepening of boundaries not only shaped perceptions of violence 
committed against Sinhalese but also of violence against Tamils. As the LTTE acknowledges 
in their foundation document: the feeling of being threatened has helped “the coming together 
of the heterogeneous masses of the oppressed Tamil nation” (LTTE 2005). This increase in 
solidarity among Tamils, however, resulted in growing pressure to uphold the moral order 
that maintains in-group loyalty and left little space and tolerance for criticism (Brewer 1999: 
435). Criticism of the LTTE or its practices were increasingly perceived as attempts to 
weaken the unity of Tamils, thereby threatening the struggle for a separate state: 
At that time, we were like any generation who goes through a war, we had a tunnel vision. You cannot 
compare anymore and there is no room and liberty to compare. If you are telling certain things that are 
not conducive for the fight, then, this does not turn out well. So, you simply go with the flow and you 
think we are fighting and the army is dying and this is what is supposed to happen because we have been 
dying for such a long time. […] We had to go with the majority as, if not, you will get pushed. Behind 
closed doors we were sometimes saying that the armed struggle is not the solution but in public we would 
say what everybody said: it is the only way, there is no other option (C 13). 
While the killing of Tamils accused of weakening or opposing the Tamil struggle started 
already in the 70s, the LTTE extended and routinized the practice in the 80s and 90s with the 
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execution of all sorts of so-called traitors (Thiranagama 2011: 133). When asked why he 
decided to eliminate rival militant groups, Prabhakaran (1986) explained that “TELO [Tamil 
Eelam Liberation Organization – a rival militant group] was killing out LTTE leaders, and if 
we had not tackled them the Tiger movement would have gradually ceased to exist. […] 
While our cadres were really keeping the Sri Lankan Army at bay, these other groups were 
indulging in antisocial activities.” Similarly, when talking about killings of Tamils, my 
respondents would often stress that these murders were necessary because they (the victims) 
were traitors who worked with the government or did other sorts of “anti-social activities”: 
There were few politicians who said that there are other solutions than an armed fight but then they were 
looked at as traitors. The whole community saw them as traitors. Now people might start to question 
some of the killings but, at that time, it was very difficult to think otherwise (C 18). 
The prosecution of traitors was thus constructed not as a personal vengeance by the LTTE 
against opponents but as a necessary measure to maintain the cohesion and solidarity 
among Tamils. This cohesion, in turn, was seen as the indispensable foundation of the 
struggle. 
8.3.2 The LTTE as the “only” Representative of Tamils – Solidarity and Moral 
Pressure  
Representation – the belief that the LTTE is the only one fighting for Tamils – became 
particularly relevant for shaping perceptions of violence once my respondents had identified 
with the LTTE as “their group” but, at the same time, had to cope with the moral distress 
about the increasing violence exerted by LTTE members against their own community.  
When talking about the LTTE, many of my respondents would repeatedly stress that the 
LTTE was the only one who was fighting for Tamils and defending them against the Sri 
Lankan army. As Brun (2008: 412) points out, this statement is a contradiction since the 
LTTE killed all other militant groups fighting for a separate Tamil state and systematically 
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silenced all voices opposed to their own. However, it is still the way many of my respondents 
thought about the LTTE. The belief that the LTTE is the only one representing them was one 
of the most important reasons why respondents continued to support the LTTE despite the 
ambivalent feelings they had about the killings of all sorts of traitors:   
They were fighting for us, we all accepted that, there is no doubt about that. Certain things I did not like, 
the killings, conscription […]. This, however, doesn’t mean that I did not like the cause. We wanted to 
have a separate state and the LTE was the only one fighting for it (C 7). 
When the LTTE eliminated other Tamil militant groups many of my respondents were very 
critical about the killings but, at the same time, “we thought we don`t have any other way. 
They are the leading party to get back our rights. So even if they did something wrong, we 
had no other choice, we had to support them” (C 10). This belief was mostly based on a 
combination of instrumental considerations and fear. On the one hand my respondents were 
convinced that “Tamils can only get their rights and lead a good life if they get their own 
state” (C 6) and thus supported the LTTE as the only force potentially capable of achieving 
this goal; on the other hand, most of my respondents – even though they were afraid of the 
LTTE – feared the Sinhalese army even more and therefore preferred to support the LTTE. 
For them, the Sri Lankan government with its routinized arrests, torture, executions, and 
surveillance of Tamils did not represent a viable alternative: “We felt like we are second class 
citizens in the country. That feeling, wherever you go, you experience it. Then you say ok 
what this people [the LTTE] are doing is right. It is better to live under them than to be slaves 
(C 19).” Based on these reflections, some of my respondents preferred not to voice their 
criticism publicly as criticism coming from Tamils themselves could be used by the Sri 
Lankan government to weaken the Tamil struggle:  
We were sometimes able to challenge them [the LTTE] from within but criticizing them openly was an 
issue for us because this would have helped the government side to tell that the LTTE is a terrorist group. 
We supported the LTTE because they were fighting for the Tamil cause, we saw them as liberation 
fighters. At the same time, they were involved in human rights violation and we had to oppose that but we 
did that from inside. We did not want to make it publicly as this would have helped the government (C 6).  
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Apart from political considerations and fear, social ties that connected Tamil civilians to the 
LTTE were another reason why my respondents continued to support them. Most of them had 
a family member, friend of neighbor in the LTTE. There was thus a certain emotional 
affection they felt for the LTTE as “they were our own not outsiders, our own people” (C 15). 
Even if many of them were equally afraid of the LTTE or disdained their violence against 
other Tamils, compared to the Sri Lankan army, “they were still our boys” (C 2; see also Bose 
1994: 127).  
Many narratives reveal the deep ambivalence my respondents felt towards the LTTE. They 
were perfectly aware of their authoritarian character that left no space for critical voices but, 
at the same time, they were grateful and proud about the commitment and the willingness of 
LTTE members to sacrifice their lives for their community. This feeling of moral 
responsibility was further reinforced by LTTE propaganda that continuously stresses the 
heroism of LTTE soldiers and the respect and love they deserve for their willingness to give 
their lives for Tamil Eelam (Bose 1994: 120). Many respondents would stress that “they 
fought for us”, “they were ready to die for us”, “they were giving their life for the people” 
when talking about why they continued to support the LTTE (C 14; C 5; C 7). They felt that 
moral – and sometimes material – support was the least they owe them. By turning itself into 
the only representative of Tamils, the LTTE was thus quite successful in upholding 
considerable moral pressure on Tamils to support their armed campaign despite growing 
criticism about internal killings.  
8.3.3 Institutionalization – Predictability, Efficiency and the Acceptance of Violence  
The institutionalization of violence – the selective use of violence according to certain 
(perceived) principles – was most consequential in shaping perceptions of violence of those 
respondents who lived in the Vanni under LTTE control. For them harsh punishments exerted 
by the LTTE against those who criticized their campaign or violated LTTE rules were 
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acceptable as these punishments were considered necessary to uphold security and stability – 
a good highly valued during war where insecurity and chaos is widespread.   
When talking about their lives in LTTE controlled areas, most of my respondents would stress 
that, after the LTTE had taken control over the area51, they felt very safe, that there was 
almost no crime and that even women could walk alone in the streets during the night without 
worrying about sexual harassment. The reduction in crime rates in LTTE controlled areas is 
equally acknowledged by external commentators and scholars working on LTTE governance. 
Most of them, however, note that it was most likely due to people`s fear of the LTTE that 
crime rates decreased, rather than due to the competence of LTTE institutions (Muttukrishna 
2007).52 Punishments were harsh and there is a well-documented number of cases where 
people were sentenced to death by separate military courts or were executed without trial 
(Wikileaks 2005; Stokke 2006).  
My respondents were perfectly aware of these harsh punishments: “When you would say that 
you are against them, they will shoot you and tie you to a lamppost. Then they will leave a 
message, saying that you are a traitor and what you did wrong (C 6).” In contrast to external 
commentators, however, most of my interviewees who lived in the Vanni would consider 
these punishments acceptable or even justified. The following quote can be understood as 
representative of the opinion many of my respondents expressed when talking about the 
LTTE`s police and court system: 
We don`t like the government police, we never go to them because we don`t trust them. Due to that, 
LTTE developed a police unit, but they were not wearing this typical police uniform but another one, 
with blue color, a friendly color; that is why, they chose this color, it is cooling, very nice. It shows that 
the police officers are here for the people. They should be a friend of the people. And, at that time, there 
was no crime. We could go out even during the night. We felt so safe at that time (C 4). 
                                                 
51 Once the LTTE had taken control over the Vanni, the SLAF was prevented from entering the area and civilians thus suffered less from 
state violence which had been widespread before.   
52 Interview, local researcher, Jaffna, July 2018; Interview political activist, Jaffna, June 2018. 
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What is evident in all of my respondents` narratives is that people evaluated the LTTE police 
and courts in relation to how they perceived the functioning of Sinhalese security institutions. 
Many of my respondents would stress that with LTTE police officers they could talk in Tamil 
and that they treated them in a friendly way. This stands in sharp contrast to the unease many 
of them felt when they had to deal with Sinhalese police officers who talked Sinhala only, did 
not explain the reasons for fines and took bribes. In contrast, my respondents would stress that 
in the LTTE police there was no corruption (C 3). Many of my respondents thus perceived the 
LTTE police as working for them. This, in turn, made punishments more acceptable. 
Moreover, as already noted above, my respondents would stress how efficient the LTTE 
police and courts were in reducing crime. For them, being able to walk around without fear 
was highly valuable, especially compared to the permanent fear and the restrictions on 
movement that made their life so difficult under military rule.  
If a rape happened, and it happened really rarely, the investigative unit will function perfectly and they 
will find the right perpetrator and they will shoot him. Because of this punishment there was no sexual 
harassment. The Sri Lankan government is not at all efficient, they don`t have the capacity. At that time, 
the LTTE`s intelligence, they were in civilian dress, was among us and we didn`t know who they were. 
Because of that, nobody did any mistake (C 14). 
As Arjona (2017: 766-768) notes, during civil wars, when insecurity is widespread, people 
feel a strong need for protection. If armed groups use violence to reduce crime, regulate 
behaviors that many dislike and thereby bring about beneficial consequences, even harsh 
punishments can be acknowledged by civilians as necessary or even justified.  
However, beliefs on punishments also depended on who is targeted. If family members or 
close friends of my respondents were accused of crimes, they tended to be much more critical 
towards harsh punishments and the LTTE security institutions in general. Similarly, some 
respondents valued the LTTE police and court system for the reduction of crimes in general 
but they would refuse to denounce people they know as punishments were too harsh. 
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Apart from the perceived effectiveness of LTTE`s institutions, some of my respondents would 
also stress that the LTTE police and courts were fair as they treated everyone equally. As the 
literature on procedural justice has shown, perceived procedural fairness makes punishments 
more acceptable and justified in the eyes of people (Tyler 2003). Several of my respondents 
would stress that the LTTE never punished people arbitrarily but investigated properly before 
they exerted punishments:  
If somebody was angry with me, they go and tell the police that I am an LTTE supporter or they will go 
to the LTTE and tell them that I am an informer or I have some connection to other militant groups. It 
was a very dangerous time. But the good part is that the LTTE will investigate properly while on the 
government side everything can happen (C 2). 
The way my respondents understand procedural justice has little to do with the Western 
understanding of the concept. It was not the fairness and transparency of the procedure that 
legitimized the court and police system in the eyes of my interviewees53 but rather the belief 
that the right person is punished. Many of my respondents would stress that the eyes of the 
LTTE intelligence were everywhere and they would thus know who committed a crime. And 
as punishments were targeted at the “real” perpetrator, for most of my interviewees they were 
acceptable or even justified. It is thus the fact that they perceived LTTE punishments as 
selective and therefore predictable that made them acceptable. For my respondents this meant 
that, when they don’t commit any crime and don’t publicly oppose the LTTE, they could 
escape punishment: 
The LTTE was very disciplined. The army commits crimes, they simply shoot civilians and the LTTE 
also commits crimes but only those the leader has said to commit. It was more predictable; under army 
control, everything could happen all the time (C 15). 
In theories on the deterrent effect of punishment, it is widely acknowledged that selective 
violence increases civilians’ expected cost of disobedience, thus making them more likely to 
                                                 
53 External commentators and scholars criticize the lack of independence of police officers, lawyers and judges who are themselves LTTE 
cadres what calls into question whether everyone, including those opposed to the LTTE, receive equal treatment under LTTE law. Moreover, 
dispensing swift justice is easy when there is limited regard for constraining factors, like rules of evidence, the rights of the accused, impartiality 
etc. (Muttukrishna 2007). 
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obey (Becker 1968). My findings suggest that violence applied selectively might not only 
increase people`s willingness to obey because of perceived costs, but because they consider 
selective punishments as acceptable and more justified than violence that is targeted 
randomly. This becomes even more obvious when comparing the accounts of interviewees 
living in LTTE controlled territory with those living in the East. In the Eastern part, the 
military situation was much more fluid and people were often “attacked by everyone” as my 
respondents would describe it. While most of them were more afraid of the army than of the 
LTTE as “you never know what they will do” (C 2), several of my interviewees were also 
critical about the LTTE. Many blamed them to have provoked reprisal attacks against 
civilians:   
The army moved in bunches at that time and they come to the market to buy vegetables. When they come 
in crowds the LTTE`s strategy was to injure several of them. But then 19 civilians were injured and only 
5 army personnel. […] We were angry. Why did they do it in the market? (C 3) 
In contrast to interviewees living in LTTE controlled territory, those living in the East did not 
have the option to behave in the right way, thereby escaping violence. Rather, they got caught 
up in circles of attack and counter-attack in which civilian casualties were the normality.  
This, in turn, made them much more critical towards the LTTE`s use of violence. Moreover, 
the LTTE`s security institutions were perceived differently in the East. Several of my 
respondents complaint that the police and courts did not investigate crimes properly and 
people were accused and punished wrongly; moreover, there was a lot of extortion of money 
by LTTE members who would show up randomly and ask for contributions (see also 
Subramanian 2005: 121). There thus seems to be a difference in the degree violence was 
institutionalized in the North and the East and this would manifest itself in how people 
perceived it. While Tamils in the North would consider punishments acceptable as they were 
effective in bringing positive social change and were applied in a predictable manner, 
violence in the East was often targeted randomly and punishment systems were less 
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institutionalized. Respondents in the East therefore felt more insecure as “the right behaviour” 
wouldn’t prevent them from being targeted. This permanent insecurity, in turn, made them 
more critical towards the LTTE.  
8.3.4 The Enduring Shadow of Violence – Desensitization and Suppression of 
Criticism 
Desensitization – the emotional immunization to all sorts of violent tactics – emerged as a 
relevant mechanism to shape perceptions of violence mainly in the narratives of those 
respondents who lived in contested areas in the East of Sri Lanka as well as in the accounts of 
some respondents who lived in LTTE controlled territory. Moreover, this mechanism became 
most consequential at later stage of the war after respondents had been exposed to violence 
for several years. 
The continuous exposure to violence, repeated displacement and the disruption of livelihoods 
led to a general sense of resignation among those of my respondents who had seen and/or 
experienced violence over many years. Interviewees would describe how, at one point, they 
started “to accept whatever comes” (C 9) and became increasingly indifferent towards all 
violence which didn’t affect them directly. While, in the first phase of the conflict, mainly in 
the 1970s and 1980s, a single murder would provoke moral outrage and would be discussed 
for weeks, after decades of violence people became slowly resigned and eventually apathetic 
to all sorts of murders and killings (see also Swamy 1994: 176). Somasundaram (2004) – in 
his study on the social and psychological impacts of the civil war on Tamils – found that, 
gradually, Tamils became passive, increasingly submissive and tended to focus on surviving 
only. Similar to this finding, many of my respondents felt that being passive and above 
politics became the only strategy to survive: “People were so scared that there was no 
allegation brought up against anyone. People would never say this was done by the LTTE or 
this was done by the army. If we say that the bomb was thrown by the LTTE, they will come 
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and attack us; if we say, it was done by the army, they will harass us, so people did not open 
their mouth (C 7).” My respondents would tell how they had learnt to keep quiet and not to 
question or challenge anything, as smallest signs of dissent carried considerable risk. In the 
later stages, the armed conflict thus not only victimized many individuals but destroyed the 
social fabric of the Tamil community.54 Many of my respondents would stress how permanent 
fear and suspicion atomized local communities and forced people to concentrate on their own 
survival only. This survival consideration, as Somansundaram (quoted in Subramanian 2005: 
34) stresses, often went to the extreme “of not wanting to knowing what is going on around 
them, […] hoping that the situation will pass them by”. Several of my respondents would tell 
how, after having lived in the midst of war for too long, they had lost their empathy for 
others: “When I went to the road and saw a person who had been shot and was about to die, I 
would not help, because if I helped, I could be associated with one side. The person could 
have some political affiliation. This is why people did not help anybody (C 8).“ Even if most 
of my respondents became increasingly critical about the never ending armed campaign and 
the LTTE`s increasing use of coercive techniques, they would be too tired and particularly too 
afraid to publicly criticize them. 
8.4 Discussion and Conclusion  
In this chapter, I aimed to single out and illustrate the working of different mechanisms that 
shape how civilians perceive and interpret violence. In doing so, the article stresses the need 
to analyze civilian perceptions of violence as resulting from and shaped by the specific 
relational context individuals are embedded in. The effect of violence on individuals is thus 
not uniform; rather, depending on who people identify with, against whom violence is 
targeted, and the way it is exerted, the same violent act, such as the indiscriminate killing of 
                                                 
54 Interview religious leader, Mullaitivu, 25 May 2018; Interview social worker, Jaffna, 8 July 2018. 
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civilians, can be perceived as either legitimate or outrageous. In particular, my analysis points 
to four mechanisms that proved to be consequential in shaping perceptions of violence. The 
first two mechanisms – polarization and representation – are particularly relevant as they 
affect individual evaluations of which type of violent act is legitimate and which one is not. 
For example, while violent acts perpetrated by the out-group (the state) against civilians of the 
in-group tend to provoke outrage among group members, similar acts exerted by an armed 
group against in-group members may be considered acceptable or even justified if violence is 
selectively targeted against so-called criminals or traitors which threaten group cohesion. 
Instead of looking for general conclusions on the impact of particular forms of violence on 
civilians, scholars would thus benefit from analyzing the relational and discursive settings 
within which violence is exerted and which gives the violent act its meaning.  
The third mechanism this chapter identified as relevant to shape perceptions of violence – 
institutionalization – has received limited attention in the literature. Through 
institutionalization violence is applied according to certain procedures and thus appears more 
predictable. Institutionalization thus shapes how the exertion of violence is perceived. It might 
thus be that violence is in fact indiscriminate, that is to say, it is applied without clear guilt 
attribution, but, as its exertion follows a specific procedure, violence appears predictable and 
therefore selective. Predictability of violence, in turn, is crucial in shaping how violence is 
evaluated by those affected by it. As the empirical evidence has shown, respondents could 
accept harsh punishments if they were applied in a predictable manner and they thus felt that 
through correct behavior they could avoid being targeted themselves  For scholars working on 
the effect of selective and indiscriminate violence on civilian support, it could thus be fruitful 
to pay closer attention to the mechanisms that shape how violence is classified by those 
affected by it, regardless of whether it is, in fact, indiscriminate or selective. 
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Finally, my analysis highlights another mechanism which has been neglected in the literature 
on civil wars and political violence. In cases where armed conflicts are ongoing for several 
decades and civilians are exposed to repeated rounds of violence, they tend to become 
increasingly apathetic towards all sorts of violence and its consequences. This finding is in 
line with works in social-psychology which show that individuals apply a range of strategies 
to cope with and mentally protect themselves against the consequences of conflict and 
violence such as different forms of denial (Cohen 2000). Future work could thus benefit from 
applying these finding to the study of violence and support during armed conflicts.   
Apart from singling out the mechanisms most relevant in shaping perceptions of violence, this 
chapter aimed to explore if and how evaluations of violence change in time and across space, 
thereby situating the identified mechanisms in particular conflict dynamics. With regard to 
temporal variation, the empirical analysis showed that perceptions of violence evolved with 
and were shaped by changes in the conflict situation. At the beginning of the conflict, the 
SLAF`s brutal campaign united Tamils against a common enemy and led to increasing 
solidarity among community members as well as to increasing support for the LTTE`s armed 
campaign. Once the LTTE became the only group fighting against the SLAF, however, 
representation started to become more relevant. One of the essential reasons why my 
respondents continued to support the LTTE`s campaign despite growing criticism about their 
use of violence against so-called traitors, was the lack of alternative; the LTTE was always 
the better option compared to the Sri Lankan army. This, in turn, confirms Della Porta`s 
(1994) and Kurzman`s (2005) important observation that the perception of an armed group`s 
violent acts is typically relative to how people see the behavior of the state, that is to say if 
state authorities offer a way out for individuals critical of the armed group`s tactics.  
While representation was most consequential in shaping support relations once the LTTE 
became the only representative of Tamils, this changed again towards the end of the conflict 
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as a result of the LTTE`s increasing ruthlessness combined with growing war weariness. The 
beneficial effect the outside threat posed by the state had on solidarity and unity among 
Tamils eroded more and more, resulting in growing atomization and mutual suspicion. At 
later stages of the conflict, it was thus mostly desensitization compared with helplessness 
which made my respondents comply with the LTTE`s rule despite their increasing 
disillusionment about all conflict actors.  
Apart from temporal variation in perceptions of violence, the empirical analysis also points to 
the relevance of variation across space. Those of my respondents who live in LTTE controlled 
territory were exposed to different forms of authority and violence than those living in 
contested areas. This variation, in turn, shaped how they perceive violence and what 
mechanisms filtered these perceptions. While respondents who lived in LTTE controlled areas 
were mainly exposed to (perceived) selective punishments exerted by LTTE security 
institutions, for respondents living in contested areas indiscriminate attacks by the SLAF were 
part of their everyday life. This permanent victimization, in turn, provoked outrage not only 
against the SLAF but also against the LTTE who was increasingly seen as the cause of all the 
hardship.  
The findings of this chapter thus stress the need to pay closer attention to how perceptions of 
violence change in time and across space as well as to the conflict dynamics that structure 
these changes Such a focus might enhance scholarly understanding of several aspects of 
armed conflicts. First and quite obviously, a better knowledge of the mechanisms that shape 
civilian perceptions of violence might help to explain why some armed groups succeed in 
maintaining support over a long period of time while others loose support rather quickly. 
Second, civilian perceptions of violence are relevant for scholars interested in the 
effectiveness of counterinsurgency campaigns. It matters if civilians perceive the violent 
campaign of an armed group as legitimate or if they just comply out of fear. In the former 
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case, they might be less likely to accept the provisions of services by the government or the 
international community even if they exceed benefits provided by armed groups. Moreover, 
counterinsurgency campaigns targeting civilians living under rebel control are most likely to 
be different depending on how civilians perceive the armed campaign by the rebel group. 
Finally, the way civilians perceive an armed campaign might have implication for post-
conflict developments. If an armed campaign was perceived as righteous, combatants who 
have been fighting for the group should have less problems reintegrating into society than ex-






9 Turning back to Civilian Lives – Ex-Combatant 
Experiences  
When I asked my respondents about the experiences they made when returning to civilian 
lives after the defeat of the LTTE, I was not surprised that most of them faced challenges due 
to poverty, war injuries and social exclusion. Interestingly, however, most of my respondents 
would stress that it was not only due to their militant past that they were excluded from 
community life or could not find a job. Rather, female ex-combatants would tell me that it 
was hard for them to get married because men “don’t like women who fought in the war” (5). 
Or ex-combatants would talk about the difficulties they faced to find employment as they are 
disabled due to war injuries. My respondents would thus stress how they felt marginalized 
due to their positing as women and ex-combatants or as persons with disabilities and former 
LTTE members. It was due to the intersection of different social divisions that they felt, they 
were excluded by their communities and/or felt discriminated by state authorities. The 
narratives of former LTTE members can thus not be reduced to one story of marginalization; 
rather, depending on their positionalities with regard to other categories, such as gender, class, 
wealth and ability, my respondents faced different challenges and followed different 
trajectories when returning to civilian life.     
The successful 'reintegration' of ex-combatants is considered of crucial importance in order to 
ensure peace and to avoid relapse into violence after war (Subedi 2018; Torjesen 2013). In 
most countries affected by armed conflict, 'reintegration' has therefore become a central 
component of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs adopted by 
governments and promoted by the international community to facilitate the return of ex-
combatants to civilian lives (Bowd and Özerdem 2013; UN 2007). However, the extensive 
policy documentation on DDR as well as the growing number of case studies on so called 
reintegration processes in various post-conflict contexts is predominately state focused and 
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explores in detail the various reintegration programs adopted by governments and 
international organizations, while paying limited attention to the experiences of ex-
combatants themselves. Considering the policy-centeredness of the existing literature, it is 
thus not surprising that we know relatively little about the variety of ex-combatants` 
experiences and trajectories in post-civil war contexts. Rather, existing works tend to treat ex-
combatants as a homogenous group that faces similar challenges and thus has similar needs in 
terms of policy support. However, assuming that ex-combatants make uniform experiences 
once they have left armed groups is problematic considering the internal heterogeneity of 
most ex-combatant populations. Case studies about various conflicts point to the generally 
high proportions of female members and minors, as well as to the over-representation of 
ethnic minorities, combined with the rural character of most armed groups and the dominance 
of members from lower socio-economic backgrounds (Kampwirth 2002; Singer 2006; Viterna 
2013). This chapter therefore focuses on the third stage of activists’ militant trajectories, 
namely on the paths they followed when returning to civilian lives. Analytically, it argues that 
one way of analyzing variation in ex-combatant trajectories is to focus on their different 
positionalities in terms of gender, age, class, ethnicity and ability and to investigate how ex-
combatants face different social, economic and political challenges based on their different 
positionings.  
The following analytical and empirical discussion will show that using an intersectional 
approach to the study of reintegration grants additional analytical and empirical insights on 
the diversity of ex-combatants and allows exploring how reintegration trajectories vary as a 
result of the intersection of ex-combatants` various positionalities. Moreover, the concept of 
intersectionality points to the context specificity of reintegration processes and allows to 
analyse reintegration experiences as the dynamic production and interaction of individual 
characteristics and perceptions of ex-combatants as well as structural factors such as 
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institutional arrangements governing reintegration, social norms and practices embedded in 
recipient communities and power relation among actors involved (Staunaes 2003; Warner 
2008; Yuval-Davis 2006). Finally, an intersectional analysis points to dimensions relevant to 
understand reintegration processes that have been (partly) neglected in the literature on 
reintegration, such as location and disability.     
9.1 Adding Diversity to the Analysis of Disengagement Trajectories  
In many countries affected by armed conflicts reintegration has become a central component 
of DDR programs adopted by governments to assists ex-combatants to return to civilian lives 
(Bowd and Özerdem 2013; Subedi 2018). Following from this, reintegration has been defined 
by some agencies as a set of support activities issued to ex-combatants (Waldman 2010). The 
understanding of reintegration as a mere policy tool, however, is misleading. As Torjesen 
(2013: 2) stresses, using “the actual project initiatives designed to help some combatants as a 
starting point for research on reintegration […] directs scholarly attention away from larger 
social, political and economic processes associated with combatants exiting from armed 
groups, and towards short-term and narrow project activities”. I therefore prefer to use the 
term disengagement instead of reintegration when referring to the paths ex-combatants follow 
when leaving armed groups. Moreover, my analysis starts with the ex-combatants themselves 
and their encounters with social, political and economic challenges rather than with the 
reintegration programs adopted by governments. Following from this, I understand 
disengagement as the process through which individuals change their identity from 
`combatant` to `civilian`, and alter their behaviour by ending the use of violence and engaging 
in other activities to sustain their livelihoods and achieve their political aspirations (Torjesen 
2013). This definition places the experiences of ex-combatants at the forefront, while treating 
DDR programs as one (important or completely irrelevant) factor shaping these experiences. 
Moreover, it focuses attention on the individual trajectories that combatants follow when they 
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leave armed groups. Every combatant has its own disengagement trajectory, regardless of 
whether he/she leaves an armed group during or after the end of an armed conflict and/or is 
enlisted in an official DDR program. And finally, disengagement is a multi-faceted process 
and thus involves different arenas which are relevant in shaping combatants` trajectories. In 
the following, I distinguish between the social, the economic and the political arena and 
briefly discuss the relevance of each of this arenas (Subedi 2018).  
First, disengagement is rarely an individual process and thus occurs not only in the life of the 
individual ex-combatant but involves relational dynamics between former combatants and the 
communities they return to (Subedi 2018). Depending on whether ex-combatants maintained 
contacts with families and “their communities” during the conflict, returning to live within 
communities might occur naturally or pose challenges to former fighters. For the social 
acceptance of ex-combatants, it is particularly relevant if they had been seen as heroes or as 
troublemakers by the communities they return to (Özerdem 2012). Moreover, community 
norms and practices and the extent to which ex-combatants are perceived to have transgressed 
these norms is relevant to understand their reintegration into local communities (Viterna 
2013).  
Second, disengagement trajectories have an equally important economic dimension. One of 
the biggest challenges in post-conflict contexts is how to find/create livelihood opportunities 
for ex-combatants. This is particularly relevant as many case studies show that 
marginalization of ex-combatants is often the result of unemployment and the social stigma 
resulting from joblessness and poverty (Miriyagalla 2010; Subedi 2018).  
Third, the political dimension of disengagement involves ending efforts to achieve political 
goals through violent means. Combatants may enter into mainstream politics at the local, 
regional, or national level either as individual voters or as representatives and advocate for 
their political objectives through non-violent channels (Kaplan and Nussio 2015).  
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Apart from the different arenas in which disengagement occurs, it is equally important to pay 
attention to how the overall political environment and power struggles between key actors 
affect combatants` disengagement trajectories. I focus mainly on the state here, as it is the 
national governments that – together with international partners – develop frameworks and 
policies to guide demobilization and reintegration and dominates the discourse on ex-
combatants, thereby shaping public opinion about them. As McMullin (2013) has shown, 
despite their objective to support reintegration, DDR programs are often framed in a way that 
stigmatizes ex-combatants. This starts with the concept reintegration itself which assumes that 
former fighters have lost contacts to their communities and therefore need support to be “re-
integrated”. However, as has been noted already, relations between communities and militants 
during armed conflicts vary; there are cases where militants remain deeply embedded in their 
communities and thus face no challenge when returning (Bosi 2018). Moreover, as McMullin 
notes (2013) governments often portray armed fighters as threats to security and as not 
deserving of long term support as this assistance might exacerbate community resentment 
against them. They thus often work against the very objective of reintegration itself and fuel 
resentment instead of fostering social cohesion.  
Moreover, post-conflict environments vary according to “the character of peace” that follows 
the end of war, namely the extent to which conflict issues have been resolved, if violence and 
security is absent or still relatively widespread and finally, as noted above, if attitudes and 
public opinions remain polarized (Höglund and Söderberg Kovacs 2010). The experiences ex-
combatants make when disengaging, in turn, are shaped by the kind of peace that prevails 
(Bowd and Özerdem 2014: 454).  
It becomes obvious from the discussion of different arenas and actors involved in 
disengagement processes that the literature recognizes the relational and contextual 
dimensions of disengagement. Scholars have analysed how ex-combatants might face 
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different challenges in the social, economic and political arena as well as how their 
trajectories are affected by power dynamics within the arenas. At the same time, however, the 
literature is surprisingly silent if – within the identified arenas – different groups of ex-
combatants face different challenges. Most academic works as well as the policy 
documentation on DDR55 tend to treat ex-combatants as a homogenous group that faces 
similar challenges and has equal needs (Billingsley 2018; Schöb 2016). This is particularly 
surprising considering the high diversity among ex-combatant populations in terms of gender, 
ethnicity, age, class etc. Case studies about mobilization during various armed conflicts point 
to the generally high proportions of female members and minors, as well as to the over-
representation of ethnic minorities, combined with the rural character of most armed groups 
and the dominance of members from lower socio-economic backgrounds (Kampwirth 2002; 
Singer 2006; Viterna 2013). Considering the heterogeneity of ex-combatant populations, it is 
unlikely that, regardless of their different positionalities, all ex-combatants follow similar 
trajectories. This becomes evident when looking at the works on the experience of female 
fighters after war – the only dimension which has received attention in the reintegration 
literature. Several studies show that female ex-combatants tend to suffer more from exclusion 
and marginalization than their male counterparts (UNIFEM 2004). Women soldiers are more 
likely to be stigmatized by communities after war and face difficulties to return to traditional 
gender roles (Viterna 2013). Moreover, there is one study which focuses explicitly on the 
experiences of child soldiers in which the author stresses that the conceptualization of child 
soldiers as a homogenous group ignores their internal diversity and thereby fails to address 
the marginalization and exclusion of some child soldiers based on gender, ethnicity, caste, 
                                                 
55 Despite the longstanding DDR history, attention to diversity among ex-combatants was introduced only recently: the national policy 
guideline ‘CONPES 3554’ (2008) pays attention to particular reintegration needs, according to different diversity categories. 




religion and region (Billingsey 2017). It thus seems that, depending on their different 
positionalities in terms of gender, age etc., ex-combatants indeed face different social, 
economic and political challenges when returning to civilian life and therefore tend to follow 
different trajectories.  
9.2 Integrating Diversity: An Intersectional Approach to the Study of 
Disengagement  
The concept of intersectionality provides a useful theoretical lens to address the existing 
limitations in the literature and provides a novel analysis of the distinct trajectories and life 
experiences former combatants face when disengaging from violence. Moreover, as I will 
show in the analysis of my empirical case, an intersectional analysis points to dimensions 
relevant to understand disengagement that have been neglected in the literature.     
Growing out of black feminist work that criticized the treatment of gender and race as two 
separate categories of discrimination, the concept of intersectionality has been used to 
highlight how different social divisions interact to produce specific forms of oppression and 
marginalization (Crenshaw 1991; Warner 2008; Yuval-Davis 2006). In other words, 
intersectionality is the idea that different categories of social division intersect with each other 
to create qualitatively different life experiences and meanings that cannot be explained by 
focusing on one dimension alone or by reducing experiences to a mere addition of different 
categories. This chapter posits that an intersectional approach can help us to better capture 
reintegration trajectories of ex-combatants in several ways. First, it points to the need to 
recognize that the experience of being an ex-combatant is always constructed and intermeshed 
in other social divisions, such as gender, social class, age, caste, ethnicity, geography etc. It is 
thus more than one category of difference that affects disengagement trajectories of ex-
combatants. Which social divisions are most relevant to shape reintegration, however, is an 
empirical question. As Yuval-Davis (2006: 203) points out: “In specific historical situations 
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and in relation to specific people there are some social divisions which are more important 
than others in constructing specific positionings.” Some social divisions are thus particularly 
salient for groups at specific historical moments (Warner 2008: 456).  
The fact that time and situation are relevant to determine the importance of particular social 
divisions highlights a second relevant component of intersectionality: It is not only the 
relevance of particular social divisions that varies in different cultural and political contexts 
but also their meaning. The way social categories are naturalized and homogenized – the 
construction of what is the “normal” behavior and thinking for ex-combatants, woman, 
children or member of a specific caste – differ according to the specific socio-political and 
cultural context (Yuval-Davis 2006). It is thus necessary to understand how relevant social 
divisions are constructed by the particular context they are embedded in, and how these 
constructions shape individual experiences and disengagement trajectories (Warner 2008: 
459).  
Third, an intersectional approach allows to ingrate different levels of analysis which are 
relevant to understand reintegration processes. Most importantly, social divisions manifest 
themselves in organizational, intersubjective and experiental forms. In other words, they are 
expressed in specific institutions and organizations, such as state laws and state agencies, 
voluntary organizations and the family. Moreover, they involve affective and power 
relationships between people, acting informally or as representants of formal organizations, 
such as the government. Finally, social divisions exist in the ways people experience 
subjectively their everyday lives (Yuval-Davis 2006: 198). While the focus of this article is 
on the third level, it is important to note that disengagement experiences of ex-combatants are 
simultaneously constructed, enforced and contested at the individual, relational and 
organizational level. The category of ex-combatant as well as gender, caste, class etc. have 
meaning at the micro-level of everyday experiences of individuals as well as at the macro 
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level of community and state institutions (Hancock 2016: 251, 253). In other words, they are 
made between “actors in sittu and in relation to normative conceptions of in/appropriateness 
and homogenizing discourses by whom actors are constrained and enabled” (Staunaes 2003).  
9.3 Analyzing the Diversity of Disengagement Trajectories 
In the following sections, I will use the narratives of former members of the LTTE to 
illustrate how, depending on their positioning with regard to gender, ability and location, their 
disengagement trajectories varied. I focus the analysis on these three social division as they 
emerged from the narratives as the ones most relevant in shaping respondents` return to 
civilian life. I will then come back to these dimensions in the following section and discuss 
how focusing on them might draw scholarly attention to dimensions shaping disengagement 
that have been (partly) neglected in the literature. I will analyse the relevance of the three 
divisions by exploring ex-combatants` disengagement trajectories related to two of the 
mentioned arenas in which disengagement occurs: the social and the economic arena. I leave 
out the political arena as the majority of my respondents didn’t mention political participation 
as relevant for their trajectories and only one of them was politically active.  
9.3.1 Disengagement and Marginalization – The Social Arena 
The lack of acceptance by society and marginalization form community life was a central 
theme in many of my respondents` narratives. However, social exclusion was not experienced 
by all ex-combatants. Male respondents without disabilities felt generally welcomed by their 
communities. They only faced some challenged in the first years after the end of the war 
when military surveillance was still a ubiquitous feature in the Northern and to a lesser extend 
the Eastern part of Sri Lanka.56 Once released from rehabilitation camps, ex-combatants had 
                                                 
56 In order to control the Tamil population and to repress any revival of militancy, the government securitized certain identities (the Tamil 
community, particularly youth and ex-combatants) and geographical areas (conflict affected areas, particularly the Vanni) and presented 
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to register with the Civil Affairs Office (CAO), a monitoring and surveillance unit run by the 
military, and, after that, to report back and sign in on a regular (weekly, fortnightly or 
monthly) basis (Satkunanathan 2016: 417). Moreover, they could receive visits by CAO 
personnel without prior notice at any time, even during nights: “In the beginning, when I 
came here [Mullaitivu], they installed a GPS here to supervise me and they came almost every 
day to ask where are you, what are you doing” (3). The military visits created suspicion and 
mistrust against former LTTE members among the Tamil community; neighbours were 
reluctant to interact with them as they feared contacts with the military (2, 16, 19). However, 
once military surveillance was reduced, male respondents felt that communal suspicion 
against them abated and they felt generally welcomed by their communities.  
By contrast, female interviewees continued to suffer from social exclusion. Many of them 
would stress that during the war men and women participated equally in the fight and they 
also felt treated equally by the LTTE; this, however, changed after the conflict: “For female 
ex-cadres it is very difficult. Men are accepted by society easily but Tamils don’t like LTTE 
women though they did not say it openly during the war” (5). As Viterna (2014: 211) notes: 
“Despite the symbolic significance that women`s participation […] lends to political violence, 
women themselves rarely leave political conflicts with righteous reputations.” Female ex-
combatants who had been seen as heroes during the war often find it very difficult to 
reintegrate into society as their roles as warriors are not conform with the traditional role of 
women in society. In Sri Lanka, as in many traditional societies, women are expected to be 
obedient, chaste and pure and they gain their social standing mainly as wives and mothers of 
sons. Their role is largely confined to the domestic sphere and very few Tamil women have 
                                                 
them as threat for national security. This threat narrative was then used to justify militarization and surveillance as the only mean to 
counter these dangers (Satkunanathan 2016: 416; Crisis Group 2011: 15). 
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been involved in political work till several Tamil groups started to recruit women in the 70ies 
(Hellmann-Rajanayagam 2008).  
Many of my female respondents struggled to readjust to traditional gender roles. Particularly, 
their past as LTTE members had severe consequences for their marriage prospects. They 
would tell how they were rejected as potential marriage candidates as people believe that a 
women committed to die cannot become a good housewife and mother (7, 8, 14, 16). Or they 
perceive girls who had been in the LTTE as though and hard to control (19, 22). Being un-
married, in turn, had detrimental impacts on female ex-combatants’ acceptance by the Tamil 
community in general. They suffered from exclusion and harsh community gossip. Many of 
my female responds who were single at the time of the interview would tell how community 
members called them names and talked to them in a derogatory manner (see also Crisis Group 
2017: 8).  
Moreover, for some female respondents it was also hard to readjust to conservative gender 
norms as they had experienced some form of gender equality and got used to different roles 
for women within the LTTE. While often transformations of gender roles cannot be 
consolidated in post-conflict societies, this doesn’t mean that there aren’t lasting changes in 
the thinking of female combatants themselves. As Alison (2003: 49) notes, participation in 
armed groups can alter female fighter`s perceptions of women`s role in society and the social 
problems facing women. Several of my respondents mentioned the general restrictions Tamil 
women face in society, such as riding a bicycle or moving around alone, and how they 
enjoyed that within the LTTE the could do all these things generally seen as inappropriate for 
women (7, 15, 26). For them, readjusting to traditional roles was a disempowering and 
frustrating experience. This is particularly true for female respondents who have held 
important positions within the LTTE. They struggled to re-adopt “the appropriate behavior for 
women” and to cope with the reduced options they had in society (15). Some of them had 
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developed leadership qualities and were not used to take orders anymore and started to 
question traditional authorities, such as their mother-in-laws.57 Others reject marriage despite 
strong familial pressure as they don’t want to give up their freedom anymore (Hellmann-
Rajanayagam 2008: 19). At the same time, however, it is important to mention that some 
female ex-combatants deliberately adopted gendered female identities in order to gain back 
acceptance by community member and leave the past behind. For these women agency meant 
to live like ordinary people and thereby forget their past they no longer wanted to be 
associated with (see Friedman 2018: 638).  
The stigmatization of female ex-combatants was further reinforced by the discourse of the Sri 
Lankan government that portrayed female ex-cadres as problematic and “lost” women who 
had been exploited and brainwashed by the LTTE and therefore needed help to get back to 
their “proper feminine roles” (Friedman 2018: 636). The government thus de-politicized 
women`s experience within the LTTE and portrayed their reintegration as a process through 
which they get back to their right feminized and domestic spheres both socially and 
economically (see below).  
Based on this conception, reintegration programs encouraged female ex-cadres to get married 
quickly and receive children, as well as to grow their hair long and wear female dresses. As 
Mc-Kenzie (2009: 258) notes with regard to the reintegration of female ex-combatants in 
Sierra Leone, women were largely stripped of their voice and given few choices in the 
reintegration process; rather reintegration was portrayed as an opportunity to leave their 
identity as warriors behind and “to `blend in` `naturally` to the community and family unit”. 
Thereby, any opportunity to rethink and reshape gender stereotypes and hierarchies is 
destroyed. Moreover, by stressing traditional gender roles and norms, the government 
reinforced existing communal stigmatization of female ex-combatants and thereby further 
                                                 
57 Interview women`s right activist, Jaffna, July 2018.  
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complicated their return to civilian lives (Friedmann 2018). Due to societal pressure, some of 
my respondents accepted to marry older men with alcohol or other problems. This further 
reduced their status in communities and exposed them to several forms of abuses: “I did not 
like the family life but there is no option, I had to life in this society as an ordinary woman 
that is why I had to get married but I am not happy. He is not the person I expected, the type 
of person I was with in the movement” (19).  
My data indicates that the extent to which stigmatization was experienced by female ex-
combatants also depended on the location where they lived after the war. While in the North, 
especially in Jaffna, most of my respondents mentioned stigmatization as a severe problem for 
their reintegration, in the Eastern part female ex-cadres were accepted by communities more 
easily (see also Krishnan 2012). This might be partly due to the fact that my respondents in 
the East lived in villages where in every family one female member has been part of the 
LTTE and acceptance of female ex-cadres was therefore higher (17).58 Moreover, female ex-
combatants in the East could often rely on female kinship networks which have historically 
been an important source of support in the area and therefore suffered less form stigmatization 
by the wider community (Kamakashi and Mubarak 2012). And finally, the reemergence of 
caste and class prejudices might also play a role in explaining greater resentment against ex-
combatants in Jaffna than in other parts of Sri Lanka. Some of my respondents claim that 
Tamils from Jaffna disliked it to be ruled by LTTE members who mostly came from lower 
caste and class backgrounds. It is, however, only now after the defeat of the LTTE that they 
show their aversion openly (29, 30). Moreover, families from Jaffna are generally very 
conservative and therefore reacted with suspicion to the LTTE`s attempt to change existing 
gender or caste hierarchies (Terpstra and Frerks 2017: 298; De Votta 2009).  
                                                 
58 Expert Interview, social worker, Jffna, 8 July, 2018. The majority of LTTE cadres came from the East of Sri Lanka as the high level of 
poverty and the lack of education in the Eastern part made it a particularly fruitful recruitment ground for the LTTE. Consequentially, 
the density of ex-combatants in the East after the war is particularly high.   
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While most female ex-cadres suffered from some form of marginalization, social exclusion 
aggravated when combined with physical disabilities and war injuries. Here as well, 
traditional gender roles intersected differently for women and men, in both cases 
compounding into situations of marginalization and exclusion. The marriage prospects of 
female ex-combatants with disabilities were even lower as, in addition to their past LTTE 
fighters, disabled female ex-combatants are perceived as unable to fulfill their sexual and 
domestic duties as wives.59 Moreover, they fear the harsh community gossip blaming them for 
having self-produced the “misery” they are living in now by joining the LTTE: “They always 
say: 'See what you achieved? Nothing. You only lost your limb'” (22). Similar to female ex-
combatants, also male ex-cadres with disabilities suffer from stigmatization. While during the 
war they felt respected and recognized for their achievements on the battlefields, even when 
they were disabled and could not fight anymore, after the war the government as well as 
community members payed little attention to their bravery as soldiers: “I had a better live 
there [in LTTE]. We were looked after like babies, especially the disabled, we were special 
there. If we wanted to get married, we could do that. I did not even feel that I am disabled and 
all these worries, why am I disabled I did not have.” (22) Once the war ended and disabled 
ex-combatants could no longer benefit form LTTE support, they suffered from problems to 
sustain their livelihoods (see third section) as well as from the stigma of not being able to 
fulfill their roles as breadwinners. In Sri Lanka, masculinity is often bound to familial duty 
and householder ship as well as to toughness and honor. The inability to adequately fulfil this 
patriarchal, hyper-masculine ideal often constitutes a significant site of anxiety for men in 
general and disabled men in particular (De Mel 2016: 101). Similar to female ex-combatants 
disabled ex-cadres thus saw their marriage prospect inhibited and their economic future full of 
uncertainty, often resulting in low self-esteem, frustration and anxiety.   
                                                 
59 Interview political activist, Jaffna, 4 June 2018; Interview political activist, Batticaloa, 27 June 2018.  
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9.3.2 Disengagement and Poverty – The Economic Arena  
The lack of work opportunities and a high degree of economic uncertainty was a serious 
problem encountered by all ex-combatants I interviewed. Many lived in extreme poverty and 
struggled every day to make ends meet. The challenge ex-combatant face to find employment 
is certainly related to the generally problematic economic environment in areas affected by 
the war. Moreover, the areas where most of former LTTE soldiers came from and went back 
to after rehabilitation are historically among the poorest in Sri Lanka (De Votta 2009). Most 
ex-combatants therefore returned home with no personal savings and little prospects for 
employment as they had missed the opportunity for formal education and training.60 
Moreover, the permanent surveillance of ex-combatants hampered their prospects for 
employment, as employers risked to become a target of surveillance themselves, and/or feared 
that  ex-combatants could be arrested by the military at any time:  
The problem was that the military was behind them. They had to register with them and they were 
following them. For those who wanted to employ them, it was difficult because they come and check 
everything and the employers they don`t want that. It happened to me I employed a girl and then they 
arrested her. If something happens, shooting or something, then immediately they arrest ex-cadres (C 15). 
In the absence of employment and functioning support scheme by the government61, ex-
combatants were mostly depended on support by immediate family members who themselves 
often lived at a subsistence level. This dependency left many with a feeling of frustration and 
disempowerment (18, 2, 9). Moreover, they felt they had learned many useful skills and 
gained relevant experience during their time in the LTTE but as these sills were not formally 
recognized, they faced disadvantages in the labour market:  
The problem is that we have no formal certificates. I am educated, I had training in the financial division 
and more than 20 years of experience there but now when I go to job interviews I only have to certificates 
                                                 
60 Most respondents joined the LTTE at a very young age and therefore rarely finished their education and/or formations.  
61 There are very few government programs offering livelihood assistance. A loan scheme provides individuals with up to 25,000 rupees 
(192 dollars) but most ex-combatants who benefitted from the program regretted it alter as loan were insufficient to make ends meet 
and most ex-combatants would prefer to work wage employed instead of running a business (Danura Miriyagalla 2014). 
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O and A level while others have many more. Therefore, they think I am not qualified. The experiences 
and skills of ex-combatants are not recognized now (29).    
Again, gender intersected differently for women and male ex-combatants trying to transition 
from ‘fighters’ to ‘workers’ (Satkunanathan 2017). Many of my female respondents would 
claim that due to their past as LTTE members they did not get jobs although they were 
qualified or they had to drop work due to societal mistrust against female ex-combatants (7, 
22, 27). Moreover, Friedman (2018) provides the example of an NGO-led training program 
for pre-school teachers in which female ex-combatants participated. After finishing, however, 
many female ex-cadres struggled to retain their work as parents were afraid to let former 
LTTE members teach their children. Furthermore, my respondents often complained that they 
faced difficulties because of the mismatch of the training received during rehabilitation or the 
programs offered by non-governmental organizations and the availability of jobs in the 
villages they lived. Reflecting the dominant gender norms of a traditional society, the 
trainings provided to female ex-combatant were often gendered, supporting them to become 
tailors and domestic helpers instead of building on and further developing their skills as 
bricklayers, computer repairers or masons many female ex-cadres had gained during their 
time within the LTTE (Murray 2010; Krishnan 2011: 138). This was frustrating for several 
female respondents, not only because it reduced their chances to get a job; rather they were 
used “to do the same work than men” (9). Being eligible for “women jobs” only was very 
disempowering for them. Finally, due to a lack of other economic opportunities many female 
ex-combatants were forced to accept employment provided by different organizations related 
to the military.62 This, however, exacerbated societal suspicion about sexual relationships of 
ex-combatants to military officers and exposed them to different forms of sexual harassment 
(Satkunanathan 2017; Crisis Group 2017: 9). The everyday struggle with economic hardship 
                                                 
62 The best job opportunities for female ex-combatants in the North are in the military`s Civil Security Division, as teachers in military run 
pre-schools and agricultural farms (Crisis Group 2017: 9). 
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and the disappointment that their sacrifice for the community is not respected, leaves many 
female ex-combatants with feelings of injustice, disempowerment and resentment: 
Society is not taking us because I have no money. If I had money everything would be okay. They won`t 
see I am an ex-combatant or who I was. People will respect me only if I have money but I have no proper 
livelihood, no house. We, the poor people only, joined the LTTE, those who are rich and educated they 
did not join they were studying in Colombo or went abroad. And now we are the ones suffering again not 
only us our children are also suffering (19). 
While female ex-cadres faced even more challenges to make ends meet than male ex-
combatants, the greatest economic burden fell on disabled ex-combatants in general and 
female disabled and unmarried ex-cadres in particular. In contrast to the war period where the 
LTTE had run a program of disability rehabilitation and provided a monthly payment of 
Rs9000 (US$70) to families of combatants with disabilities, after the war, disabled ex-
combatants have been victims of a fragmented 63 and under-resourced program of 
reintegration that paid little attention to the specific needs of disabled ex-cadres. Similarly, 
skills retraining programs and livelihood grants provided by the international community, 
such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM), targeted ex-combatants with 
some experience and skills and provide them with small grants to help them start their own 
business. Disabled ex-combatants, by contrast, would have needed intensive training and re-
skilling programs in order to enable them to generate sufficient income (Krishnan 2011). 
Moreover, due to their injuries, disabled ex-cadres can be more easily identified as ex-
combatants and therefore more easily rejected by employer based on their past in the LTTE.64 
This, in turn, resulted in feelings of disempowerment and injustice among disabled ex-
combatants who often felt left out, neglected and forgotten:  
Military soldiers who got injured, they receive everything from the government but we don`t receive 
anything, even local government officials are not interested in helping us. There is a monthly allowance 
                                                 
63 The multiplicity of state agencies involved and the lack of coordination among them has caused overlaps and confusion, while at the 
provincial level the DDR programme is overseen by under-funded councils (Krishnan  2012 : 7). 




for disabled people from the government but we are not eligible as we were fighting against the 
government (29). 
The resentment about being forgotten was often reinforced by a feeling that society tried to 
exploit them. Some of my respondents claimed that when looking for jobs they were often 
promised wages obviously lower than “what others [non-disabled] were receiving.”65   
In the absence of targeted support by the government or the international community, at the 
local level, immediate kin-networks emerged as the main informal providers of economic and 
emotional support for disabled ex-combatants (Krishnan 2011: 139). Especially female ex-
combatants with disability would stress how for them continuous emotional and economical 
support by their “akas” (elder sisters) and “aunties” (mother`s sisters) was invaluable. At the 
same time, however, the concern of being a burden for their families and having to ask for 
money all the time when they wanted to go out, leaves many disabled ex-cadres with a 
permanent feeling of unease and guilt:   
My father passed away when I was in the jungle. Now my mother has to look after my six younger 
sisters. I did not want to be an extra burden to my mother because of my disability, and so I travelled to 
Batticaloa town with my three disabled [ex-LTTE] friends. We registered ourselves at the IOM office and 
asked whether there were any jobs for disabled young women, like us. After taking our details the IOM 
officer told us that they would contact us if anything turned up, and then asked us not to come back to the 
office to make enquiries. We were hurt (cited in Krishnan 2011: 140). 
Finally, the location where ex-combatants lived after the war also had an influence on their 
economic situation. While most of the respondents from the Northern areas I interviewed 
surrendered to the military in the last phases of the war and therefore underwent 
rehabilitation, most of my interviewees from the Eastern part demobilized at an earlier 
conflict phase, most of them in 2004 after Karuna the Eastern military commander had split 
from the LTTE.66 This meant that my respondents from the East were no longer part of the 
LTTE once the formal reintegration process was initiated after the end of the war. Without 
                                                 
65 See also IRIN, Sri Lanka's rehabilitated ex-combatants struggle to adjust, 4 July 2014, available at: 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/53bbd8c94.html [accessed 5 April 2019] 
66 After internal power struggles had let to the split of the LTTE in an Eastern and a Northern section, a violent clash between the two 
groups, many LTTE members from the Eastern section who did not support Karuna demobilized and went back to their families.    
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undergoing rehabilitation, however, they were not eligible for any support provided by the 
government. This points to a general problem in the design of DDR programs which often 
concentrate on ex-combatants who de-mobilized at the end of the war and pay little attention 
to those who had left or escaped from armed groups earlier (MacKenzie 2009: 252). At the 
same time, however, not being officially “marked” as ex-combatants had the advantage that 
ex-combatants from the East suffered less from continuous military surveillance and the 
resulting suspicion against them by community members.       
9.4 Discussion and Conclusion  
In this article, I argued that adopting an intersectional approach can enhance our 
understanding of disengagement processes. It forces scholars to pay closer attention to the 
diversity of ex-combatant populations in terms of ethnicity, gender, age, class etc., and to 
analyze how this diversity translates into different disengagement trajectories. The empirical 
analysis has shown that depending on their positioning with regard to three relevant social 
divisions – gender, ability and location – ex-combatants` experiences varied. They not only 
faced varying degrees of marginalization, also the reasons why they felt excluded were 
different. However, an intersectional approach not only focuses scholarly attention to 
variation in disengagements paths, it draws attention to dimensions affecting ex-combatants` 
experiences which have been (partly) neglected in the literature. In the following discussion I 
focus on the three dimensions - gender, disability and location – that resulted as relevant from 
my empirical analysis and show how reflecting on this dimension might allow scholars to get 
new insights into disengagement processes.   
The gender dimension has received increasing attention in the literature on post conflict 
developments. Similar to the findings of this article, several scholars have shown that female 
ex-combatants face particular challenges when returning to civilian lives, as often their new 
roles as female fighters clash with traditional gender roles. This often means that female ex-
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combatants are either pushed to re-assimilate to local gender norms and give up different 
forms of empowerment gained during the war or, if they are unwilling or unable to do so, to 
accept social exclusion and marginalization. While my research confirms existing findings on 
the challenges women face when leaving armed groups, it suggests that focusing the analysis 
on processes of identity construction could be a fruitful analytical perspective to understand 
disengagement of female ex-combatants. Such a perspective would allow scholars to better 
capture women`s experience when returning to civilian lives as well as to analyze how female 
ex-combatants attempt to generate identities that allow them to lead a life they consider as 
dignified. My data points to two process which seem particularly relevant: Some of my 
female interviewees tried to hide their identity as warriors by concealing information about 
their past or at least distance themselves from their former LTTE membership they felt was 
constantly re-imposed on them by the government and society and thereby to escape social 
exclusion. Other respondents, by contrast, were proud of their new role as independent 
women and thus embraced their “identity as female warriors” and the new roles they adopted 
during the war despite communal suspicion (Snow and Anderson 1987). For them leaving 
their “new war-generated identities behind” (Gear 2002: 141) would have meant a loss of 
autonomy and self-worth. Similarly, Clark (2013), in her study of reintegration processes in 
Croatia, explores the numerous (emotional and instrumental) functions the branitelj (ex-
combatant) identity served for Croatian war veterans as well as the how government 
discourses and policies shaped identity negotiations on the individual level. Studying gender 
and identity could thus help scholars to overcome the often held expectation that ex-
combatants need to overcome and adopt a new, post war identity (Gear 2002) and to focus on 
the different strategies ex-combatants adopt as well as the factors and conditions that shape 
ex-combatant decisions to preserve, adjust or leave war identities behind. 
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Unlike gender, disability hasn’t been recognized as an important dimension that shapes 
disengagement. As Lord and Stein (2015: 2018) show reintegration programs often fail to 
address the specific needs of disabled ex-combatants or, if they do so, they focus on the 
provision of medical care and not on the “multitude of social and economic barriers that 
inhibit reintegration […] and contribute to the stigma and discrimination” against ex-
combatants with disabilities. Exploring how varying degrees and forms of disability affect 
disengagement trajectories of ex-combatants might thus lead to novel insights into a neglected 
dimension of disengagement as well as enhance our understanding of other social processes 
such as stigmatization, marginalization and/or empowerment. For example, (Meyers 2014) in 
one of the very few works on disability and post-conflict developments, explores the usage of 
the disability identity by two grassroots associations in Nicaragua. He finds that Ex-Contra 
soldiers with disabilities used the identity to obscure their past as “traitors” and US-
collaborators and represent themselves as unjustly discriminated against disabled persons. By 
contrast, Ex-Sandinista soldiers with disabilities also make claims, but only reluctantly as 
disabled, as they prefer to preserve their self-identify as war wounded and thereby war heroes. 
This work thus shows how actors strategically use and negotiate their identity as disabled and 
thereby to improve and/or preserve their standing within society.  
Finally, location is another neglected dimension in the literature on reintegration. Scholars 
pay little attention to how socio-spatial dynamics might affect reintegration processes. My 
empirical findings, however, suggest that depending on the socio-spatial context, ex-
combatants face different challenges when returning to civilian lives. For example, in the 
East, where most LTTE fighters came from, the density of ex-combatant population after the 
war was very high and they could thus rely on existing ties among ex-combatants and their 
families for emotional as well as economic support. My respondents from the East thus faced 
less problems of social exclusion as ex-combatants form Jaffna where resentment against 
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LTTE members was more widespread. Depending on several factors (relations between 
communities and armed groups during the war, social and ethnical composition of 
communities, continuation of violent incidences, state surveillance etc.) ex-combatants might 
thus be received in different ways from different communities within the same state territory 
and consequently face varying degrees as well as different forms of challenges. For example, 
Kaplan and Nussion (2015) show that variation in levels of social cooperation and 
organizational capacity across communities in Colombia results in varying degrees of 
political participation among ex-combatants.  
Adopting an intersectional approach might thus provide scholars with new dimension 
affecting disengagement that have been neglected in the literature and thereby open up fruitful 




10 Some Concluding Reflections 
This dissertation has suggested that adopting a dynamic and multi-dimensional approach to 
explain micro-mobilization processes could help scholars to overcome some of the 
shortcomings of existing explanatory frameworks of mobilization during civil war and focus 
scholarly attention on dimensions which have been neglected or underexplored in the 
literature. In this concluding chapter, I aim to point to the most relevant improvements such 
an approach can bring to the study of civil wars and political violence more generally, as well 
as to scholars interested in the Sri Lankan civil war. Then, I will turn to some additional 
reflections on how the findings of this dissertation could open up themes for further 
investigation. 
Focusing on micro-mobilization dynamics is rare in the civil war literature. This dissertation 
showed that this is problematic as a focus on micro-level processes can improve scholarly 
understanding of mobilization during armed conflicts in two central ways. First, concentrating 
on the micro-level allows scholars to investigate variation in activist experience (while still 
providing parsimonious explanations) instead of assuming uniform motives and militant 
trajectories. Analysing these variations is important because it allows us to better capture the 
empirical reality of activists who are embedded in different social networks as well as varying 
socio-political contexts and thus make different conflict experiences. Paying attention to 
variation in conflict experience, in turn, is relevant as it is this experience which shapes the 
mobilization trajectories of different groups of militants. Moreover, being aware of variations 
in activist experiences not only allows scholars to explain why activists follow different 
militant trajectories; it also improves our understanding of meso- and macro-level dynamics 
of armed conflicts. By singling out the mechanisms which underpin existing meso- and 
macro-level theories and frameworks, such as the micro-foundations of collaboration in rebel 
controlled territories or the micro-mechanisms than sustain support relations between armed 
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groups and their supportive communities, a micro level analysis can complement or challenge 
existing approaches.   
In addition to understanding variation in activist experience, a focus on micro-level processes 
allows scholars to investigate how different factors are most relevant in shaping mobilization 
across time and space as well as how different factors interact to generate particular 
mobilization outcomes. It thus allows for a dynamic understanding of mobilization 
trajectories which are shaped by conflict developments and in their turn influence how the 
conflict evolves. It would be empirically untenable to assume that militants who mobilized at 
the very beginning of the Sri Lankan civil war, when the LTTE was a small guerrilla 
organization, followed the same trajectory than those who mobilized once the LTTE 
controlled large territory and acted as a de-facto state. Moreover, a focus on the micro-level 
not only allows for a dynamic but also for a multi-dimensional understanding of mobilization. 
This means above all that mobilization is not understood as resulting from individual 
motivations alone but as embedded in group dynamics and socio-political contexts which are 
crucial to explain the different trajectories militants follow. Any attempt to understand my 
respondents’ motivations to engage in violence without paying attention to the LTTE as a 
mobilizing network and the everyday context they were embedded in would be sketchy as 
motivations emerged and became salient within this particular context.   
While it is true that the LTTE may be a special case in terms of the size of territory they 
controlled as well as the sophistication of their governance structures they established, and 
one could thus conclude that the analytical framework proposed in this dissertation has little 
relevance to explain micro-mobilization dynamics in other civil war contexts. However, a 
more detailed look at other cases of civil war dynamics shows that a range of conflicts in 
countries as diverse as Colombia (Arjona 2016; Metelits 2009), Indonesia (Barter 2014), the 
Philippines (Alpaslan and Podder 2012; McKenna 1998), Mozambique (Lubkemann 2005), 
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Sudan (Mampilly 2011), Greece (Kalyvas 2006) and Turkey (Metelits 2009) – to name just a 
few – have all witnessed considerable variation in territorial control, level and type of 
repression and/or the construction of elaborate structures of rebel governance. As the 
framework proposed in this dissertation puts particular weight on variation in these 
dimensions as explanatory factors for variation in mobilization trajectories, I would suggest 
that the mentioned civil wars which display variation in the organization of the armed groups 
network, as well as in levels of rebel control and repression, constitute particularly promising 
cases where the developed framework could be used to analyse variation in micro-
mobilization dynamics. For example, during the civil war in the Philippines forms and types 
of civilian-rebel interaction as well as recruitment patterns varied considerably over time as 
well as across space as a result of variation in territorial control, level of repression and the 
organizational structure and governance provision of the government as well as armed group 
networks (Alpaslan and Podder 2012; Podder 2012; McKenna 1998). Similarly, Arjona 
(2016) shows in detail how the degree and form of rebel governance established by armed 
groups during the Colombian Civil War varied considerably in time and across space and how 
these variation leads to differences in civilian-non-combatant interactions as well as to 
differences in recruitment patterns. While focusing more on micro-mobilization dynamics of 
civilians during the Indonesian civil war, Barter (2014) equally shows that the strategies 
adopted by civilians varied considerably as a result of variation in territorial control, 
behaviour of rebel groups and level of repression experienced. Finally, Kubota (2013) has 
shown that participation pathways combatants followed to join armed groups during two 
Cambodian Civil Wars differ in rebel controlled zones as compared to government 
strongholds. Applying the proposed framework to these conflicts could further improve our 
understanding of variation in micro-mobilization patterns as well as provide an important 
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“test” and potential adjustment to the dimensions suggested as most relevant to explain 
variation in mobilization dynamics in this dissertation.   
This brings me to the second general improvement a dynamic and multi-dimensional analysis 
of micro-mobilization processes can bring to the civil war literature: it highlights the 
emergent character of individual motivations for collective action. Contrary to most studies 
on mobilization, I tried to explore and understand when – through what kind of interactions – 
and how – through what kind of mechanisms – motives for collective action emerged, were 
sustained and/or transformed. Focusing on motivations as emergent categories forces scholars 
to treat identity, ideology, interests and emotions as processes rather than as constant and 
invariant properties. This is important for three, interrelated reasons. First, it shows that 
motivations for collective action are mostly the result of violent conflicts rather than 
exogenous to them. If we therefore want to understand when and how (ethnic) identity – to 
take the example of one of the most discussed motivational factors in conflict studies – 
matters for mobilization, we have to analyse ethnic identification as a process which is shaped 
by ongoing conflict dynamics. Second, taking the relational context within which 
identification dynamics are embedded forces scholars to analyse when – in which settings – 
identity becomes a relevant category to understand mobilization while in other contexts 
(potentially within the same conflict) ethnic identification has limited or no explanatory value, 
and it is another motivation, such as instrumentality, which is most consequential. In other 
words, the relevance of identity, ideas, interests and emotions as motivators for collective 
action varies across time and space (this again points to the need to analyse militants as a 
heterogeneous rather than a homogenous group) and scholars would thus benefit from 
exploring in more details the actors and interactions that foster the salience of one particular 
motivation in a specific socio-political context. Moreover, it would be misleading to assume 
that once people begin to interpret a conflict in ethnic terms or they start to perceive a conflict 
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as one between an oppressive majority and oppressed minority, that is to say identity or ideas 
become salient, mobilization would result automatically. The empirical evidence presented 
here shows that it is rather the combination of motives with networks and enabling factors, 
such as ethnic identification combined with emotional pressure exerted by armed group 
networks in rebel controlled territories, which pushes individuals to make the second step 
from support to collective action. Moreover, in most cases motivations emerge from 
interactions between activists and people from local networks they were embedded in or 
spatially close to, such as between recruiters and potential activists or between activists 
themselves. The salience of motives thus depends not only on contextual factors but is 
constructed within interactions. We thus have to understand mobilization processes as the 
result of interactive patterns within specific local contexts. Third, if we want to understand 
how identity, ideology or emotions become salient through interactions, we need to look at 
the mechanisms that promote an understanding of conflicts in ethnic or ideological terms 
and/or evoke specific emotions. As King (2004: 435) stresses with regard to identity: 
“constructivism is intuitively right that social identities can be shaped, but it rarely offers an 
account of why identities take the shape they do (and why this fact should even matter in 
explaining mobilization and violence)” (for a similar criticism of constructivist approaches 
see Fearon and Laitin 2000: 850). The empirical chapters have pointed to several mechanisms 
which proved relevant in this regard, such as most importantly polarization, military 
socialization, emboldening emotions and empowerment. Moreover, the empirical evidence 
showed that, often, these mechanisms become relevant in specific socio-political settings. For 
example, for military socialization to be effective, armed groups need intimate access to 
young people`s everyday lives; this mechanism is therefore most likely to be widespread in 
rebel controlled areas. Finally, the mechanism through which identities and ideologies are 
constructed might also have implication on how “sticky” they get. For example, socialization 
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is more likely to lead to the internalization of beliefs or identities than the instrumental 
adaptation of an identity in order to get protection or material benefits.  
Taken together, a focus on when and how individual motives for collective violence emerge, 
are sustained or transformed can improve scholarly understanding of where and in what way 
specific motives are most likely to become relevant for mobilization and how they shape 
violent collective action.  
For scholars of political violence, the empirical material presented in this dissertation 
contributes to the emergent strand of works which use the analytical concept of pathways or 
trajectories to analyse and understand micro-mobilization processes during episodes of 
violence. It, however, extends existing approaches by, first, pointing to dimensions which 
have been neglected or unexplored in existing works. Several of the empirical chapters have 
demonstrated that variation in the everyday life contexts of activist and civilians is 
consequential in shaping their conflict experiences, thereby leading to different paths to 
militancy, disengagement trajectories and support relation to the LTTE across space. 
Analysing the different “localities” where activists mobilize in more detail is particularly 
relevant for scholars working on political violence as violence has a strong transformative 
capacity that changes existing networks, organizations and institutions and creates new ones, 
thereby altering the micro-mobilization context of activists. Further work could thus benefit 
from analysing empirically and analytically how different micro-mobilization contexts can be 
distinguished and how they shape mobilization trajectories.  
Moreover, while we have several works that explore variation in pathways to militancy, there 
are very few studies that analyse the different trajectories individuals follow when returning 
to civilian lives or that try to empirically analyse variation in support relations between armed 
groups and civilians over time or across space. This dissertation thus extends existing studies 
by analysing not only variation in pathways to militancy but to understand and explain 
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differences in how armed campaigns are perceived by civilians and in how militants 
experience their return to civilian lives. In doing so, the empirical evidence presented 
highlights factors that shape disengagement trajectories and support relation, which have been 
under-explored in existing works, such as ability, locality, the institutionalization of violence 
or desensitization, and which could provide avenues for further exploration.  
Finally, the empirical evidence presented points to emotions – a factor which has rarely been 
analysed systematically – as a relevant mechanism to explain recruitment dynamics as well as 
to understand participation, retention and support for armed groups (see the more detailed 
discussion below).  
Scholars of the Sri Lankan civil war will find in this dissertation a novel perspective on the 
conflict which has been analysed mainly on the meso- and macro level. Existing studies 
provide relevant and interesting insights into why the civil war started (De Votta 2004; 
Kaufman 2006), the state structures established by the LTTE (Mampilly 2011; Stokke 2006), 
the tactics used by conflict actors (Wickremesekera 2016), the different rounds of peace 
negotiations (Höglund 2005; Lilja 2011) and post-war developments (Subedi and 
Bulathsinghala 2018; Thiranagama 2015). However, there are relatively few works on the 
experiences of those men and women who participated in the armed struggle and those 
civilians who lived in the war zones during the conflict. The grassroots voices captured and 
micro-mobilization processes analysed here thus provide a picture of life in the LTTE and the 
war zone as experienced by the men and women who lived it. Their experiences bring to life 
why they joined the armed group, their experiences within and with the movement and their 
pathways back to civilian lives. Taken together, the micro-level mobilization patterns 
analysed in this dissertation complement existing accounts of the Sri Lankan civil war by 
documenting and exploring how meso- and macro-level dynamics of the conflict, such as the 
well analysed rebel state established by the LTTE or the repressive post-war contexts, 
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structure experiences on the grass root level and, at the same time, are shaped by those who 
participated in the conflict.  
In addition to these reflections on how a dynamic and multi-dimensional perspective can 
enhance our understanding of violent collective action, I would like to conclude by pointing 
to some dimensions which emerged as relevant for mobilization from my research but which 
have been neglected in the literature, thereby situating my findings in the broader literature on 
(violent) collective action and identifying potential avenues for further research.  
10.1 Mobilization and Emotions 
While emotions have been rediscovered as relevant to explain non-violent collective action as 
well as to understand human behaviour in general, the role emotions play during armed 
conflicts has been widely neglected in the literature. Most studies focus on either 
instrumentality, identity or ideology to explain why individuals engage in collective violence. 
While my findings don’t dismiss the relevance of these factors, they point to emotions as an 
additional dimension that needs to be taken seriously for understanding the micro-foundations 
of armed conflicts. Similar to Varshney`s (2003) argument that instrumentality needs to be 
extended to include norms and values – what Max Weber calls value rationality –, I would 
argue that scholars need to include emotions into their analysis of how people form their 
preference and make decisions. Contrary to the long-hold belief that emotions are opposite to 
rationality, scholars nowadays agree that emotions and rationality are intertwined and that it is 
their combination that forms the basis of human belief formations and behaviour (Moors, 
Ellsworth, Scherer et al. 2013). Moreover, scholars working on the relevance of emotions for 
understanding social dynamics have recently begun to systematically link discrete emotions, 
such as anger or shame, to specific processes of belief formation and action tendencies. These 
developments are relevant for the analysis of violent collective action as they allow scholars 
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to more systematically integrate emotions into their frameworks and link them to cognitive 
and behavioural mechanisms that promote mobilization (Petersen 2011; van Troost, van 
Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2013). This dissertation aimed to do a first step into this 
direction by pointing to the relevance of emotions in propaganda campaigns employed by 
violent entrepreneurs to mobilize support and recruit fighters. By looking at how particular 
narratives used by armed groups are linked to specific emotions and mechanisms that promote 
mobilization, I tried to more systematically integrate emotions into the analysis of 
recruitment. However, while this dissertation focused on recruitment in particular there is 
ample evidence that emotions are not only relevant in recruitment campaigns but for the 
analysis of civil wars in general. As Horowitz (1985: 140) has noted in his classic Ethnic 
Groups in Conflict: “The sheer passion expended in pursuing ethnic conflict calls out for an 
explanation that does justice to the realms of feelings”. Today, however, we still know little 
about what kind of emotions matter to explain mobilization nor how precisely – through what 
kind of mechanisms – they shape violent collective action. This is problematic as several 
works suggest that emotions are as or even more consequential in shaping action than are 
cognitive processes (Jaspers 2011; Petersen 2011; van Zomeren 2013). Focusing on emotions 
could thus help scholars to better understand why some people make the second step and 
engage in violence while others don’t, why sometimes support relation between armed groups 
and their constituencies are very persistent over time despite the increasing ruthlessness of the 
group (sometimes against their own constituency) or why militants continue fighting although 
chances of victory are extremely low.  
10.2 Mobilization and Networks 
As Passy (2003) has pointed out almost two decades ago, there is a broad consensus among 
scholars that networks matter for collective action. At the same time, however, we know 
much less about how they matter. This finding is still true for mobilization during civil wars. 
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While several scholars have shown that networks matter to explain why individuals 
participate in mobilization, far less attention has been paid to how exactly ties matter (Bosi 
and Della Porta 2012; Malthaner 2018; Viterna 2013). I would argue that a micro-
mobilization perspective can be particularly helpful to extend our understanding of what type 
of networks matter and how – trough what kind of mechanisms – they shape mobilization. 
While exploring the impact of networks wasn’t the explicit focus of one of my empirical 
chapters, the evidence presented in most chapters points to the armed group network as 
particularly relevant in influencing mobilization dynamics. While this might seem quite 
evident, the literature has paid surprisingly little attention to how mobilization at different 
stages of an activist`s career is shaped by the armed group as a mobilization network.67 This is 
at least partly due to the fact that scholars tend to conceptualize mobilization as a process 
involving only the motives of the individual while neglecting the agency of the armed group 
(Eck 2014; Guichaoua 2011). Such a one-sided focus, however, is problematic as the analysis 
of mobilization paths of LTTE militants has shown. The LTTE as recruitment networks was 
consequential in shaping activists` paths at most stages of their militant careers as well as in 
influencing civilian perceptions of the conflict. Scholars would thus benefit from analysing 
mobilization processes as the result of an interactive process, involving the agency of 
individuals and the armed group. While I don’t mean to imply that the armed group is the 
only network relevant for understanding mobilization, I would posit that compared to the 
initial phase of a conflict (on which most studies on network effects on collective violence are 
focused); at a later phase the influence of armed groups on local conflict dynamics increases 
considerably, particularly in conflicts where one group establishes itself as the dominant 
representative of a community and exerts tight control over members of the community. As 
Wood (2008) has pointed out, conflict dynamics lead to the transformation of existing 
                                                 
67 For works explicitely including the agency of armed groups see Eck 2014; Bosi and Della Porta 2012; Viterna 2015. 
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networks and, as I would add, to the creation of new ones; we, however, know little how these 
transformations affect conflict dynamics. With regard to the study of mobilization, one 
interesting avenue for research in this regard could be to explore systematically if and how 
changes in recruitment strategies employed by armed groups lead to variation in mobilization 
paths in time as well as across space (see below). Moreover, armed groups often transform 
existing network or they create new ones which are tightly connected to the group and their 
goals. As the empirical analysis has shown, the LTTE penetrated schools and especially 
tuition classes and transformed them in “insurgent schools”, where youngsters were exposed 
to different forms of military socialization and indoctrination (Isaac, Coley, Cornfield et al. 
2016). Exploring how these armed group-affiliated networks function in transforming 
individuals` understanding of the conflict and their role in it could improve scholarly 
understanding not only of what type of networks matter but also of how precisely networks 
shape collective action, that is to say to single out the mechanisms through which they 
facilitate mobilization (Passy 2003). My findings point to the importance of military 
socialization as crucial in shaping individuals` decision to join armed groups as well as to 
continue fighting. We, however, would need more detailed studies of different types of 
socialization practices, such as military training, political education and propaganda 
campaigns employed by armed groups, and a better understanding of how they transform 
people`s beliefs, interpretations and self-understanding.  
Taken together, a close focus on armed group networks and the way they shape mobilization 
could help scholars to explore how the impact of networks changes over time and across 
space as well as how – through what kind of mechanisms – they matter.  
10.3 Mobilization and Territory  
Territory and control has gained some prominence in recent approaches to civil wars. 
Scholars increasingly agree that territories are more than a mere container within which 
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violence occurs but a relevant dimension that structures conflict dynamics and is, at the same 
time, structured by them. The empirical evidence presented in this dissertation builds on this 
development in the literature on collective action and has demonstrated that the local socio-
political setting is consequential in shaping participation and reintegration paths of militants 
as well as civilian perceptions of violence. Moreover, my findings point to potential avenues 
of research which could further illuminate our understanding of the territorial dimension of 
violent collective action. First, the empirical evidence presented suggests that, depending on 
the socio-political context, armed groups face different constrains and opportunities with 
regard to the recruitment strategies they are able to employ. For example, once armed groups 
control territory and succeed in guaranteeing a certain stability in their area, they are likely to 
face new challenges as well as options with regard to the recruitment of new fighters. On the 
one hand, the increase in security and stability within the rebel controlled areas might lead to 
a decrease in the numbers of volunteers as individuals are less exposed to government 
repression which is surely one central factor that – via different mechanisms – pushes people 
to join an armed group (Kalyvas and Kocher 2007). At the same time, however, territorial 
control enables armed groups to employ recruitment strategies, such as socialization, 
surveillance or the provision of public goods, for which knowledge about and access to 
people`s personal lives is crucial. While these reflections are only suggestive and would have 
to be investigated further, they do point to the relevance to explore more systematically if and 
how the constrains and opportunities armed groups face with regard to recruitment differ 
depending on the socio-political context and how these differences lead to variation in 
recruitment strategies across space.  
Second, paying closer attention to local conflict dynamics and particularly the everyday 
context individuals live in is particularly promising to better understand how civilians make 
conflict relevant decisions on the ground. The emerging literature on rebel governance has 
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made important steps to conceptualize and empirically explore the different political orders 
which might exist next to each other. However, many works on rebel governance focus 
somehow narrowly on the different forms of services provided to civilians while neglecting 
other aspects of local political orders that might shape individual mobilization paths. As 
Arjona (2017) and others have stressed, territorial control not only allows armed groups to 
control the use of violence and take over service provision from the state but provides rebels 
with the opportunity to shape people’s beliefs and preferences. In other words, territorial 
control allows armed groups to – at least to a certain degree – monopolize the use of symbolic 
force. This includes the power to name, to identify, to categorize, to state what is what and 
who is who (Bourdieu 1994). Looking at the symbolic processes through which armed groups 
try to shape interpretations and processes of identification is crucial to understand how armed 
group use territoriality to shape people`s interpretations of the conflict as well as the way they 
understand their own role in it. Moreover, another difficulty with some works on rebel 
governance is that they focus exclusively on areas controlled by rebels. However, in order to 
better capture micro-mobilization processes, we need to explore other relational settings, such 
as refugee camps, diaspora communities internal and external to the conflict affected country, 
among others, and the way they shape mobilization. In sum, paying closer attention to the 
different micro-mobilization areas within which individuals are embedded could provide the 
micro foundation for different theories on mobilization during armed conflicts and show that, 
depending on the socio-political context, different theories are most consequential to explain 
collective action.  
10.4 Mobilization and Repression  
That repression matters for mobilization is a well-established finding in the literature on 
mobilization. There is, however, no consensus when and how repression produces 
mobilization and when it inhibits collective action. I would argue that a micro-level approach 
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can help to clarify the repression-mobilization nexus in two crucial ways. First, a micro-level 
perspective focuses on how repression is perceived by individuals and it is this perception 
which finally shapes mobilization decisions. This, first of all, means that scholars have to pay 
closer attention to the socio-political context individuals are embedded in and how this 
context shapes their perception of repressive acts. Many conceptual and empirical studies as 
well as my own empirical work point to the relevance of boundary making dynamics and 
group identification and how these processes shape perceptions of conflict actors and their 
actions. Research on mobilization and repression could benefit from applying these findings 
on in and out-group biases more systematically to explore how repression exerted by different 
actors is perceived depending on group-identification and how this might shape decisions on 
(de-)mobilization. Moreover, recent studies have shown that different types of violence are 
more or less likely to result in mobilization. There is an emerging consensus that 
indiscriminate violence produces mobilization while selective violence leads to collaboration. 
The empirical evidence presented here tends to confirm this finding. It, however, adds some 
nuances which might be relevant to understand mobilization. First, my findings suggest that 
indiscriminate violence by the out-group tends to promote support for the in-group; the 
opposite direction, however, is less clear as it is mediated by in-group-bias. We would thus 
need more detailed works on when and how indiscriminate violence exerted by the armed 
group people identify with results in decreasing support and when indiscriminate measures 
against in-group members are perceived as necessary and therefore acceptable. Second, the 
evidence presented in this dissertation points to some rather under-explored mechanisms 
which affect the evaluation of (indiscriminate) violence and would therefore be worth further 
exploration, such as the degree of dependency of communities on the armed group as their 
representative, the degree of institutionalization of violence and processes of desensitization. 
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Second, a micro-mobilization perspective could be promising to better understand how 
repression might not only shape the mobilization trajectories of those directly affected by it 
but also influence collective action through the way repression is used in narratives employed 
by armed groups. Those of my respondents who have lived in LTTE controlled territory were 
mainly exposed to government repression as narrated by the LTTE or as displayed in LTTE 
produced videos and movies. It is thus the framed perception of violence which mattered for 
their decision to participate. This, in turn, suggest that’s scholars should pay closer attention 
to how armed groups strategically frame repression in order to provoke particular 
mobilization outcomes. The evidence presented in this dissertation illustrated that frames 
proofed particularly effective via emotions, that is to say by evoking resentment and anger, 
which then shaped participation, support and retention. Connecting frames of repression and 
emotions could thus be a promising avenue for further research for scholars interested in 




11 The Sri Lankan Civil War – A Chronology of Key Events  
Period of Colonialization  
1505 - Beginning of Portuguese influence over the island.  
1658 - Dutch take over control over whole island (except central kingdom of Kandy).  
1796 - Britain takes over island.  
1815 - Britain starts bringing in Tamil laborers from southern India to work in tea, coffee and 
coconut plantations.  
1833 - Whole island united under one British administration.  
1931 - British grant the right to vote and introduce power sharing with Sinhalese-run cabinet.  
1948 - Ceylon gains full independence.  
 
Sinhala Nationalism and Increasing Polarization 
1956 - Solomon Bandaranaike elected on a Sinhala only platform. Sinhala made sole official 
language and other measures introduced to bolster Sinhalese and Buddhist nationalist 
sentiments.  
1958 - Anti-Tamil riots leave more than 200 people dead. Thousands of Tamils displaced.  
1959 - Prime Minister Bandaranaike assassinated by a Buddhist monk. Succeeded by widow, 
Srimavo, who continues to implement Sinhala nationalist policies.  
1972 - Ceylon becomes a republic and changes its name to Sri Lanka. Buddhism is given 
primary place as the country's religion. 
1976 - Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) formed as one of several militant groups as 
tensions increase in Tamil-dominated areas of north and east.  
1977 - Separatist Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) party wins all seats in Tamil areas. 
Anti-Tamil riots leave more than 100 dead. 
 
Escalation and Intensification of the Sri Lankan Civil War  
1983 - 13 soldiers killed in LTTE ambush, sparking anti-Tamil riots leading to the deaths of 
several hundred Tamils. Membership in Tamil militant groups explodes, marking the 
beginning of the Sri Lankan Civil War.  
1985 - First attempt at peace talks between government and LTTE fails.  
1987 - Government forces push LTTE back into northern city of Jaffna. Government signs 
accords creating new councils for Tamil areas in north and east and reaches agreement with 
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India on deployment of Indian peace-keeping force. LTTE refuses to disarm and begin three 
years of fighting that kills 1,000 Indian soldiers.  
1990 - India withdraws. LTTE controls northern city of Jaffna. Violence between Sri Lankan 
army and the LTTE escalates again.   
1990 - Thousands of Muslims are expelled from northern areas by the LTTE.  
Civil war and peace negotiations  
1993 - President Premadasa killed in LTTE bomb attack.  
1994 - President Chandrika Kumaratunga comes to power pledging to end war. Peace talks 
opened with LTTE.  
1995-2001 - War restarts across north and east. Tigers bomb Sri Lanka's holiest Buddhist site. 
President Kumaratunga is wounded in a bomb attack. Suicide attack on the international 
airport destroys half the Sri Lankan Airlines fleet.  
2002 - Government and LTTE sign a Norwegian-mediated ceasefire. De-commissioning of 
weapons begins; the road linking the Jaffna peninsula with the rest of Sri Lanka reopens after 
12 years; passenger flights to Jaffna resume. Government lifts ban on Tamil Tigers. Rebels 
drop demand for separate state.  
2003 - LTTE pulls out of talks. Ceasefire holds.  
2004 The LTTE eastern commander, known as Karuna, leads split in rebel movement and 
goes underground with his supporters. Violence between the two factions escalates and forces 
Karuna to collaborate with the government. LTTE regains control in the East.   
2004 - More than 30,000 people are killed when a tsunami, massive waves generated by a 
powerful undersea earthquake, devastate coastal communities.  
2005 - State of emergency after foreign minister is killed by a suspected Tiger assassin.  
2005 - Mahinda Rajapaksa, prime minister at the time, wins presidential elections promising 
an all-out war to defeat the LTTE. Most Tamils in areas controlled by the Tamil Tigers do not 
vote.  
 
Defeat of the LTTE 
2006 - LTTE and government forces resume fighting in the north-east in worst clashes since 
2002 ceasefire. Government steadily drives Tamil Tigers out of eastern strongholds over 
following year.  
2008 - Government pulls out of 2002 ceasefire agreement, launches massive offensive.  
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2009 - Government troops capture the northern town of Kilinochchi, held for ten years by the 
Tamil Tigers as their administrative headquarters. President Mahinda Rajapakse calls it an 
unparalleled victory and urges the rebels to surrender.  
2009 Government declares Tamil Tigers defeated after army forces overrun last patch of 
rebel-held territory in the northeast. Military says rebel leader Velupillai Prabhakaran was 
killed in the fighting. Tamil Tiger statement says the group will lay down its arms. 
 
Post-civil War Developments  
2010 President Mahinda Rajapaksa re-elected by a large margin.  
2012 March - UN Human Rights Council adopts a resolution urging Sri Lanka to investigate 
war crimes allegedly committed during the final phase of the decades-long conflict. Sri 
Lankan government declares resolution as usurping its sovereignty. 
2013 - Tamil National Alliance opposition party wins first elections to semi-autonomous 
provincial council in the north, with 78% of the vote. Commonwealth observers say army 
intimidation compromised the vote's environment. 
2015 January - Maithripala Sirisena defeats Mahinda Rajapaksa in presidential election, 
pledging accountability over alleged atrocities during the civil war. 
2015 September - Rajavarothiam Sampanthan becomes the first lawmaker from the ethnic 
Tamil minority in 32 years to lead the opposition in parliament. 
2016 - Government acknowledges for the first time that some 65,000 people are missing from 




12 Overview Interviews Conducted  
I. Life history interviews with former members of the LTTE 
Interview 
code 




Date and location of interview  
1 Male  1989 Jaffna  Schaffhausen, 16 December, 
2017  
2 Male 1992 Mullaitivu Zurich, 5 January, 2018 
3 Male 1997 Mullaitivu Mullaitivu, 26 May, 2018 
4 Male 1996 Mullaitivu Mullaitivu, 29 May, 2018 
5 Female 2003 Mullaitivu Mullaitivu, 29 May, 2018 
6 Male  1995 Mullaitivu Mullaitivu, 30 May, 2018 
7 Female  1998 Mullaitivu Mullaitivu, 30 May, 2018 
8 Female 1997 Mullaitivu Mullaitivu, 1 June, 2018 
9 Female 2002 Mullaitivu Mullaitivu, 1 June, 2018 
10 Male  2003 Mullaitivu Mullaitivu, 2 June, 2018 
11 Male  2002 Mullaitivu Mullaitivu, 2 June, 2018 
12 Male 1989 Batticaloa Batticaloa, 15 June, 2018 
13 Male 1990 Batticaloa Batticaloa, 15 June, 2018 
14 Female  1991 Batticaloa Batticaloa, 15 June, 2018 
15 Female 1997 Batticaloa Batticaloa, 16 June, 2018 
16 Female 1992 Batticaloa Batticaloa, 16 June, 2018 
17 Female 2003 Batticaloa Batticaloa, 17 June, 2018 
18 Female 2002 Batticaloa Batticaloa, 17 June, 2018 
19 Female 1989 Batticaloa Batticaloa, 18 June, 2018 
20 Male 1993 Batticaloa Batticaloa, 18 June, 2018 
21 Male 1998 Batticaloa Batticaloa, 20 June, 2018 
22 Female 2001 Batticaloa Batticaloa, 21 June, 2018 
23 Male  2002 Batticaloa Batticaloa, 22 June, 2018 
24 Male 2000 Batticaloa Batticaloa, 24 June, 2018 
25 Female 1989 Batticaloa Batticaloa, 24 June, 2018 
26 Female 1994 Batticaloa Batticaloa, 25 June, 2018 
27 Female 1991 Batticaloa Batticaloa, 25 June, 2018 
28 Male 1998 Mullaitivu Jaffna, 30 June, 2018 
29 Female 1990 Jaffna Jaffna, 9 July, 2018 
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30 Male 1991 Jaffna Jaffna, 10 July, 2018 
31 Male 1994 Colombo London, 29 January, 2019 
32 Male 1993 Colombo London, 28 January, 2019 
 
 
II. Life history interviews with civilians 
Interview 
code 
Gender  District of residence 
during the Civil War  
Date and location of interview  
C 1 Male Mullaitivu Kilinochchi, 23 May, 2018 
C 2  Male Mullaitivu Kilinochchi, 24 May, 2018 
C 3  Female Mullaitivu Mullaitivu, 27 May, 2018 
C 4 Female Mullaitivu Mullaitivu, 27 May, 2018 
C 5 Female Mullaitivu Mullaitivu, 5 June, 2018 
C 6 Male Mullaitivu Mullaitivu, 6 June, 2018 
C 7 Male Batticaloa Batticaloa, 21 June, 2018 
C 8 Female Batticaloa Batticaloa, 21 June, 2018 
C 9 Female Batticaloa Batticaloa, 22 June, 2018 
C 10 Male Batticaloa Batticaloa, 23 June, 2018 
C 11 Male Batticaloa Batticaloa, 26 June, 2018 
C 12  Female  Batticaloa Batticaloa, 26 June, 2018 
C 13 Male Batticaloa Batticaloa, 27 June, 2018 
C 14 Male Mullaitivu Kilinochchi, 10 July, 2018 
C 15 Female Mullaitivu Kilinochchi, 10 July, 2018 
 
 
III. Expert interviews 
Professional Occupation Date and Location of Interview 
Religious leader (priest) Mullaitivu, 25 May, 2018  
Political Activist Mallaitivu, 26 May, 2018 
Social Worker  Mullaitivu 28 May, 2018  
Researcher Jaffna, 28 May, 2018 
Former school director Mullaitivu, 1 June, 2018 
Political activist Jaffna, 4 June, 2018 
Researcher Jaffna, 4 June, 2018 
Religious leader (priest) Jaffna, 8 June, 2018 
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Journalist Jaffna, 11 June, 2018 
Religious leader (priest)  Batticaloa, 23 June, 2018 
Leader Muslim community Batticaloa, 27 June, 2018 
Political activist  Batticaloa, 27 June, 2018 
Social worker Jaffna, 8 July, 2018 
Researcher  London, 26 January 2019 
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